


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Ladies whose names appear or have appeared in the official lists as serving or having served as officers in any of the three Services are eligible as above.

Naval, military, and air force cadets at the Service colleges are eligible on the recommendation of their commanding officers.

Officers' messes are not eligible for membership, but may subscribe to the JOURNAL.

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The JOURNAL is published in February, May, August, and November. Copies may be purchased by non-members, price 10s. od. each (10s. 6d. by post), or £2 yearly (£2 2s. od. by post). Orders should be sent to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

## MUSEUM

The R.U.S. Museum is open daily from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., except on Sundays, Christmas Day, and Good Friday. Members may obtain free passes for their friends on application to the Secretary.

Members of the Services in uniform are admitted free.

## SECRETARY'S NOTES

### COUNCIL

November, 1959

#### Vice-President

The Council received with regret the decision of Admiral of the Fleet The Earl of Cork and Orrery that the time had come for him to relinquish his Vice-Presidency of the Institution.

#### Representative Member

Captain M. G. Greig, D.S.C., R.N., has succeeded Captain M. J. Ross, D.S.C., R.N., as Admiralty Representative Member on taking up the appointment of Director of Seamen's and General Naval Training.

### INCREASE OF SUBSCRIPTIONS

Full details of the increased rates of subscriptions that will become effective on 1st January, 1960, have been sent to all non-covenanting annual members. It is urgently requested that those who have not yet replied will do so as quickly as possible whatever their answer may be.

### NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 10th July and 9th October, 1959:—

#### NAVY

Mr. E. J. Winstanley, R.N.V.R.  
Commander J. B. Paterson, D.S.C., R.N.  
Lieut.-Commander I. A. Wright, R.N.  
Lieut.-Commander T. G. Ridgeway, R.N.

#### ARMY

\*Major H. W. L. Browne, Royal Engineers.  
Major A. P. Baker, Royal Corps of Signals.  
Major D. J. Wood, 1st Green Jackets (43rd and 52nd).  
Major J. A. H. Luard, Coldstream Guards.  
Major C. W. Ikin, Royal Regiment of Artillery, T.A.  
Captain N. B. Knocke, The Royal Sussex Regiment.  
Captain D. E. Miller, The Border Regiment.  
Captain N. A. Shackleton, Canadian Army.  
\*Major G. C. Bartram, The Durham Light Infantry, T.A.  
\*Major H. R. Daniel, The Barbados Regiment (Reserve).  
Captain R. W. Thompson, Intelligence Corps.  
Lieutenant T. Davies, R.E.M.E.  
\*Lieut.-Colonel P. H. Hordern, D.S.O., O.B.E., Royal Tank Regiment.  
2/Lieutenant C. D. L. Clark, Royal Horse Artillery.

#### AIR FORCE

Squadron Leader A. J. Spence, M.B.E., R.A.F.  
Group Captain D. H. Burnside, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F.  
Wing Commander G. J. South, D.S.O., D.F.C., R.A.F.  
Flying Officer P. Davies, R.A.F. Reserve of Officers.

\* Life member

**PRIZE MEMBERSHIP**

2/Lieutenant R. W. S. Hall, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Pilot Officer R. J. Wilson, R.A.F., and Pilot Officer J. F. Volkers, R.A.F., have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

**LIAISON OFFICERS**

The following alterations to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place :—

<i>Establishment or Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
Portsmouth	Lieut.-Commander V. Harcourt-Smith, R.N.
H.M.S. <i>Dryad</i>	Lieut.-Commander C. H. Griffiths, R.N.
B.A.O.R.	Lieut.-Colonel P. R. H. Turner.
Royal Air Force, Middle East	Group Captain A. D. Jackson.
H.Q., British Forces, Arabian Peninsula	Squadron Leader E. D. Mackay.

**LECTURES**

The programme of lectures arranged for the second part of the current session is circulated with this issue of the JOURNAL.

**CHRISTMAS CARDS**

Orders for Christmas cards, specially designed for members of the Institution, can still be accepted.

Card A has the crest of the Institution on the outside, and inside a reproduction of a black and white sketch of Vanbrugh House in Whitehall Yard, the first home of the Institution. The price, including envelopes, is 12s. a dozen.

Card B is a reproduction in colour of an oil painting showing a view of the Tagus and Belem Castle with the Russian Fleet saluting the British Admiral's barge, c. 1808; inside is the crest of the Institution. The price, including envelopes, is 20s. a dozen.

Postage and packing is 1s. for the first dozen and 6d. for each additional dozen by ordinary mail.

Members are requested to ensure that the correct remittance, including postage, is sent with their orders. *Orders cannot be executed until payment is made.*

Sample cards can only be sent against a remittance of 1s. 2d. for the A type and 1s. 10d. for the B.

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BOYS' COMPANY OF THE TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS, 1959

# THE JOURNAL

of the

## Royal United Service Institution

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Vol. CIV

NOVEMBER, 1959

No. 616

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### EDITOR'S NOTES

**A**T the moment of writing a Russian rocket has just circled the moon and is on its way, in a vast circling movement, back to the vicinity of the earth. This latest example followed quickly on a former Russian rocket which was aimed at, and hit, the moon.

Space travel, for so long the dream of its devotees and the butt of the world's humorists, must now be seen not only as a possibility or even a probability but as an eventuality which will occur in the reasonably near future. The Russian achievements can leave us in no doubt about that. But it is not so much the fact of space travel as the implications that can be drawn from it which are of most interest today. They would seem to fall into two distinct spheres.

The first is the effect it is likely to have in the world today. However much we might wish it otherwise, Russia has led the way in this exciting new adventure. Even if other countries should now successfully achieve a moon shot, they will only be following in Russia's footsteps, and the glory will be by that much diminished. In the eyes of the uncommitted countries, Russian rocketry is now pre-eminent and there will certainly be, as a result, a strong temptation on the part of many of these countries to clamber aboard the Russian bandwagon. It does not matter much that space rocketry is not all that closely allied to rocketry designed for terrestrial war; in the eyes of less perceptive students of this new art the smaller is swallowed up by the larger.

Generally speaking, the United States was thought to be at least as far ahead in military rocketry as the Soviet Union, though well astern of station in respect of space rocketry. This may not now be the case, the two Soviet lunar rockets indicating the use of a remarkably sophisticated long-range guidance system that appears to be far ahead of any yet developed in America. They indicate also the technical solution of the difficulties always associated with the first stage of multi-stage rockets. Yet these, though massive technological achievements, are not of such vital importance in the purely military sphere. Single stage rockets fulfil most of war's needs in this field, and the huge increase in range of destruction represented in the advance from fission to fusion makes permissible a less degree of accuracy in delivery to achieve the same result.

But be this as it may, the neutral and the uncommitted nations are much more likely to be dazzled by the rocket which circles the moon than by the simpler affair which merely hops an ocean and bursts in the vicinity of a city. We must remember that, in the present stage of the cold war, one of the greatest objectives of both sides is to win the hearts and the minds of the uncommitted countries. So far, East and West have probably broken about even in this respect, both sides having made

A

approximately the same number of stupid mistakes and gestures. The two Russian *luniks* could easily swing the pendulum eastward for the time being.

The other great sphere of interest lies in the effect that the conquest of space will have on the pattern of war as we know it today. This is much more difficult to evaluate without ascending into the realms of fantasy. Yet we do already have some sort of tangible clues. Two years ago a rocket launched in America took a photograph at the top of its trajectory and the developed result showed half a continent on the single plate. It is not difficult to visualize the value in war to any belligerent to have permanently available the means of photographing any part of the entire globe. Another advantage which would accrue would be in long-range signalling. Already the moon has been used to bounce a wireless signal back to earth, but the moon is not always orbitally available. In these days of nuclear submarines of unlimited range, and shortly of nuclear aircraft of equal endurance, a supply of space satellites for long-range signalling purposes would be invaluable. A third advantage could well lie in weather forecasting. If the experts are to be believed, knowledge of the upper layers of the earth's atmosphere would enable long-range weather forecasts of extreme accuracy to be made, another invaluable advantage to any belligerent.

These are just the first and the most obvious advantages which can accrue to the conqueror of space. We do not need to go so far as imagining invasions launched from the moon to think of many others. Manned platforms in space can pose threats at which today's imagination boggles. What we have to realize, and realize quickly, is that we are, in this respect, now dealing with eventualities and no longer with fantasies.

\* \* \*

If current plans mature, France will explode her first atomic bomb in the New Year, possibly towards the end of January or early February. It will be an event of considerable significance, not so much because it will demonstrate France's claim to admission to the nuclear club but because it will indicate that the door is still open and may well act as a spur to other nations to become members. Among them it is possible, and many think probable, that China may be knocking on the door before very long.

As between East and West, a state of nuclear sufficiency already exists today; in other words each side holds enough of these weapons to blow the other to smithereens. Additions to existing stocks, on an alliance basis, are relatively meaningless. It is quite understandable that, for reasons of national pride and prestige, France, China, and the other nations on the point of achieving nuclear capability passionately desire to own their own bombs, though in fact this argues a certain lack of faith in the efficacy of the two major alliances, N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact. However that may be, the facts have got to be faced and the most difficult and unpalatable of them all is that the hitherto exclusiveness of the nuclear club is likely to be shortly a thing of the past.

The danger in this is obvious, and not merely in terms of war. The testing of a French bomb in the Sahara is quite likely to trigger off a new wave of test explosions by the other 'have' Powers, to say nothing of the initial tests of those nations who may soon be expected to pass from the 'have not' to the 'have' stage. First bombs are almost always 'dirty,' and it seems as though we must anticipate a significant increase in the present level of radio-activity in the earth's atmosphere. This is not a particularly reassuring outlook.

Above that, of course, lies the added danger of war. As a deterrent, the possession of the nuclear weapon concentrated in the hands of very few nations has so far proved absolute. But obviously each extension of that possession reduces the power of the weapon as a deterrent until we approach the stage when it becomes no deterrent at all. Whither mankind then?

These are questions which urgently demand both thought and answer. It would be naive to try to lay the blame for this on France, for she is merely following in Britain's footsteps, who in turn followed in those of the United States and Russia. And in any case the roots of the problem lie far deeper than just who does, or does not, own the bomb. They lie far deeper, too, than the wrangling in Geneva about the limitation of tests. But wherever the solution lies it needs to come quickly, before the club becomes so crowded that unanimous agreement is impossible. In this particular connection, two questions can legitimately be asked. How honest was Mr. Khrushchev in his speech to the United Nations putting forward a plan for total disarmament within four years? By honest we mean the degree of inspection he would be prepared to accept. The other question is: What chance is there of the British proposals put forward at the same meeting being accepted? Although much more pedestrian than Mr. Khrushchev's proposition they were at the same time much more realistic. If either of these two questions could receive an affirmative answer, we would at last begin to emerge from the wood.

\* \* \*

In this present issue of the JOURNAL, back again to its normal size after the dispute in the printing industry, we have brought together four articles which we think should provoke thought and discussion. Wing Commander Cameron argues the case for the full rigour of the hydrogen bomb in his article "In Defence of a Deterrent Strategy," while Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard sums up the alternative policy of the graduated deterrent in his paper "Unity in Defence and Disarmament." These mutually antipathetic viewpoints represent, we believe, the opposing facets of most current and informed thought (leaving out the nuclear disarms) on the vexed subject of atomic war, and both cases are forcefully put by their respective authors. On the sidelines of this controversy we have included an article by Lieut.-Colonel Armstrong, of the United States Army, "The British Revalue their Strategic Bases," which illustrates pungently another aspect of the atomic revolution. Are we, as Colonel Armstrong suggests, blinking the fact that the nuclear bomb is a reality? Has it really, and finally, drawn a curtain across all past experience of war? Our fourth article in the group, written by Commander Clarkson, "Suez and Syracuse,"—another article on the sidelines—may have already been seen by some of our naval readers. However, we make no apology for reprinting it here, for we think it is a valuable restatement of the basic facts of life in so far as Great Britain, still an island, is concerned.

This issue of the JOURNAL sees also the end of one series of articles, "A Signal Officer in North Russia," by Brigadier Chenevix Trench, and the start of another series by John Erickson, who examines in them the relationship between Russia and China in the Far East.

Looking ahead, we hope to publish in February Colonel Smiley's own account of the remarkable little operation in Oman which was so brilliantly and successfully carried out earlier this year under his leadership, and also an important article by Mr. Peter Paret, who has made a profound study of the French operations in Algeria against the F.L.N.

## UNORTHODOX WARRIORS

By COLONEL PETER FLEMING, O.B.E.

On Wednesday, 14th October, 1959, at 3 p.m.

BRIGADIER BERNARD FERGUSSON, D.S.O., O.B.E., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: The chief characteristic of Colonel Fleming is one that he has in common with a bad penny. He is always turning up. Before the war he turned up in Srinagar, having walked from Pekin. This shocked the people of Srinagar, who told him to go back and do his expedition again properly and less casually. During the war he stayed behind in Norway and then turned up again in this country. Then he stayed behind in Greece and turned up again, as I well know, in Egypt. He went flying into Burma in 1944 in a glider. The glider parted company with the tow aircraft and Colonel Fleming was reported missing and was greatly mourned except by me, because I was sure he would turn up. He turned up in India a month later.

We are very lucky that he has turned up this afternoon. He has been under close surveillance since about a quarter to one, under good management which has ensured his being here. He will talk about unorthodox warriors.

There is somebody that I wish could have been present, and that is Lord Wavell, the great Lord Wavell who had a great taste for unorthodoxy in warriors and was a close friend of Colonel Fleming. Well, Lord Wavell is not here, but I am very pleased to see that one of his daughters is in the audience.

I think I have said ample to introduce Colonel Fleming, and I now ask him to speak to us.

### LECTURE

‘WARRIOR’ is one of those words which have rather come down in the world; like some others—‘worthy,’ ‘dainty,’ and ‘intrepid’—it has acquired a faint undertone of parody. You may, I suppose, conceivably refer to a man as an intrepid warrior during the address at his memorial service, but if you called him that to his face while he was still alive he would think that you were being funny, or possibly insulting.

When I looked ‘warrior’ up in the dictionary I was very much disconcerted to find that in its prosaic as opposed to its rhetorical usage it means “a member of any of the fighting Services.” I immediately realized how delicate was the task that I had undertaken and how wide a field I might be expected to cover. We all know how absurdly touchy are the other two Services to which we do not happen to belong, and I foresaw trouble if I did not find room on my canvas for sailors and airmen as well as soldiers. Then it struck me: How about all those foreigners? Her Majesty’s armed forces, though superior to anybody else’s, are not unique of their kind. Could I do justice to my theme without combing the ranks of our detested enemies and our glorious allies for examples of unorthodoxy?

Here the problem is complicated by the fact that what is unorthodox in one army is not necessarily so in another. Before the last war I was a war correspondent in China, and I soon realized that when the Chinese claimed, as they were occasionally able to do, that they had ‘completely surrounded’ a Japanese unit, they meant that they had surrounded it on three sides. According to their traditional doctrine, which may have got modified a little lately, it is a very serious error to place your enemy in a position from which he cannot without serious inconvenience withdraw and thus oblige him to stand and fight.

By this time I had begun to realize that the aspects of my subject were so many and so diverse that I should have to select only one or two and concentrate on them. So what I shall say applies mainly to the British Army, and mainly to the principles of unorthodox warfare rather than to its individual exponents. I have not attempted to deal with atomic warfare. I really do not see how anybody could in this context.

I think that one can detect in the British public's attitude to the British Army a curious ambivalence. On the one hand you often read in the newspapers of some civilian enterprise, say an anti-litter drive by a rural district council, being carried out 'like a military operation.' I am sure that anybody who has taken part in even the most successful military operation will agree that this implied confidence in the Army's prowess, though touching, is misplaced.

On the other hand soldiering in these islands is not and never has been held in inordinately high esteem. It ranks as a profession, like the Church, the law, medicine, and so forth. If you ask an ordinary intelligent chap which of the professions he considers to be the most hidebound and unprogressive there is very little doubt what his answer will be; and yet the Army, like the two other Services, has continuously to adapt itself to new theories and new techniques and has to show a marked flexibility. Only if the whole Prayer Book were rewritten every 20 years, half of our laws changed, and half of the human anatomy drastically altered, would the clergyman, the lawyer, and the doctor be in the same case as a Regular officer. In spite of this the soldier is, in general, regarded as a hidebound stick-in-the-mud. It was almost inevitable when Low created Blimp in the thirties that he should make him a colonel. He did toy with the idea of making him a bishop. It might not have been a bad thing for the Church if he had.

Colonel Blimp was a warrior left over from a war in which there was not a great deal of scope for unorthodoxy, but Lawrence bequeathed an example, even if it may have been partly based on legend, which made the General Staff at the beginning of the second World War reasonably receptive to unorthodox ideas. In 1939 Lawrence was a sort of patron saint of irregular warfare and it was the precedent of his successful and economical operations against the Turks that ensured during the period of the 'phoney' war at least a sympathetic hearing for a lot of unusual and wildcat schemes.

I can recall one particular *tranche de vie* from that period. We were at the time at war only with Germany though no fighting was going on; but we expected to be at war with Italy, Japan, and (probably) Russia and it was thought that there would be great scope for irregular activities and unorthodox ideas. The War Office were at some pains to interview people who might be supposed to have some sort of talent for irregular operations—mountaineers, Arctic explorers, Antarctic explorers, canoeists, yachtsmen, people who had lived with headhunters, people who had written travel books, and so on. All sorts of individuals were caught in the dragnet and taken to the Directorate of Military Intelligence for vetting.

The security people got worried about this and said, "You cannot do this. You have found a chap who speaks first-class Arabic. The enemy will hear about this and think that we are going to do something in the Middle East. You must get out a questionnaire to cover every possible form of what you regard as adventurous activities." This was done, a questionnaire was made out and all these chaps had to answer whether they could fence, box, ski, shoot with a pistol, use a blowpipe, swim under water, climb a mountain, and so on.

Most of the interviewing was done by a G.2, who was somebody's brother-in-law. There was very grave overcrowding in the War Office, and this officer had to carry out this interrogation in the passage in a cubicle behind a screen like a fortune-teller at a church fête. I was passing this mysterious cubicle one day when he was completing the interrogation of a minor poet who had spent the whole of his life in an Asiatic capital after being sent down from the university. The G.2 had cultivated a very bluff and soldierly voice. I heard him say, "Right! You can't fence. Can you ride?" The minor poet simpered and shrugged his shoulders. "Only on donkeys," he said.

Going back to those days, I think it is almost certainly true that the unorthodox warrior is more likely to emerge and be given a chance when things are going badly than when they are going well. It is not often possible to draw an analogy between war and cricket, but the principle involved here is really the same as the principle on which Peter May, if the England innings opened disastrously, might decide to promote Godfrey Evans to No. 5. The Commandos would never have been formed if the British Expeditionary Force had not been driven off the Continent. The threat of invasion, of course, created an atmosphere in which unorthodoxy for a time ran riot. The Army was almost destitute of weapons and the General Staff was wholly destitute of completely reliable formulæ for destroying the Germans if they got ashore, and in this atmosphere all sorts of people—inventors, astrologists, water diviners, and veterans of the Spanish Civil War—were received with anxious deference by the top brass.

I am sure that it is true that the longer the odds against victory and the smaller the country's total military potential, the more likely the unorthodox warrior is to get a run for his money. In the first World War the Q-ships would not have played the part they did if the Royal Navy had had adequate means of destroying U-boats by less far-fetched methods. In the second World War, if our land and air forces in the Middle East had been continually superior to those of the enemy, Colonel David Stirling would not have been called on to blow up all those enemy aircraft. The Long Range Desert Group, though it would have had a reconnaissance role, would not have played such a dramatic part in the campaign.

Really the same thing applies to Burma. In the same way and for the same reasons, if the 14th Army and XV Corps had been able to launch a conventional frontal attack on the Japanese with reasonable hopes of success, no one would have thought of bringing the Chindits into being.

The time has come for me to try to define what I mean by unorthodoxy. It is not easy to do. Most unorthodox warriors cultivate a certain panache, but merely having a panache does not make one an unorthodox warrior. Lord Wavell, although he never wore more than the regulation number of cap badges, was probably a more unorthodox commander than Lord Montgomery. Then take General Carton de Wiart. He looks like a pirate, and I think he enjoys being shot at by foreigners. Nevertheless, I would not call him an unorthodox warrior. I would say that he is a very cool, sensible, resourceful officer who has frequently been called in to handle unusual and unhopeful situations with inadequate resources.

Talking about panache, I remember one night flying in to Brigadier Fergusson's so-called stronghold in Japanese-held territory with the general who had taken over command of the Chindits from Wingate after he had been killed. On important occasions Wingate, who was eccentric rather than flamboyant in such matters, always wore an enormous white Edwardian-style topee. It always looked right, and I am sure that his men relished it in the same way as we relish Sir Winston

Churchill's quaint taste in bowler hats. His successor (a very fine soldier) had entirely forsaken panache and wore the regulation slouch hat and, in accordance with orders, had removed his badges of rank. He looked more like a schoolmaster going on a mountaineering holiday than a commander of irregular forces taking the field. I suspect that in this small matter he underplayed his hand.

In these days the unorthodox warrior always fights on two fronts. It is true to say that all units and formations are in a perpetual state of hostilities with the staffs controlling them, of whose failure to supply them with the necessities of life they take a rancorous view. But a battalion, a brigade, or a division, though it may feel that it has been neglected and misunderstood, is at least on the order of battle. It exists. Even if the powers that be refuse to supply an extra cook or five and a half miles of barbed wire, it will still be there and it will survive these chronic deprivations. It is not like that for the unorthodox warrior. To begin with he is only one man with a bright idea. In the old days, 300 or 400 years ago, this did not matter much. He went to Court, found a patron, was given a bag of gold, raised a scratch force, and went off somewhere to put his bright idea into practice. In these days, to the regret of many, military affairs are conducted in a rather less informal and more centralized manner.

Possibly the best way to examine the sort of problems and difficulties which confront the unorthodox warrior and the qualities and resources that he needs to overcome them is to take a specific case which I have found it convenient to reconstruct—if that is the right word—in the future.

In January, 1970, for reasons which need not detain us here, Great Britain found herself in a state of war with Ruritania. Weapons of mass destruction had been outlawed, and in the expectation of universal disarmament conventional forces had been drastically run down all over the world. The British Government of the day was a weak one; so was the Ruritanian Government of the day. War was not popular in either country, and for some months hostilities were confined mainly to leaflet dropping and the jamming of television broadcasts. The small British Army was confined to a static anti-invasion role. The Channel Tunnel was then in the process of redenationalization, and could not legally be blown up until this was completed. Ruritania, a slightly larger country with an army of about the same size, had similar preoccupations with internal security. It looked very much as though this deadlock could not be broken until the large conscript armies which both sides were raising had been trained and equipped. The British people, I need hardly tell you, were, as ever, staunch and undismayed, but they were hit much harder by the television blackout than were the Ruritanians, a relatively uncultured people who found solace in the traditional delights of folk music, ibex-shooting, and schnapps. By the spring of 1970 there was an ugly feeling abroad in the United Kingdom, and the British Government was casting desperately about for some means of ending the war in a speedy and at the same time an honourable way.

It was at this stage that an unconventional warrior appeared, in the person of Major Griggstock of the Loamshire Regiment. Since the war about which I am speaking has not yet taken place, it would be contrary to the national interest to divulge any particulars of the operation by which he hoped to bring Ruritania to her knees. Suffice it to say that it would have, with a single, swift, terrible blow, crippled the picture postcard industry on which, according to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Ruritania was dependent for 82 per cent. of her revenues. Griggstock was

confident that he could carry out this enterprise with a small force of 500 hand-picked men. He wrote a paper about this. (I should here mention my conviction that in these days a good prose style is really almost indispensable for the unorthodox warrior.) The paper got up through the Chiefs of Staff to the War Cabinet who welcomed Griggstock's proposals with rapture, and he was told to go ahead and raise his force. This had to be done in the strictest secrecy, and the security authorities were called in. They complicated matters by insisting that the force must be given a cover-name. It was allotted the innocuous designation of No. 23 Mobile Bath Unit, and its commander spent many weary hours piloting its war establishment through various War Office committees and explaining why a mobile bath unit had a higher scale of automatic weapons than that authorized for a battalion of foot guards.

After six weeks of intensive preparation, Colonel Griggstock, as he now was, found that he was unpopular with almost everybody in authority. Commanding officers disliked him because he recruited their best officers and non-commissioned officers, the War Office disliked him because he was causing them extra work, the R.A.F. disliked him because they had to carry out photographic reconnaissances on his behalf without being told why, and the Royal Navy disliked him because Ruritania lacked a coastline and they did not like being wallflowers. The Press detested him because although everybody in London knew all about the operation they were not allowed to make any reference to it, and White's Club hated him because 43 of its members had been incarcerated in the Tower under the Official Secrets Act for talking indiscreetly in the bar about Griggstock.

I do not think we need follow this keen officer any further on the path to death or glory. I selected him only as a peg on which to hang a very rough sketch of some of the hazards which the unorthodox warrior will face in what you might call his formative state. All these hazards are endemic in a closely knit, highly organized military machine. They have all to be overcome somehow. I do not think it is unfair to suggest that the unorthodox warrior is seldom the best person to overcome them. He is always an individualist, generally has a strong personality, and possesses such a firm belief in the brightness of his bright idea that he tends to regard critics of its efficacy as little better than traitors to their country.

The higher the authority from which his *carte blanche* comes, and the *blancher*, so to speak, the *carte*, the less true sympathy he is likely to meet with from the numerous staff officers who have to supply his requirements, and the suspicion and prejudice that he is bound to arouse will be increased if, as often happens in the early stages, he is fettered by the supposed requirements of security. If you want to get anything out of a staff, from a fleet of helicopters to a railway warrant, it is the greatest handicap to have to preface your request with a statement that you cannot divulge the purpose for which it is required. So I think it follows that the unorthodox warrior, if he is ever going to take the field at all, needs a lot of assets and attributes which are neither unorthodox nor warlike. He needs tact, patience, friends at court. He must be able to tune in to the 'old boy' net. He should, I think, cultivate the manner and appearance of a conventional rather than a farouche type. By all means let him carry a sjambok or a knobkerrie or an ice-axe when training his private army, but let him leave the weapon behind when he goes to G.H.Q. to seek a mandate for an extra typewriter.

I have referred to the importance of a good literary style. This should be clear and persuasive rather than forceful. The more novel the expedients that he proposes,

the more care he should take to buttress them with precedents from the history of warfare, which can provide precedents for almost anything. He must take the greatest possible care when writing up an appreciation or drawing up a plan to keep the lay-out in line with the latest staff office blueprint, and, especially, get the abbreviations right.

As to this question of providing precedents from the history of warfare, perhaps I may produce a minor precedent here. In 1940, when we were threatened with invasion, General Thorne, commanding XII Corps in Kent and Sussex, was weak in orthodox resources. General Thorne decided to organize 'stay-behind' parties to harass the Germans when they came ashore. This was eventually laid on all over the Home Forces but we in XII Corps were the pioneers. At an early stage we found that the doctrine from the War Office and the Home Forces was unacceptable to us. Their idea was that when the Germans came we should hide in the shrubbery until a suitable party had arrived and then rush at them with our tomahawks and do what damage we could before either being killed or making our way back to the British lines. We took the view that this ephemeral effort was not worth making and that there was no reason why guerilla parties should not make their own dumps in the area and operate there on a more or less permanent basis. This did not meet with much favour and we were told that we should have to stick to the party line, until we wrote a paper on the subject and prefaced it with a quotation from a Chinese general of 500 B.C. What this quite imaginary general was made to say was, "A guerilla without a base is no better than a desperate straggler." Nobody on the General Staff had, for the very best of reasons, heard of this general, but for almost equally good reasons they were not prepared to admit this. After that we got our way.

My final word of advice to the would-be unorthodox warrior is that he should strive to create on the people who are going to launch him into action the impression of only very slightly maladjusted orthodoxy.

My own guess is that there is not a great deal of future for the unorthodox warrior in major wars. He may now and then get what shooting men call "a day round the outsides," in Muscat and Oman or somewhere, but in major wars his scope will be limited. This is for two main reasons. One reason is the increasing lack of targets or objectives which it is within his capacity to attack and which cannot be better attacked by other means. Take Lawrence, for example. From a purely operational, as opposed to political, point of view, his main achievement—perhaps his only worthwhile achievement in a strictly military sense—was the interruption of the Turkish communications, which were largely dependent on a single-line desert railway. "Range," he used to say, "is more to strategy than forces"; a rather cloudy statement by which he presumably meant that if you can reach far enough into the enemy's rearward areas and attack his most vulnerable and least well defended parts you do not have to strike him very hard. But in these days there are better means than camels of carrying high explosive into the enemy's rearward areas, and I am sure that in the second World War Lawrence's main target, the desert railway, would have been left to the Royal Air Force, who would have cut it and kept it cut.

I would recall David Stirling's operations against the Libyan airfields in the second World War. In the third World War, those airfields will not be in Libya because, as a result of the increasing speed and range of aircraft, armies will not any

longer trail their air forces along behind them like a bag of golf clubs. It is difficult to see the same opportunities that presented themselves to the Long Range Desert Group presenting themselves to their successors. I do not say that there will be no opportunities, but I think they will get fewer.

The second thing which will limit the scope of the unorthodox warrior is the steady and increasing improvement in wireless communication. You might think that this would be a great help. I doubt if it will. It will mean that he will have G.H.Q. breathing down the back of his neck and perhaps even the supreme commander appearing on the screen of a portable television set every evening. I do not say that this high degree of remote control will invariably lead to disaster, but from what I know of the unorthodox warrior it will not suit him at all, and I should not be surprised if the whole thing ended in tears.

Perhaps I can again take my own advice and provide a precedent for this particular theory. It is provided by the contrast between two military incidents at the beginning of this century. In 1900, when the foreign legations were besieged in Peking during the Boxer rebellion, nobody had any communication with anybody. The besieged community was entirely cut off. Admiral Seymour, who led the first relief expedition, was soon out of touch with his base at Tientsin, which was itself besieged, and was for some time out of touch with the Allied warships off the Taku Bar. Everybody was in a desperate plight, but because nobody had any means of telling anybody else how ghastly everything was, it all ended happily. Half a dozen efficient wireless transmitters would have brought about a catastrophe.

Four years later the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, sent an expedition under Colonel Younghusband into Tibet. The expedition was of roughly brigade strength. Here communications were excellent. Nothing could have been more unfortunate. The Indian post office put up a telephone line behind the force as they advanced, and the Tibetans never cut it. The legend was that they were afraid that if they pulled it down the beastly British would never be able to find their way out of Tibet. Anyhow, the result of this was that the whole of this small and very tricky sideshow was controlled, or anyhow minutely supervised, from Whitehall, where Mr. Balfour's Government was tottering and the Secretary of State for India was a booby. I do not think you would ever find a better example of the evils of remote control than the Younghusband mission to Lhasa.

I confess that I take leave of the unorthodox warrior with regret. He is a rather lonely figure who generally finishes up with more critics than admirers. He will be lucky if he ever lives down the initial stigma of being either a charlatan or an exhibitionist or both. When he goes into action he has the not really very pleasant feeling of leaving behind him, in the great chairborne hierarchy, a sprinkling of officers who will be only too glad of an opportunity to say, "I told you so," or even, "Serve him right"; and however well he does, the true value of his achievements is almost bound to be a matter of controversy for a very long time.

But war is a lacklustre business and the unorthodox warrior injects into it an element of audacity and imagination. We should all be sorry if he became extinct. There is, of course, no risk of this happening literally because all three Services will continue to breed unorthodox warriors in perfectly adequate and at times perhaps embarrassing quantities. I hope I have not taken too gloomy a view of their prospects. All I have tried to suggest is that, though there will not be a dearth of actors, there may be a dearth of parts for them to play. I doubt if I am alone in hoping that this danger, like so many others, proves illusory.

## DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN : I hope you will now all deluge the lecturer with questions, hostile for preference.

MR. PETER KEMP : May I waste five minutes of your time, Mr. Chairman, and that of the audience, by raising five points which have occurred to me in quite the wittiest and one of the most interesting lectures that I have ever heard ?

THE CHAIRMAN : As most people will know, Mr. Peter Kemp has had an unorthodox career, including fighting in Spain during the Civil War.

MR. KEMP : I will raise the points in the order in which they occurred and not in order of importance.

The first is Spain. The lecturer indicated what most people believe, that the civil war in Spain was a guerilla operation. It most certainly was not. With all respect, I do not mean that rudely ; but there was not any possibility of guerilla warfare in Spain. We could not do it in the Republican territory—I fought on the Nationalist side—nor could they do it in ours. So Spain is a bad example to take for guerilla warfare. It was purely regimental stuff, with all the unpleasantness that regimental warfare sometimes means.

As to the second point, the lecturer was talking about unorthodox warriors, and I think that possibly the most interesting of them in our military history was the Earl of Peterborough, who, as you know, in the war of the Spanish Succession, used to make cities surrender by using dummy armies and dummy fortresses. He used to be seen walking up St. James's Street with a white goose under his arm which he intended to eat for dinner and wearing the Order of the Garter across his chest—a fantastic character.

Thirdly, the lecturer talked about the unorthodox warrior fighting on two fronts. All unorthodox warriors in the last war were fighting a war on two fronts. I hate to have to say it but it is true. Certainly it was my experience in the Balkans and Albania. We were not told that we were doing so, but we were fighting the Germans on the one side and the Russians on the other, and it is no good denying that that is true. In Albania it was said to me, " The most interesting thing about this country is that there are three parties. There is the pro-German party, there is the pro-British party, and there is the pro-Russian party. But the interesting thing is that it is the British who pay for the pro-Russian party."

The last thing I want to say concerns anyone who may be an unorthodox warrior in the next war. It is, " You cannot expect to be supplied. You have to live on the country. They will not like it but you have to persuade them somehow to support you."

THE LECTURER : Those are very interesting observations. I should like to refer to only one, the first one, about the Spanish Civil War. I think that Mr. Kemp misunderstood me. The veterans of the Spanish Civil War who played so large a part in 1940 in training and running the more fashionable Home Guard training schools were there not as exponents of or authorities on guerilla warfare but because they represented, or were thought to represent, a citizen army which had stood up and fought for a time against a better armed and better organized enemy possessing a certain amount of armour. That was the main thing.

MR. KEMP : Mr. Chairman, may I answer that ?

THE CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR. KEMP : Yes, that is the general impression. In actual fact—I spent three years in that war—the Spanish people were not on the side of the Republicans except in territories controlled by the Government forces, where they could be shot. I know that Tom Wintringham—I imagine that the lecturer was thinking of him—did give that impression, but I suppose it is his word against mine. All right.

GROUP CAPTAIN S. O. TUDOR : I sensed that the lecturer was lamenting the departure of opportunities suggesting that, in fact, there were fewer opportunities for the uncon-

ventional or unorthodox warrior. I think that perhaps the opportunities will come back as the inability to fight a nuclear war is there. Would the lecturer like to say something about that?

THE LECTURER: Not very much! Perhaps they will, but I should have thought that they will not increase.

GROUP CAPTAIN TUDOR: Bows and arrows and blowpipes and things like that?

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER: I feel that there is something frightfully attractive about the unorthodox warriors, and I believe that they are essential in anything that may happen in the future just as in the past. But because they are so attractive there is a temptation to quite a few people to ape them. I think that unorthodoxy is an essential part of the make-up of a genius. The successful unorthodox warrior is a genius, and people of ordinary calibre should be warned that though anybody can learn from genius, and should learn; when others try to imitate them it leads to absolute catastrophe. It is frightfully attractive but I would utter a word of warning, that those who are not blessed with some form of genius will be most unwise to try to imitate the unorthodox warrior of the past.

COLONEL L. V. S. BLACKER: The lecturer has given us a delightful discourse, and I should like to listen to another dozen. I can think of numerous occasions when the unorthodox warrior with unorthodox weapons and unorthodox tactics has done a great deal to win the war, but can anybody mention a case where an orthodox army with orthodox weapons and commanded by an orthodox general has been victorious?

THE LECTURER: Is the point of the question that the orthodox ones have not been victorious?

COLONEL BLACKER: No. I am asking whether a British Army commanded by an orthodox general and possessing orthodox weapons and using orthodox methods has ever been successful.

THE CHAIRMAN: I would point out that the questioner is Colonel Stewart Blacker, who has contributed many weapons to strengthen the arms of soldiers, both orthodox and unorthodox.

THE LECTURER: If I have the point aright, the answer is that all good commanders have a strong streak of something that you might call imagination, or genius, or flair. I think that there is such a thing as an orthodox company sergeant major, but I do not think that there is really such a thing as a good orthodox fighting commander. There must be an element of imagination. You would not perhaps put him in the history books as unorthodox, but he does not slavishly follow the manual.

COLONEL BLACKER: I think that Lord Roberts, much against his will, in both his major campaigns was forced to use orthodox weapons when the enemy in both cases had superior weapons. The Afghans in 1879 had superior artillery, and the Boers in 1900 had superior weapons of all sorts. His orthodoxy was in both cases not so much in tactics as in strategy, in the way he managed his lines of communication, or rather by not having lines of communication.

THE LECTURER: I am sorry that General 'Boy' Browning is not here. I remember a lifelong theory of his about orthodox weapons. He said that the great ruin of war for about 300 years was that people gave up bows and arrows much too soon for cannon, which for a long time was a very primitive arm with a slower rate of fire and not much greater range and accuracy than a bow, because it was fashionable and looked up to date. People chucked away their bows and arrows long before they should have done. I think there may possibly be something in that.

MR. KEMP: To supplement what the lecturer has said, in my experience as, I suppose, an unorthodox warrior, I always found, and I think most of my colleagues did, that you get from the orthodox soldier the best co-operation possible. I could name—it would be invidious to do so—various generals concerned. I have never approached any Regular

soldier, any career soldier, who has not given the most complete sympathy and the most complete understanding to irregular warfare.

There is another point of history, one which the lecturer raised. Quite honestly, Europe has never recovered from the Thirty Years War. At the end of that war the people of Europe in the 18th century were so devastated that they gave it up except for professional soldiers and foolish volunteers, and only in the last 50 years have we departed from that principle, and that is in my opinion the trouble from which we are suffering. In other words, war ought to be left to those who like it.

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. E. REID : We know that during the course of the last war there were unorthodox warriors who carried out some very spectacular feats and that there was a great deal of glamour about it. They received much publicity, which was most excellent for morale, but most of these private armies, I believe, were very specially equipped, and they were equipped and provided at the expense of the orthodox forces, from which they drew the very best material. I have wondered sometimes whether, taking it by-and-large, the final results achieved were really commensurate with the cost and the withdrawal of the best material from orthodox forces and the general expenditure of time, money, strength, and everything else. I wonder whether the lecturer would give his opinion about that.

THE LECTURER : I think that is a jolly good expression of the 100 per cent. orthodox point of view. You never get the answers—at least I should not think so—in the same generation. Did the provision of extra equipment and the diversion of resources to such-and-such a sideshow pay off ? Was it worth giving Popski 10 extra jeeps when Corps Headquarters had to go short ? There are other questions of that type. You can argue about it for days, but there will always remain these doubts.

I tried to bring this out in what I said. There will always be controversy about any unorthodox achievements, however valuable they appear to be. There will always be a slight reaction against what the speaker called glamour, which I suppose really means publicity of a distasteful kind, though the troops like it. There is always a slight feeling of jealousy that the irregulars are hogging the limelight and are more apt to write books about it afterwards and that kind of thing.

I do not think you could have had an abler or more sympathetic exposition of the 100 per cent. orthodox point of view.

LIEUT.-COLONEL W. A. C. COLLINGWOOD : I am a little depressed as an orthodox soldier—I am one now—because the lecturer ended up on the note that unorthodoxy was finished or unlikely to take place so much in the future. I feel very strongly that in the future, in fact, there will be more scope for it, considerably more, because, after all, in that future there is certainly at the moment no such thing as the orthodox. Nobody knows what will happen. It would, however, seem to me that it will be the ideal occasion for the unorthodox approach.

Secondly, while I agree with the lecturer's opening statement that the unorthodox warriors come from all nations, it is a particular feature of the British character that we can produce these men and leaders, and I feel sure that we shall do it, particularly in the circumstances of the future wars, whether they are small wars, perhaps in hilly areas—an example is the recent Muscat operation, which were unorthodox—or major wars. I think there will be no orthodox war and no orthodox line.

THE REV. G. CHARLESWORTH : May I ask if our lecturer really thinks that in the event of any serious major war of the future, atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs will not eventually be used ? I foresee it as a holding operation in which those who will be victorious are making hydrogen bombs to be dropped.

THE LECTURER : I will be extremely orthodox on this occasion, and very 'G.S.', and say that that is outside my terms of reference.

THE CHAIRMAN : The questioner I am about to call is Captain Hanbury-Tracy, who was behind the lines in Burma and Malaya.

CAPTAIN N. J. F. HANBURY-TRACY : Would there not be a possible future for the unorthodox warrior in the sabotaging of sputniks and guided missiles ?

THE LECTURER : I think that there is always an opportunity to sabotage anything, though sabotage is always harder to carry out than is generally supposed.

It is interesting to recall that the earliest German parachutists were envisaged simply as saboteurs dropped in connection with a bombing raid, dropped by the same aircraft that dropped the bombs. The Germans realized that with the small bomb loads and the inadequate bomb sights of the late thirties no vital damage could be done to an industrial target, and the original role of the two battalions of parachutists raised under Student was to do this dotting of the i's and crossing of the t's after a conventional bombing raid.

CAPTAIN S. W. ROSKILL : One of the difficulties that I do not think we solved in unorthodox warfare in the last war was the matter of co-ordinating the work of different authorities. For instance, in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1944 you had occasions when raiding squadrons would attack an island and almost simultaneously the intelligence authorities were trying to put agents into the same island. Can you give us any views on how the various unorthodox warriors might be able to co-ordinate their authorities rather better than they did last time ?

THE LECTURER : Captain Roskill knows five times as much as I do about any form of warfare, orthodox or otherwise. I would say that what happens is this. At the beginning of a war, in this country at any rate, the existing secret organizations expand and fresh ones are created, and there is a great deal of empire-building which goes on until the end of hostilities and a great deal of mutual antipathy and jealousy between the empires ; in the last war luckily not with such disastrous results as attended the long struggle between the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst in Germany, which really made absolute nonsense of everything. The same thing has always existed in every country between the secret intelligence organizations and the various forms of clandestine or irregular activity.

The theoretical way to deal with this is the way in which Lord Mountbatten dealt with it in the South-East Asia Command. The war had been going a long time when he took over. There was a good deal of precedent for it and there were a certain number of visible heads which could be knocked together. He formed a branch of his Supreme Headquarters staff called P Division which had the job of co-ordinating, or trying to co-ordinate, the activities of all the British under-cover organizations and, I think, the O.S.S. as well (which was much harder). It also had the invidious task of allotting priorities for the aircraft and submarines on which most of the operations of these bodies depended. There were very few of the right types of aircraft and submarine, and it was essential to get this done. I do not know quite how well it worked, but it was a theoretical planning solution of this problem. The trouble is that you seldom get that laid on early enough in a war to get everybody under starter's orders, so to speak.

COLONEL C. G. D. THRUPP : Perhaps I might make a suggestion that the time when we want unorthodox soldiers is in peace. I remember when we tried to put tanks on the map between the two wars and were laughed out of court. We want people like General Fuller now.

THE CHAIRMAN : That is a statement rather than a question. I wonder whether our lecturer would like to endorse the statement. It is a very useful one.

COLONEL THRUPP : Nobody has mentioned anything like that. Perhaps we may use this as an unorthodox chance for someone to do it.

THE LECTURER : I see that some orthodox journalist has suddenly discovered that the Army has only 12 helicopters altogether. I wonder whether any unorthodox person has been working on that. I am sure there is a great deal in what you have said.

MR. KEMP : A point was made just now which in my opinion cannot be too strongly stressed. It concerns the rivalry and, indeed, the hatred between various intelligence

organizations. I think this did more damage to their war effort—I will not say—than they did good; but it is something which ought to be said honestly. I think it was absolutely disgraceful. You all know about it as well as I do.

THE CHAIRMAN: Not being an impartial Chairman, I entirely agree with you.

COLONEL BLACKER: Perhaps it is of interest to point out that Marlborough put the bayonet outside the barrel of the musket instead of inside it as a result of the lessons that were learned at Killiecrankie.

THE CHAIRMAN: I would not dare to sum up the discussion, but I cannot refrain from making one or two points. There are lots that I could make, but I will content myself with two or three.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power has gone, but I would have dared to say this even if he had been here. I feel that this thing about orthodoxy and unorthodoxy, the regular and the irregular, is frightfully important. I would dispute Sir Arthur Power's suggestion that you have to be a genius to be an unorthodox soldier.

Taking up a second point, I would refer to what Mr. Kemp said about always being supported by an orthodox commander. Surely these points come together to make one, that the really great commander will not be afraid of using unorthodox means and that the menace is the chap who is so orthodox that he is horrified at the very suggestion that private armies should be used: though private armies can get out of size in certain circumstances.

The sort of thing which I mean by bad orthodoxy is, to take a very simple instance, the use of armoured cars entirely as a means of communication simply because the 12th Lancers were used to get the Army off the beach at Dunkirk in 1940. In every exercise today you now find your armoured cars being used as a glorified corps of signals. That is what I mean when I say that orthodoxy can become your master and you its slave.

You do not have to be especially brilliant to be an effective behind-the-lines operator. I remember an ordinary subaltern in the Durham Light Infantry putting up a plan to Wavell before the war for behind-the-lines operations, and he could not get it past his company commander, let alone before Wavell, and had to go through the back door, as I know because I was Wavell's A.D.C. I feel that very often the behind-the-lines operators get far too much publicity, and that it is Second-Lieutenant So-and-so and Private So-and-so in the ordinary regiments who get forgotten and overlooked much too often, and they usually have a more dangerous time and an equally hard time. The fact is that the unorthodox chap, because he is unorthodox, gets far more publicity than the ordinary chap in a line regiment or the gunners and so on.

I take issue with our lecturer about the want of targets in the future. I believe that the more complicated a future war may be, the more we shall have to find targets by unorthodox methods. I should think that it would be absolute paradise for the unorthodox behind-the-lines chap the next time. I could take issue with our lecturer on that for some three hours, but I will let it go at that.

There is one final thing. People have been talking about Muscat and Oman, and I think that they would be glad to know that the commander of the Trucial Oman Scouts, Colonel Carter, has thought it safe to leave Trucial Oman for a few weeks and is in this room now. I saw them early last year. They are a magnificent unit which has had little publicity in this country. They are doing a wonderful job out there.

That is all I have to say, except to thank you, Colonel Fleming, for an extremely amusing and provocative—and, of course, from time to time thoroughly unsound—exposition of what I still think is one of the most fascinating by-products of a professional army. (*Applause.*)

GENERAL SIR CAMPBELL HARDY: I am sure that you would all like to join me in thanking Brigadier Fergusson for conducting the meeting so efficiently. (*Applause.*)

## UNITY IN DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

By REAR-ADMIRAL SIR ANTHONY BUZZARD, BART., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.

**T**HREE can be little disagreement that at the moment there is an unhealthy lack of unity in Western defence and disarmament policies, and that this is bad for Britain, bad for the West, and indeed bad for the world. It is, moreover, probably the Communists' intention that we should be disunited in our defence and disarmament policies.

One of the main causes of this lack of unity is, I think, that our approaches to the problem are often far too narrow, and often made from very different starting points.

I propose, therefore, to put up four basic starting points:—

- (a) the nature of the Communist threat;
- (b) the moral principles concerning war and armaments;
- (c) the relation between defence policy and the cold war; and
- (d) the extent of America's and Europe's dependence on each other in defence, i.e. interdependence.

I will then discuss the two extreme forms of defence policy most commonly proclaimed, massive retaliation and unilateral nuclear disarmament, and finally submit a middle of the road defence policy between these two, not just as a compromise for the sake of compromise, but as the least of the evils available to us today and the only policy offering any hope of breaking the present deadlock in disarmament and other issues.

### THE COMMUNIST THREAT

Let us begin, therefore, by first looking for a common starting point in the nature of the Communist threat, and how the Russian and Chinese leaders probably see the Western threat to them. On the one hand we must remember that they have repeatedly stated that the struggle between Communism and Capitalism must be fought unrelentingly until one or other has been destroyed, and that Capitalism inevitably leads to war. Moreover, they certainly possess tremendously strong military forces of all sorts. On the other hand it is equally clear that the Communists believe that Capitalism will inevitably collapse in time, and that, meanwhile, they must do their utmost to avoid destruction themselves by a full-scale clash with America. Bitter experiences in the last two wars have also implanted in the Russian mind an inherent fear of a resurgent Germany, against which they have set up their buffer satellite states.

In terms of the military balance of power, it is almost certain that the Russians, and even more so the Chinese, see themselves at the moment inferior to the West in terms of total global war, in so far as relative factors still apply to such a war. This is due not so much to present American superiority in nuclear weapons and techniques of air attack but to the inherent factors of geography, which are always likely to enable Americans to attack from land and sea bases about three times as close to Russian and Chinese vitals as their bases can be to American vitals.

On the other hand, in terms of local limited war, the Communists almost certainly see themselves at present with the balance of power strongly in their favour, owing not only to their vast conventional forces and reserves of manpower but, again, to geography, which in this case enables them to operate on interior


lines of communication. This, coupled with the initiative inherently possessed by the aggressor and the secrecy always possible in a police state, makes it extremely difficult for the West to provide, in time, the necessary local forces to deter or repel aggression in many areas around the Communist Eurasian perimeter.

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that every serious study of Communist intentions always seems to conclude that the most real and urgent threat to us is the subversion and political and economic penetration being pursued so vigorously in the cold war. Behind this subversive effort lie vast Communist forces, partly for perfectly legitimate reasons of defence, but partly also to seize any opportunity of exerting local power politics, and perhaps local aggression, in support of their subversion, if it should ever be in their interests to undertake it.

Almost every unprejudiced observer seems to agree that the Communists are most unlikely deliberately to initiate anything like a total or global war, certainly not unless they thought they could virtually get away with it. The real danger, so far as hot wars are concerned, is local aggression and unintentional local war arising as a result of some miscalculation, or the action of some third party, such as Israel or Egypt, which, if not handled properly, might then spread to total global war unintentionally.

To support this view we have, since the end of the War, all the evidence of Communist action against Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Berlin Blockade, Korea, Indo-China, the Middle East, Quemoy, and now back to Berlin again. But in the future it is possible that such local aggressions may be pursued with increasing boldness as the total global war stalemate sets in. And if Communism continues to spread towards the more sensitive Western interests, so the situation may well become increasingly dangerous and explosive.

Our first common starting point for Western defence might therefore be summarized thus, and perhaps depicted diagrammatically:—



The main Communist threat lies around the cold and limited war levels. It is in these that the Communists, at the moment, enjoy superiority over the West. We, on the other hand, enjoy superiority over the Communists at the total war level. But they are rapidly catching up and, in any case, relative strengths at this level are becoming of increasingly little importance. If we succeed in preventing or suppressing limited conflicts, then there will be no total war. But if we fail to prevent or suppress the limited conflicts which are almost bound to threaten from time to time, then there is a grave danger that they will spread to total global war unintentionally. Meanwhile, we require all the resources we can find to win, and ultimately neutralize, the cold war.

#### MORAL FACTORS

Let us now try to reach some common ground on the fundamental moral factors which should govern the threat or use of force and power.

It is, in my view, man's increasing neglect of the moral and legal principles which should govern the aims and means of warfare, including the unscrupulous methods adopted in the two World Wars, the policy of unconditional surrender demanded in the last War, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which is largely responsible for our present unhappy situation. The H-bomb, of course, now serves to highlight this situation. Indeed, I suspect that it may represent Providence's cane, lying ready upon his desk as a final warning of what is in store for us if we do not learn to control the power which has been given us.

During the last few years I have taken part in a number of conferences with theologians of different denominations and countries. If I were asked to give a summary of the conclusions to which I thought these theologians would give the maximum measure of all-round support, it would run something like this.

All war is evil, must be abhorred, and is contrary to the Christian spirit, teaching, and purpose. The ultimate aim must therefore be to abolish all war.

To achieve this ultimate aim of abolishing war, only two general attitudes are tenable for Christians meanwhile. The first is the genuine Christian pacifist attitude, which seeks to uphold this ultimate ideal here and now, by refusing to take part in any killing in any circumstances. It is certainly possible to argue that there is much support for this view in the Gospels, and one can therefore only respect those who adopt this attitude personally as individuals. Indeed, it may well be desirable that the flag of idealism should be kept flying in this way by some individuals, in order that we may remember how far the world has slipped and where we have got to get back to.

Whether or not, however, it is logical and right for pacifists to try to persuade their Governments to adopt such an attitude as State policy, in the present state of the world, seems to be much more doubtful. If one believes in the justification for policemen upholding law, order, and justice by force, including, if necessary, killing, within individual nations, then it is difficult to see why such measures should not be used to uphold law, order, and justice between nations, on the same principle as the policemen.

The only other tenable attitude is the non-pacifist Christian attitude, in which readiness to fight and, if necessary, to kill and to be killed, seems only to be right if four important conditions are fulfilled :—

*First*, war must only be resorted to in order to uphold justice, e.g. in defence against blatant aggression or to remove some intolerable basic injustice after

all other means have been tried to the limit. Fighting just for a vital national strategic or economic interest is not, in itself, a good enough reason for resorting to war.

*Secondly*, once at war, the aim adopted must again only be that of restoring justice, and our conditions for a cease-fire and a return to negotiations must therefore be limited to this. We must, in fact, provide every possible opportunity for the enemy to see the error of his ways and change his mind.

*Thirdly*, the methods we employ must similarly always be restrained and controlled within the limits of overall justice. A Christian never ceases to have an unlimited responsibility for all his neighbours, those he is defending, those in the neutral countries, and even, too, those in the 'aggressing' enemy country, who must be deterred, resisted, and, if necessary, killed, not with hate and vengeance but with reluctance and compassion. This means that the methods used should always be limited, so that the destruction wrought is kept to the minimum and always in proportion to the aim of upholding overall justice. In practice, this means, of course, that the fighting should always be kept under reasonable control and that we should hold on to the legal principles, built up over the ages, for reasonable discrimination to be observed as between combatants and civilians, and as between belligerent countries and neutrals. And it is, of course, the utterly uncontrollable and indiscriminate nature of total war with nuclear weapons, committing to death, disease, or deformity present and future generations of innocent women and children, and neutrals playing no part in the war, which makes it quite different from any conventional war of the past.

*Fourthly*, if the destruction should spread to a degree which brings it out of proportion to the aim of upholding overall justice, then one way or another the fighting should be brought to an end.

All this means, in fact, that it may be possible to justify aims and means in war similar to those adopted by the policemen, but no more. And this means, amongst other things, that to be prepared to fight only to deter an aggressor from fighting is quite a different thing from initiating the fighting; and to be prepared to use nuclear weapons only to deter an aggressor from using his is quite a different thing from being the first to use them.

This does not, of course, mean that it is necessarily right to use nuclear weapons, even if the enemy does so. A strong case can, in fact, be made on moral grounds for placing a limit somewhere upon the action which we are prepared to take, regardless of what the enemy does, in a situation in which, for the first time, there is virtually no limit to the degree of destruction within the power of mankind.

At least I think we can agree that we have reached the stage at which our whole attitude to war must be disciplined afresh, and brought more closely into line with these principles, or the human race may well perish.

#### THE COLD WAR

A third starting point, on which I think agreement is easy, is that defence policy nowadays is not just a question of deterring, limiting, or fighting the various hot wars which may threaten. It also has to take account of, and be attuned to, the cold war, which is with us here and now, and is being fought with increasing skill and vigour by the Communists. The criterion for a good defence policy should not only be the extent to which it succeeds or fails in 'holding the ring' against

hot war, but also the extent to which it helps or hinders the political, psychological, and economic issues being fought out inside the 'ring' in the cold war.

These cold war considerations include gaining settlements with the Communists on disarmament and issues such as Germany and Korea; winning to our cause the uncommitted countries and the many millions of good people behind the Iron Curtain, whose views Khrushchev and Co. are now increasingly having to take into account; and finally, holding together our own people in the democracies of the Western Alliance, on whose unity and morale, as well as physical strength, the future progress and indeed survival of the world largely depends.

#### INTERDEPENDENCE

This leads me to my fourth and final starting point. It does not require a military expert to point out that to balance the immense power now developing so rapidly in Communist Russia and China at all the three levels—total war, limited war, and cold war—will require the utmost combined efforts of the whole of the Western democracies, and a great deal more unity and leadership than at present exists. Any idea that this problem can be solved by America alone is quite out of the question, for even if she had the necessary manpower and technical resources, geographically she is so far away from the Iron Curtain that, alone, it is quite impossible for her to prevent Europe, Asia, and Africa from falling to the Communists without all the assistance she can get from us and her other Western Allies.

Equally, it is out of the question for Great Britain, Europe, and the Commonwealth to balance Communist power without the full and integrated support of America, since we have nothing like the economic and, particularly, the technological strength required for the task, especially in the Middle and Far East, where our European positions could be easily out-flanked.

It is quite vital, therefore, that we approach this problem from the point of view of the West as a whole, and do all we can to adjust our own individual contributions to further our common Western interests. I believe that one of the main reasons why we have got into so much difficulty with our defence and disarmament is that we, in Great Britain, and some of our Allies, too, have approached this problem the other way round—that is to say, we have been influenced too much by what seems to be the best policy for our own individual countries, and for influencing each other, instead of 'playing for the side,' so to speak. What is urgently required is the implementation of the lip service which we all pay to the principle of interdependence, and to surrender to it a little more national sovereignty.

Let us now examine some of the various defence and disarmament policies being proclaimed by various sections of the Western community.

#### MASSIVE RETALIATION

First, at one end of the scale, there is the 'all or nothing' policy of massive retaliation. The principal feature of this policy is that the main emphasis is always placed upon the deterrent effect of total war, the theory being that so long as we stress sufficiently strongly the danger, the possibility, and indeed our willingness, if necessary, to be the first to embark on total war, then no nation will run the risk of any war at all, or at least any but the smallest wars, and there will then be the best possible prospects of something approaching total peace.

This policy was originally evolved in the early 1950s, during the emergency of Korea, when the West had virtually no defence except America's atomic bomb, and when she had the virtual monopoly of that weapon.

But now that Russia, too, can retaliate massively, and the weapons of both sides have grown a thousandfold from kiloton to megaton proportions, the situation has become very different. For, whatever we may say, the Communists must increasingly doubt whether America—or Britain—would in fact commit suicide for a serious local threat in, say, Scandinavia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, the Middle East, South-East Asia, or Korea. Thus our nuclear deterrent, greatly increased in its severity, has been greatly decreased in its certainty of application. And the 'all or nothing' school often forgets that a deterrent, to be effective, must be reasonably certain of being applied, as well as being severe in its consequences.

Moreover, deterrence is only half the problem, for whatever deterrents we try to arrange, conflicts of some sort are almost bound to break out from time to time for many years yet. There is all the evidence of past and recent history to support this, and the evidence of history also suggests that many conflicts arise due to miscalculation or misunderstanding, to guard against which again there must be the minimum of doubt about our retaliation, and, above all, the minimum of bluff.

As a means of preventing and suppressing hot wars, the policy of massive retaliation is therefore likely to become increasingly ineffective and, indeed, dangerous, particularly in its liability to provoke or set-off by spontaneous combustion the total global war which nobody wants.

This policy is certainly incompatible with our assessment of the real Communist threat of limited aggression and local power politics. It is incompatible with our desire to win the confidence and respect of the uncommitted countries and the better elements behind the Iron Curtain. Within our own ranks in the Western world it is incompatible with the need for unity, for alliances cannot be held together on the basis of committing suicide for each other. Nor, of course, is it compatible with the moral standards which we are at such pains to defend, with international law, with the U.N. Charter, or, as we shall see shortly, with disarmament and other settlements.

The extent to which this policy is still officially pursued by the West seems uncertain. It is doubtful whether there is any united official thinking on this point. But it is clear that N.A.T.O.'s official policy, and certainly that of Britain, still places the main emphasis for the prevention of all but the smallest wars on the deterrent effect of being prepared to initiate total war. Mr. Dulles, to give him his due, showed a little more flexibility in this on occasions, but unity, even in America, seems lacking on this point, and certainly the American posture as a whole still seems to suggest a tendency towards this 'all or nothing' policy of massive retaliation.

#### 'SCRAP THE LOT'

At the other end of the scale from massive retaliation are the various policies of pacifism, non-violent resistance, and unilateral nuclear disarmament. It is perhaps natural and inevitable that, faced with the 'all or nothing' policy, there should be a trend towards 'nothing', certainly in terms of nuclear weapons, and to some extent in terms of conventional weapons too.

As I have already said, there seems to be much justification for a personal pacifist attitude, but to ask Western Governments to adopt this policy would seem

to be inviting them to turn the world over to the control of ruthless dictators, who would then fight amongst themselves, with the result that we should have lost both our freedom and all hopes of peace and the control of armaments. At all events, there seems to be virtually no possibility whatever of a responsible Western Government adopting such a policy in the near future.

Equally there seems almost no prospect of Governments adopting Sir Stephen King-Hall's policy of non-violent resistance, which argues that all forces other than those required for internal security should be disbanded, because any use of nuclear weapons is bound to result in total global war, and any use of conventional forces is bound to lead to Western defeat.

Unilateral renunciation by Great Britain of the possession and use of all nuclear weapons, as demanded by the Nuclear Disarmament Campaign as a gesture to break the present deadlock, looks nearer the bounds of practical politics at first sight. But when examined more closely, it, too, has no real possibility of being accepted by any responsible Government at this stage. For we have so neglected our conventional forces that, at the moment, Western defence plans are almost entirely dependent upon being able, if necessary, to initiate the use of at least some nuclear weapons, so that if Great Britain renounced their use, she would virtually have to pull out of N.A.T.O. and her other alliances. And this would probably mean the break-up of the whole Western Alliance, on which rests mankind's great hope for the Federal World Government and the World Police Force which we all hope will ultimately develop.

This does not, of course, mean that we in Britain could not renounce the manufacture or individual ownership of nuclear weapons. This might well be desirable. Nor does it mean that we should be content to remain in the position of having to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But the West as a whole will still have to continue to possess them, at least for many years, because there are as yet no technical means in sight by which the detection of existing stockpiles can be assured, and no means of preventing an enemy remaking nuclear weapons in a few months in war. We have therefore somehow got to learn to live with the possibility, if not the probability, of the Communists for many years possessing nuclear weapons. And for the West not to remain in possession of them whilst the Communists still do, would not only be inexpedient, but could, I think, be said to be morally irresponsible. For in a crisis, with, say, a limited conventional conflict being waged, it would be placing an almost unfair temptation in the hands of the Communist dictators if they were able to reach for their nuclear weapons, in the knowledge that we had thrown ours away. This was a temptation which we were unable to resist at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How much less likely would Khrushchev be able to resist it.

One is forced to conclude, therefore, that, although it is certainly arguable that we, in Great Britain, might renounce the manufacture and individual ownership of nuclear weapons, renunciation of their use in the near future might well break up the Western Alliance, and would be shirking our responsibilities; and renunciation of their possession by the West as a whole would be most unwise.

#### LIMITATIONS IN GENERAL

Faced with these two extreme policies of massive retaliation and 'scrap the lot,' the question inevitably arises whether there is any practicable compromise between these two.

In searching for such a compromise, one naturally turns to the possibility of upholding justice, if necessary, by force, but without resort to its unlimited or disproportionate use. Is it, in fact, possible to put power to work in the service of law, justice, and progress towards settlements, without either abusing or crippling it? Is it, too, possible to meet the real and most likely threat of limited aggression by limited means, and, if fighting should break out, then to keep it limited? Two world wars might suggest this is impracticable, but a new factor now involved is the mutual terror of total nuclear war, which could never be in the interests of either side in any circumstances. Is it possible to exploit this mutual terror, since we somehow have to live with it for many years anyway? Is it possible to link such a compromise policy with gradual progress towards disarmament and other settlements in the cold war?

To pursue such a policy of limitations, the West would have to aim at a condition in which its total war weapons and preparations were retained only to deter the Communists from ever using theirs, and from ever spreading any limited conflict that might break out, just as his total war capability would discourage us from doing so.

Under the shadow of this mutually restraining influence, we would then prepare to deter and, if necessary, meet all limited threats to justice by limited means. This requires that we must first set ourselves the target of escaping from our present dilemma of having to be the first to use total war weapons and methods.

Clearly, the first step would be a Western shift of emphasis and priority of resources from total war weapons and towards limited war weapons and preparations. This means we would have to accept the total war balance of power or stalemate, and take steps to restore the local balance of power in terms of limited war, which, at the moment, is weighted against us.

What would be the effect of this? Referring to our balance of power diagram, let us consider first our hot war problem of deterring aggression. Instead of leaving the limited war level of aggression wide open to what we believe to be the most likely Communist threat, we would begin to block—and the Communists would see that we were blocking—this most likely and tempting opening. True, we would have reduced our capability for fighting total global war through to a finish, but we would still, of course, retain sufficient total war weapons to keep such a war thoroughly un worthwhile for the Communists.

And if a limited conflict should break out, through miscalculation or other reason, despite our deterrence, we would also be better placed, because instead of being faced with the awful dilemma of defeat or suicide for anything beyond a comparatively minor incident, we would be more able to suppress the conflict. Moreover, the Russians would also see that we were less dependent upon, and less likely to embark upon, total global war, with less temptation therefore for them to lose their heads and initiate such war in order to get in the first blow.

And in considering our cold war problem, instead of always having to maintain total war tension and the total war arms race at a maximum, we would be able to relax tension and the arms race at that level, thus offering a little 'carrot' to the Communists at a point where we can afford it. Thus would the atmosphere be a little more favourable for disarmament, at least in terms of total war weapons.

At the same time, with the Communists then able to see that the openings for exerting power politics were becoming increasingly blocked at the limited war level,

they might begin to discuss disarmament and other issues such as Germany a little more genuinely. This is the level at which we have, in fact, still to apply a little 'stick' to the Communist 'donkey,' in order to obtain just and reasonable terms from them.

From the point of view of the uncommitted countries, and the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, of whom the Communist leaders increasingly have to take account, instead of always exposing ourselves to Communist propaganda, which can so readily claim that it is we who are the H-bomb warmongers, we could gradually show genuine desire and ability to uphold justice, without having to adopt total war methods.

And finally, from the point of view of the morale and unity of our own peoples in the West, instead of having to live with the fear and demoralization of having to threaten and, if necessary, initiate total war for anything beyond a comparatively minor incident, we would gradually become able to conform to the basic moral and legal principle of using force only in proportion to the needs of upholding justice.

Instead of N.A.T.O. and our other alliances having to be run on the basis of 'one in—all commit suicide', they would increasingly be run on the basis of 'one in—all go to the assistance of the one.'

Indeed, everything seems to suggest that this acceptance of a total war balance of power or stalemate, with the acknowledgment of the futility of total war which this would imply, is the only possible way out of the world's present difficulties. For, at the moment, with our emphasis on total war, we are in a vicious spiral, which drains more and more resources, morale, and unity away from our already inferior positions at the limited and cold war levels. And the weaker we get at these levels, the more we have to emphasize and brandish our total war weapons ever more fiercely. Thus, still more of our strength is drawn away from our cold and limited war capability and, of course, the Communists are increasingly tempted to exploit our weakness at those levels, and so on, with the ever-mounting emphasis on total war tending, at the same time, to stimulate the arms race in a vicious circle of its own at the total war level.

The only possible way to arrest and reverse such a spiral is obviously to remove some of the priority and emphasis from the West's total war weapons and preparations. This would begin to break the vicious circle of arms and fear at that level, loosen both Communist and Western fingers, which are at present poised so dangerously on the triggers of their total war weapons, and thus buy the time so urgently needed to escape from our dilemma. And with Western resources and confidence thus able to flow back towards improving our strength and unity at the limited and cold war levels, we might gradually stop the Communists from exploiting their present superiority at these points, and then perhaps bring them to the disarmament and the other local settlements. This would improve our strength and unity still further at the limited and cold war levels, and so provide the overall balance of power necessary for the ultimate reconciliation between East and West which we all long for.

#### LIMITATIONS IN DETAIL

Let us now study in a little more detail how such a modification of our present policy towards this compromise of 'limitations,' and the escape from our dilemma of having to be the first to embark on total global war, would have to be implemented in practice.

First, as regards total war, we—that is to say, the West as a whole—should make it clear, both by declaration and by our preparations, that we accept the inevitability of the total war balance of power or stalemate. We should explain that, although we intend keeping sufficient total war weapons, and sufficiently up to date in them, to ensure that this overall stalemate is maintained, we no longer consider it to be a relative neck-and-neck matter, and we do not intend spending any more resources on total war preparations beyond those necessary to keep such a war thoroughly un worthwhile for any potential aggressor. Nevertheless, we should indicate that we would use our total war weapons in implementation of that deterrent if the Communists used theirs, though never in a spirit of revenge, but only to ensure that it could never be misinterpreted as bluff.

We might, and in my view should, even go further and give up any idea of fighting total global war through to a victory, if we should ever reach such a stage. For a completely unlimited, uncontrolled conflict of that sort would be such a disaster that it could never be in proportion to any issue between us and the Communists, or to the only tenable aim of war, that of upholding justice. It would, in fact, impose far more injustice on humanity overall than any conceivable injustice that we were fighting to remove. This is the point at which it seems to me that the policy of non-violent resistance might well have an application if there were no other method of bringing the fighting to an end.

And now, secondly, in order to restore the limited war balance of power, this compromise policy would require three things:—

*First*, to spend the resources thus saved by our acceptance of the total war stalemate in improving the strength and mobility of our conventional forces, and this is a matter which should be given far greater priority than it has had hitherto. It might even be necessary for a few years, until we have checked and reversed the present vicious circle and got disarmament under way, to find some additional resources for this purpose. There is little doubt that, in America at least, more money could be made available if the need were really felt and understood, which the Americans are now beginning to do. The real requirement is not for great increases in manpower, but for more money to improve the equipment and, above all, the mobility of our conventional forces, in order that the large number of divisions which the West as a whole already possess can be moved sufficiently quickly, and be given sufficient air and naval support, to deter or repel any limited aggression wherever it might take place around the Communist Eurasian perimeter.

*Second*, the restoration of the limited war balance of power requires the acceptance of a much better co-ordinated programme for the development and production of armaments by the countries of the Western Alliance—the implementation, in fact, of the lip service which we all pay to the principle of interdependence. This is largely a question of surrendering a little more national sovereignty all round and, particularly, being a little less tight-fisted about our military and commercial secrets.

*Third*, this restoration of the limited war balance of power requires, unfortunately, for at least some years, acceptance of the necessity for the West, if necessary, to have to initiate the use of tactical atomic war in the most extreme cases of Communist limited aggression by conventional forces only. This is a most unpalatable and difficult matter, but is a fundamental factor from which we are unable to escape until disarmament has gone a considerable

way and our two other measures for increasing our conventional strength have taken effect. This is due not so much to the Communists' vast reserves of manpower but, as described earlier, to geography and the initiative which they hold as potential aggressors and as dictators, which enables them to mobilize and re-deploy their forces more quickly and more secretly than we can.

Now it may immediately be said that if we initiate the use of tactical atomic weapons in the event of an overwhelming local conventional aggression, the Communists might also use such weapons, and the balance of power at the local limited war level would then be no better. This, however, is not so, because for various reasons the possibility of tactical atomic weapons being used would, generally and on balance, favour us in our task of deterring or halting aggression more than it would the aggressor in his task of seizing territory without incurring disproportionate political or military losses. We are more likely to deter and, if necessary, halt Communist aggressions, if we are liable to use tactical atomic weapons as well as conventional weapons, than if we had no choice between the defeat of our inferior conventional forces and suicide with our H-bombs.

Another query which immediately arises is, of course, whether tactical atomic war could be sufficiently limited to be in proportion to the issues at stake in a local limited war, whether it could be reasonably controlled and discriminate, and whether it could be sufficiently distinguished from total global war to prevent it spreading to that. Here we move from facts to opinions.

Clearly, the geographical area of hostilities would have to be limited, but this would apply to any local limited conventional war too. The atomic weapons used would have to be strictly limited in their size and radioactive fall-out in order that they may be reasonably discriminate. The targets attacked would also have to be strictly limited, particularly as regards keeping away from centres of population, otherwise the destruction would be quite out of proportion to the limited issues at stake. Moreover, the country being defended might otherwise prefer Communist occupation to defence. And above all we should have strictly to limit our war aims. In this latter lies the essence of the problem. Never again must we aim at unconditional surrender or, indeed, at victory as such, but only at a cease-fire and return to negotiations on the basis of the minimum conditions required to remove the injustice for which we were prepared to go to war. Any idea of winning such a war would be fatal, as well as wrong morally.

Are such limitations and distinctions practicable, and do the essential people concerned believe that they are? At the moment I believe this is extremely doubtful:—

*First*, because little attempt seems to have been made by Western political and military staffs to work them out, and they are certainly too difficult and complex to be left until the eleventh hour when a crisis arises.

*Second*, because we have, as yet, done nothing to give the Communists, or the exposed countries liable to be attacked, or the peoples of the Western Alliance who might want to go to their support, any idea of the sort of limitations and distinctions we envisage. Indeed, most people have been led to suppose that tactical atomic war would be likely to lead to total global war.

Consequently, at the moment, if a serious local threat arose too strong for our weak and immobile conventional forces but not warranting the use of the H-bomb, there would be so much disagreement and disunity amongst the West as to whether

tactical atomic war should be initiated that either there would be Western paralysis and a bloodless Communist victory, with another country's freedom lost, or, if we should initiate tactical atomic war, then it almost certainly would spread to total global war through sheer lack of previous study and ventilation of the sort of limitations and distinctions needed to prevent this.

If, however, one looks into this matter, one finds that the necessary limitations and distinctions could be made reasonably practicable and credible, provided they were studied in detail, and ventilated in general, well beforehand. Briefly, the reasons for supposing this are :—

*First*, that tactical atomic war weapons are shortly becoming available which are about one hundred-thousandth of the power of the larger total war weapons, have a lethal radius of a few hundred yards as compared with 10 to 12 miles, and can be used with almost negligible fall-out effect. In other words, there is a vast difference between the larger and smaller nuclear weapons, if only we are prepared to establish some sort of distinction between the two.

*Second*, in the event of us having to use tactical atomic weapons for a limited issue, both sides would be desperately anxious not to spread the war out of sheer self-interest, because the local limited issue at stake could not possibly be worth anything approaching total global war for either side. This would be particularly so in the case of the Communists, because any substantial spreading of the conflict would soon begin to encroach upon their vitals when it would still be thousands of miles away from American vitals, which form the main source of Western strength.

This does not mean to say that there would be any guarantee that the limitations and distinctions would in all cases hold good. It is always possible, of course, that they might fail and that the war might spread. But if it did spread, and the fighting begin to get out of control and out of proportion to the limited issue at stake and the overall aim of upholding justice, then I suggest that we should, and would, bring the fighting to an end—if necessary on the enemy's terms, as we British have done many times before in our history.

But the point is this. If we would only work out these limitations and distinctions in detail beforehand, and then ventilate them in general terms, then we would stand the best possible chance of deterring any serious local aggression altogether, and therefore of never having to use our tactical atomic weapons at all. And if by any chance that deterrent should fail, then we would also stand the best possible chance of the war not spreading. We would, in fact, at least be backing the best horse, and be backing it both ways.

Either we must do this and give our tactical atomic deterrent the best possible chance of working, or we should give up our present plans and preparations for embarking upon tactical atomic war as such, which is what, at the moment, the Western forces in general, and the Americans in particular, are becoming increasingly committed to. But there is little doubt in my mind that the least of the evils facing us at this stage is, in fact, to establish our distinctions and make the best we can of this bad job, when one considers that the alternative to tactical atomic war in the case of a serious local aggression is either defeat with our inadequate conventional forces, or suicide with our H-bombs.

But do not misunderstand me. I do not for one moment consider that this tactical atomic solution is satisfactory and one with which we should be content.

Although tactical atomic weapons could be used with a very great degree of discrimination, nevertheless they are much more terrible weapons than conventional weapons, and are not entirely discriminate, because any troops not killed outright by them would be liable not only to prolonged radiation sickness but to risks of long-term genetic deficiency, which might deform their descendants generations later.

My final plea, therefore, is that when we have escaped from our dilemma of having to be the first to use total war weapons, we should then also set ourselves the target of escaping, too, from our dilemma of having to be first to use tactical atomic weapons, and get into a position in which we only have to retain these weapons in order to prevent the enemy from ever using his.

#### DISARMAMENT

By pursuing a defence policy of 'limitations' as proposed, this might well become possible, though it might take five years or more. For not only would our conventional strength be increased by the transfer of resources to it from our total war preparations, and by the economies resulting from our improved interdependence, but the stage would then also be set for disarmament, because of the emphasis removed from the race in total war weapons and the restored balance of power at the limited war level. We would then be in a position to pursue a disarmament policy properly attuned to and co-ordinated with this 'new look' defence policy on the following lines.

Instead of attempting to gain agreement with the Communists on tests, surprise attack, and other measures, in terms of both total and limited war weapons, altogether and simultaneously, we would at first concentrate mainly on such measures in terms of total war weapons, because only at that level is there, as yet, the balance of power which is the pre-requisite of equitable disarmament. Indeed, it may well be desirable that tests of tactical atomic weapons (which, incidentally, are at present undetectable and do little harm to health) should continue on both sides until they are as small and as clean as the scientists can make them. For on that, to a considerable extent, depends for some years our ability to deal with Communism without blowing the world up.

Similarly, agreement on measures against surprise attack with total war weapons is at present more likely than agreement on measures against surprise attack with limited war forces, because until we have shown that we can restore the limited war balance of power, the Communists are unlikely to agree to measures against local limited war surprise attack, though, if we can get any such agreement, we should, of course, do so.

Once these measures for stopping tests and surprise attack at the total war level have been agreed, further steps in reducing total war weapons, and their spread to more and more countries, should become possible. And with the emphasis and expenditure on total war weapons and preparations thus further reduced, still more resources should become available to continue, if necessary, increasing the fire power and mobility of our conventional forces.

But we would hope that, with this gradually improving environment for disarmament, the achievement of a reasonable balance in conventional strength would meanwhile be assisted by some first steps in disarmament at the limited war level, particularly such measures as disengagement and the provision of U.N. observers at and behind the more explosive frontiers, both of which would reduce

the degree to which it is necessary for us to continue the improvement of our conventional strength. Thus, by the combined efforts of properly co-ordinated defence and disarmament policies, we might ultimately escape from our dilemma of having to be the first to use tactical atomic weapons. And gradually we might balance—and, we hope, abolish—war from the already stalemated and saturated total war level down through the tactical atomic limited level to the conventional limited level. The competition and reconciliation between Communism and Capitalism would then be thrashed out at the cold war level.

Perhaps I might best summarize all these proposed modifications to Western defence and disarmament policies in the form of a declaration which the Western leaders might make on the following lines.

"Our first aim in the West is to prevent the total war which nobody wants, and to ensure that it does not occur unintentionally during the necessarily long period required to organize disarmament and a world police force. Our first objective is, therefore, to escape from our dilemma of having to be the first to use total war weapons or methods, and to get ourselves into a position in which we can meet limited threats by limited means.

"As regards total war, we accept the inevitability of an overall balance of power or stalemate in this. Moreover, although we will, until controlled agreements can be arranged otherwise, continue to keep our total war methods up to date sufficiently to ensure that this overall stalemate is maintained, we no longer consider it to be a relative neck-and-neck matter, and we do not intend spending any more resources on total war methods and preparations beyond those necessary to keep such a war thoroughly unworthy for any potential aggressor.

"As regards limited war, we are determined to restore the balance of power at this level, in order to be able to deal with limited threats by limited means. In implementing this, we would always confine ourselves to the use of conventional forces, wherever this was possible, and we will stretch our resources to the limit in order to be able to deal with all possible conventional aggression with conventional forces only. Owing, however, to the Communists' present inherent ability to deploy superior conventional forces against us at some points in some circumstances, during the next few years at least we must reserve the right, if pressed too far, to initiate tactical atomic war, in the face of overwhelming conventional aggression. If we were ever forced to do this, we would, nevertheless, in a limited conflict, limit strictly our war aims, the area of hostilities, the size and radioactivity of the weapons we used and the targets we attacked, particularly in keeping off centres of population, provided the Communists did the same.

"Not only are we determined to escape from our dilemma of having to be the first to use total war methods, but we are also determined, in due course, to escape from our dilemma of having to be the first to resort to tactical atomic war. We realize this may take some time, and will probably be impossible until the speed and strength of Communist potential for aggression with conventional forces has been reduced by agreed steps in disarmament, inspection, and disengagement.

"As regards such measures of disarmament, we will agree right away to the stopping of tests, surprise attack, and the spread to further countries of total war weapons with, in each case, the comparatively small inspection required for such steps, followed as soon as possible by the 'cut-off' of nuclear material, and the reduction of means of delivery, in terms of total war weapons. But we will only agree to stopping tests, 'cut-off' of nuclear material, and reduction of means of

delivery in terms of limited war weapons when the Communists have reduced their conventional forces and agreed to disengagement and inspection to guard against surprise local attack, to the point at which their conventional capability balances ours.

"Thus, we are prepared to abolish the already balanced total war now, and we will abolish tactical atomic war as soon as there is a balance at the conventional war level. We hope that even conventional war, at least on any substantial scale, will then become abolished, too, because of the mutual fear of the nuclear potential which can never be entirely removed from either side. Thus will we settle the issues between East and West at the cold war level, with increasing resources being transferred towards it, on both sides, as disarmament proceeds step by step."

But none of this can start until we have shaken off the massive retaliation attitude, which is so incompatible with the real Communist threat, with alliances, with disarmament, with international law, with the U.N. Charter, and, indeed, with the moral standards which we profess to defend.

Can we in Britain rise to the occasion and give the lead which is so urgently needed in both America and Europe? Not, I fear, until we are prepared to sacrifice a little more national sovereignty, and place Western and world interests before British interests.

## IN DEFENCE OF A DETERRENT STRATEGY

By WING COMMANDER N. CAMERON, D.S.O., D.F.C.

"Or to take arms against a sea of troubles  
And by opposing end them?"—*William Shakespeare*.

**I**T was the Attlee Government of 1945 which decided that Great Britain should make the atom bomb and now, some 14 years later, this country can truly say that it is in the nuclear business. During this somewhat lengthy period of incubation, while we sheltered under the nuclear umbrella of the American Strategic Air Command, the various Governments who have been in power have evolved policy to exploit our emergence as a nuclear power. Sir Anthony Eden's White Paper of 1955 stated that "the introduction of nuclear weapons has significantly reduced the risk of war on a major scale; in the circumstances our immediate duty and our policy are clear to build up our own forces, in conjunction with those of our allies, into the most powerful deterrent we can achieve and by this means to work for peace through strength." In Mr. Duncan Sandys's first White Paper of 1957 this view was ratified and the principles of deterrence began effectively to shape the future structure of all three fighting Services. In 1959, the Government in the annual Statement on Defence maintained that they had no reason to alter their approach to the subject of deterrence and, indeed, events had only gone to strengthen the original concept. This has been a remarkably consistent policy, but during the period of evolution of the British deterrent the strategy as a whole and the British contribution in particular have come up against more criticism and ridicule than perhaps any other important decision in the military history of this country.

This criticism has often been ill-informed and ill-considered, and it has been obvious that a great number of the critics have misunderstood not only the effectiveness of nuclear weapons but also the principles underlying a true deterrent policy. Some of the vested interests, too, have resented the changes a deterrent strategy has wrought on hitherto orthodox military thought.

It is intended therefore in this article to answer some of this criticism first of all as it affects deterrent strategy as a whole and then as it affects the British contribution in particular.

### THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE

The deterrent can be defined as the ability and demonstrable power to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon the enemy's homeland; the threat of its use and the unmistakable determination to carry out that threat if necessary being employed to dissuade the enemy from embarking upon any adventure aimed at world domination. This ability and power is supplied by a nuclear force of bombers and/or missiles backed by the political skill required to make full use of the concept, and last but not least the national will and courage to back the deterrent to the extent of authorizing its use should the international situation become so desperate as to demand it. These principles of military power, political utilization, and national will are completely complementary in deterrent strategy; none of them can stand without the other.

### MILITARY POWER

Two atomic weapons were used operationally when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by the United States Air Force in 1945. Since the war there have

been many nuclear tests, British, American, and Russian, and much has been written about fall-out, blast, fire, and radio-activity. Most of it is true and certainly we know that the West are in possession of weapons at least 50 times more powerful than those used against Japan before the end of the war. The experts have made it quite clear that two to three hydrogen weapons dropped on cities of the size of London, Moscow, and New York would completely erase them from the map. The fall-out from an attack of this magnitude on, say, London, depending on the direction of the wind, could paralyse England from a line through Birmingham and the Wash down to the south coast. However well prepared this country was for an attack on this scale, the death rate would be enormous. It has also been estimated that nine nuclear weapons dropped around the United Kingdom would completely destroy our cities, our agriculture, and pollute our water supply; in fact this country would become nothing more than a radio-active rubble heap. The same would apply to Russia and the United States if subjected to a similar attack, though for obvious reasons the number of weapons required in both cases would be several times greater.

At the moment America, Russia, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, have the weapons and delivery systems necessary to bring about this catastrophic degree of death and destruction.

#### POLITICAL UTILIZATION

Some years ago now the world was startled and shocked by a Press interview which was given by the then American Secretary of State, the late Mr. John Foster Dulles, in which he said when discoursing on nuclear strategy: "Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink you are lost."

This was perhaps not a very sensible time to make his tactics known to the enemy, but nevertheless it is still today a most accurate assessment of the political use of a deterrent strategy. But one must also take this concept a little further and say that the whole art of dealing with an opponent when both sides are indulging in 'brinkmanship' consists in not allowing your enemy to get himself into a position where he has to make a choice between hydrogen war and a humiliating defeat that would be politically unacceptable to the public opinion of his country. Soon your enemy comes to understand that he also must not manoeuvre himself or you into a position which will make the choice of hydrogen war inevitable. And so the *status quo* is maintained, with small fracas occurring from time to time on the periphery but with the main combatants realizing that on no account must they get themselves too fully involved. It is within this structure that the understanding politician finds room for strategic manoeuvre.

This is not a comfortable state of affairs, and no-one would pretend that the fear of mutual annihilation is a sound basis on which to build the future of the world, but we must realize that in present circumstances the only alternative is Western enslavement. Nothing less. Thus it is surely better to exist and endure in this state of tension and to work slowly and painstakingly for improved relationships rather than accept the alternative of defeat.

#### NATIONAL WILL

The national will and determination to use our nuclear bomber force, should a deterrent strategy fail, is the first essential to ensure that it does not fail. The failure

of our deterrent and the use of our bomber force would of course mean mutual suicide for both East and West, but it is the realization by the enemy that we have the national determination to use our nuclear weapons if sufficiently provoked that will persuade him that global hot war is not a profitable means of continuing policy. But it is no use bluffing about it, and the people of this country must be educated to understand the alternatives. Sir John Slessor has covered this problem in his usual straightforward fashion: "If we are not prepared in the very ultimate resort to accept the possibility of suicide to avert the certainty of annihilation, then we are lost. I for one see no superior attraction in being disembowelled by a Russian bayonet or pounded to death by V.2 missiles deployed along the Channel coast, rather than risk extinction by the hydrogen bomb."

One cannot help feeling that we have not done enough in this country to educate the people in the intricacies of our national deterrent strategy. The United States have gone out of their way to ensure that public opinion understands all that Strategic Air Command and a deterrent strategy stand for. The American public appreciate they stand for peace and the strategy has a successful record in the past to prove this. Now that this country has become an operational nuclear power, there is a great need for deterrent strategy to be put in simple terms so that the man in the street can see what he is voting for and paying his taxes for. He will then appreciate that it is by facing up to a real risk of global war, and not supporting a gradual surrender because of the fear of the consequences, which is the real and lasting safeguard of peace. Dr. Kissinger adroitly summed up the principles of deterrence when he wrote: "Deterrence is brought about not only by a physical but also by a psychological relationship; deterrence is greatest when military strength is coupled with the willingness to employ it. It is achieved when one side's readiness to run risks in relation to the others is high; it is least effective when the willingness to run risks is low, however powerful the military capability."

#### ARGUMENTS AGAINST A DETERRENT STRATEGY

It has been suggested earlier in this article that the adoption of a deterrent strategy by the West has produced more argument and counter-argument than any other military decision in history. The main arguments against a deterrent strategy are well known and hardly a day passes without some aspect of this policy being criticized in magazine or newspaper or on the television screen. Unfortunately the answers are not so well known, mainly because the military are precluded from entering into public controversy. Let us have a look at some of the arguments and the answers.

One of the main arguments of the less well-informed anti-deterrent strategists is, "of course you could never really use this weapon." This is a most insidious argument, not least because it appeals to the hearts of all decent rightminded people who naturally find it difficult to believe that weapons of such tremendous destructive power could ever be unleashed on the world. Nothing however could be more dangerous to the security of the West than this 'head in the sand' attitude. It would be criminal folly to suppose that the Russians would shrink from using any means, including nuclear weapons, to subdue the West if they felt there was something to be gained by it. The only hope for the West therefore lies in maintaining the effectiveness of its deterrent forces and the will and determination to use them if necessary.

The only circumstances in which the Soviets are likely to turn to naked aggression, either nuclear or conventional in overwhelming numbers, would be if they felt

that the West did not have the courage and moral determination to support their professed deterrent strategy. Obviously total nuclear war can hold no attractions for the Soviets, since it would mean not only the virtual annihilation of the prize which they wish to gain but also the crippling of their own homeland. There is no sense and no victory in this direction, and it may be accepted therefore that they would only seek to conquer the West by military means if they felt that there was an odds-on chance that they could do so with the minimum damage both to the West and to their own country. This odds-on chance will only come up for them if the West weaken in their determination to use their nuclear weapons. If the West did not possess an effective deterrent force, or, if possessing it, they lost the determination to use it, the Soviets would only need to unleash their numerically far superior conventional forces—or just one nuclear bomb—to bring us to our knees. But so long as we remain prepared to use our deterrent force in the extreme circumstance, the Soviets will know that they can never win since they will realize that their aggressive actions will assuredly spark off a total nuclear exchange wherein lies no victory for either side. We must therefore be realistic about nuclear weapons however much we may dislike them, and the moment the Soviets think that we would never use them, then we are most surely doomed.

The next favourite argument and most popular at present is the 'nuclear sufficiency' argument. The advocates of the 'nuclear sufficiency' school claim that as Russia has now got the weapons and the weapon carriers capable of destroying the West in global nuclear war, then the bomber forces of East and West will face each other across the world and, short of direct aggression against their homeland no Government would dare to authorize their use. They accordingly argue that we must build up our conventional forces to counter those of Russia, who otherwise would hold the initiative. This of course is just what the Russians would like, and do not forget that we would still have to maintain our deterrent force to neutralize the Russian nuclear threat. By returning to large conventional forces we would be inviting economic disaster, and this would apply even to a country of the financial strength of the United States. What better invitation to Communism to come in by the back door than a low standard of living and widespread economic distress, which provide the most fertile ground for the seeds of Communism to grow.

We are faced throughout the world with a conventional force of something like 400 Russian divisions and an air force of some 25,000 aircraft. If the West is to continue to maintain a reasonable standard of living and financially to help underdeveloped countries in their resistance to the spread of Communism, then the threat of retaliation by nuclear weapons is the only sound strategy to adopt. 'Nuclear sufficiency' has not made any material difference to our defence concept. Soviet Russia is no more anxious to be destroyed under a state of nuclear sufficiency than she was some five years ago before the build up of her nuclear force. The knowledge that she had already wrought havoc in the West would make the ruin of her homeland no easier to bear, and until the Russians are prepared to be partners in a genuine comprehensive world-wide disarmament plan, then the West has no other course but to maintain the *status quo* by the threat of nuclear retaliation.

The next argument which follows is that the deterrent is only useful to deter global hydrogen war and nothing else. Well, it is true that the main aim of a deterrent force is to deter global war which, as Sir John Slessor has put it, "is not a bad start." But in so doing it also in a more indirect way deters limited wars. Perhaps this thought deserves some expansion. It is obvious that the West with no aggressive

intention will not start a global nuclear war against Russia unless by extreme provocation. It is also equally certain that, realizing as they surely do the extent of the consequences, the Russians will wish to avoid getting themselves into a position where either they invite a nuclear attack by the West or where their only choice to save their face in the world would be by initiating a nuclear attack against the West. This mutual fear of global war also invalidates the old concept of the global war by miscalculation—the 'nuclear creep' from limited war to global war which many considered, and still consider, the likeliest means of Armageddon occurring. The conclusion then is that you do not get involved in a dangerous limited war in the first place, and as Russia holds the initiative for starting or provoking limited war then we can expect that she will refrain from getting involved, or if she does get involved, she will make sure she can extricate herself without on the one hand, loss of face, and on the other, of bringing down a nuclear attack against her homeland. This will be true so long as she knows that the people of the West have the morale to back the deterrent to the limit. The non-involvement of Soviet forces in limited war during the past decade indicates that the Kremlin well understands this aspect of strategy, and this must be fully appreciated before it is useful to discuss deterrent strategy as it affects limited war. It has to be accepted that Russia does not want her cities, industry, and agriculture, which have taken so long to build up, to be destroyed. She must be made to realize that the West will do just that if forced too far. It is thus up to the West to maintain a stiff and unbending start line throughout the world, both geographically and morally.

The same applies to cold war ; the criticism being that the deterrent is no use when it comes to dealing with a cold war of the type likely to occur, say, in the Yemen or Kuwait. From a purely direct and physical point of view this is true, but the very fact that the deterrent exists ensures that we can handle the small type of situation in a conventional and straightforward manner unhindered by threats of rockets or nuclear attacks from Russia in the way they were threatened during the Suez crisis but quickly silenced when General Gruenther, then Supreme Commander in Europe, took a nuclear stand on our behalf.

Now what about the moral issue ? The use or the threatened use of nuclear weapons poses a moral issue which has become a challenge to the conscience of the Christian world. There has been much criticism in this country on this vital issue—the marchers to Aldermaston and the demonstrators at Swaffham being working examples. All war is repugnant, but already twice in this century we have had to face up to grave threats to preserve our way of life and the ability to worship as we please. Twice we have considered it worthwhile to have our youth slaughtered on battlefields extending from the air over this country to the waters of the Pacific. If the West were to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, either unilaterally or in agreement with Soviet Russia, without any foolproof scheme for comprehensive disarmament, then we would be at the mercy of the vastly superior so-called conventional forces of the Soviet Bloc. The choice therefore is quite simple—being prepared to fight for our freedom with nuclear weapons or being annihilated by conventional means.

A recent Lambeth Conference produced the following observation on the moral issue : " The use of nuclear weapons is repugnant to the Christian conscience. Some of us would go further and regard such use in any circumstances as morally indefensible while others of us, with equal conviction, would hold that so long as such weapons exist there are circumstances in which to use them might be preferable

to political enslavement." Such is the opinion of the Church of England, and it is a fair summary of the breadth of opinion in the country today on the use of nuclear weapons in war.

#### THE INDEPENDENT BRITISH DETERRENT

One of our leading Sunday newspapers recently criticized the British deterrent as "one of the cruellest leg-hauls in history." While fully appreciating the freedom of the Press, one cannot help feeling that this is the sort of statement, made without any relation to the facts, which does a great deal of harm to the national morale and the will of the people to back the deterrent. It is irresponsible, and immediately indicates to our enemy that there is doubt about the potency of our nuclear force. Let us however see if there is any truth in the newspaper statement by examining as many of the facts as possible outside the security barrier.

What constitutes an independent British deterrent force? I suggest the ability to destroy some 30-40 Russian cities is quite enough to discourage the Kremlin from starting any openly aggressive operations against British dependencies and interests throughout the world. And let us not forget, of course, that to a very large extent the British deterrent is also the deterrent which could be threatened on behalf of our European Allies. The days have now passed where the defence of these islands can be divorced from a general European defence concept, and you can be sure—though our sister countries of Europe do not say much about it—that they are thankful of the existence of a British deterrent force.

What hardware have the Royal Air Force been given to provide the teeth of our deterrent force? In the Vulcan and Victor we have at the moment the acknowledged best two aircraft of their type in the world. They are on the whole superior to the bomber aircraft which have provided and are providing the background of S.A.C.'s deterrent effort.

We have been told in White Papers that we have a growing store of kiloton weapons and that the production of hydrogen weapons is proceeding steadily. The advent of the hydrogen-headed guided bomb will ensure the effectiveness of our present 'V' bombers until the mid-sixties and possibly longer. After that we have our Blue Streak ballistic missile and possibly another manned bomber of advanced design. The Government also have accepted the TSR 2 which, though designed as a Tactical Strike Reconnaissance aircraft, will be capable of carrying a large kiloton weapon (or even, one imagines, as development goes on, a hydrogen weapon) well into Russia, boosted by flight refuelling. It is a sobering thought when one considers that what is the modern equivalent of the fighter-bomber of the last war is now quite capable in one sortie of destroying a large Russian city. The TSR2, of course, is not intended to be part of our deterrent force, but it is quite a useful adjunct to our nuclear order of battle should we ever have to count on it.

The V-force aircraft have shown during the 1958 S.A.C. bombing competitions that it is a force which stands on an operational par with our more experienced allies of S.A.C. General Power, Commander of S.A.C., had this to say of our deterrent force recently: "The British V-bomber force with its high performance jet aircraft and thermonuclear weapons is an essential element of the western deterrent and it has an important place in our joint operational plans which are now fully co-ordinated. Should the free world ever be attacked by the Soviet Union, rapid reaction would be vital and having regard to the British closer proximity we are relying on her V-bombers to provide an important part of the first wave of the allied retaliatory force."

Well, there is no doubt that not only the Commander of S.A.C. believes in the power of the British deterrent but also President Eisenhower, when the proof of our emergence as an operational nuclear power brought about the significant and far-reaching Eisenhower-Macmillan statement of interdependence. If the decision to develop the bomb and the aircraft has done nothing else it has produced a trust and sharing of ideas between our two countries to the obvious advantage of both, but possibly to our greater advantage as many steps in defence evolution can now be sidestepped because of information provided by the U.S.A.

There is no denying the fact that the British deterrent is today a deterrent in its own right and certainly sufficiently powerful to make Russia pause and think twice before starting a manœuvre against British interests. If it is a "cruel leg-haul," then it is a joke not being shared by our enemy or our allies.

#### ARGUMENTS AGAINST A BRITISH DETERRENT

One of the main criticisms of the British deterrent has been based on cost. Many of the newspapers, some of our most renowned military correspondents, and many politicians have suggested that if we did away with this vastly expensive deterrent force then we would have enough money available to build up our naval and army forces for conventional limited and cold war.

Perhaps we could look at this suggestion a little more closely. The Defence Estimates this year point out that only some 15 per cent. of the national defence budget of some £1,500,000,000 is taken up in paying for our deterrent force. This percentage of course includes research and development and the fighter and guided weapon defence of our deterrent bases.

If the whole of this 15 per cent. which is equivalent to a sum of about £225,000,000 suddenly became available to be allotted to conventional forces for limited and cold war, what would it produce? It might produce a few more divisions and their backing for the Army (assuming you could also get the men) or a few more frigates and a nuclear submarine or two for the Navy. However a great deal of this sum would be taken up in producing tactical fighter-bombers and additional transport aircraft, and indeed some air defence would still be required even though it was completely divorced from our then non-existent deterrent bases. So really the cost argument holds no water when examined closely, as the bulk of the savings would be reallocated to the Air Force.

There is no escaping it. The British deterrent is providing real value for money; it is not only deterring global war but it is also helping to deter the limited wars. In addition it can be used for dropping conventional bombs should the occasion require, and in the cold war the V-bomber has taken over many of the flagwaving tasks originally carried out by the Royal Navy. The basis of the deterrent policy is also giving our politicians a great deal of manœuvre which, provided they use it properly, enables them to carry out their policies unhindered by the threat of nuclear retaliation by the Russians.

What about the 'leave it to the Americans' and concentrate on conventional forces argument? It has already been shown that to abandon our independent deterrent and to use the money available to strengthen our land and sea conventional forces is a financially empty proposition. Furthermore, the last few years have shown that the Government's decision to build up an independent deterrent was the right one

and the main reason given at the time " that if we were to remain a great Power then we must be members of the nuclear club " has been more than justified by events.

However much we trust the United States, there is no escaping the fact that we in the Commonwealth have got commitments all over the world which carry little or no personal significance to the Americans. By maintaining a separate deterrent from the United States we can give our politicians freedom of action from Russian threats whilst maintaining British policy, say in defence of our oil interests in the Middle East. And in addition to the Macmillan-Eisenhower policy of interdependence, which was a direct result of our independent deterrent, there is every reason to believe that during the past few years the council of our politicians has been greatly respected in Washington, but only because we are a nuclear power and therefore worthy of respect. It meant we could avoid having to hang our hats on our reputation as statesmen and strategists and the glories of the past, and how very much more effective it has proved. Mr. John Strachey, one of the Labour spokesmen on defence, remarked in a television broadcast that during a recent tour of the United States he was greatly impressed by the improved standing the British had in America as a result of our emergence as an operational nuclear power.

There is a strong school of thought in this country at the moment which suggests that as Russia is now fully capable of striking North America, then our allies will seriously change their opinion of what is, and what is not, worth fighting for in Europe and indeed in other parts of the world as well ; the suggestion being that only a direct nuclear attack on the United States would produce massive retaliation against Russia. This may or may not be so, but it is difficult to believe that American politicians are not far-sighted enough to realize that if the Soviets dominate Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, then the U.S.A. are out on their own as the last bastion against Communism. It follows that it would then only be a matter of time. But it is not without the bounds of possibility that Britain and America could disagree about a situation within this broad geographical area, and here rises perhaps the strongest argument for an independent British deterrent force. Mr. Phillip Goodhart, M.P. for Beckenham, pointed out recently in a letter to one of our national newspapers that " the Russians may well reckon that an American President would not commit S.A.C. to defend Paris. But if the Russians also had to reckon with a striking force controlled by a British Prime Minister they might well decide that the whole venture was too risky to begin. " The thought that global deterrence should be under two separate national commanders is a good one and it ensures that even with America in a declared isolation the Russians have two distinct threats to face, which naturally leads to greater stability over a larger area and less temptation for the Soviets to try any adventurous excursions.

It is also true to say that the independent British deterrent can pose a threat to the Soviets out of all proportion to the number of bombers, missiles, and weapons actually in the order of battle. Professor Martin, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, writing in *The Sunday Times*, recently made this point when he stated : " Russia must reckon with the possibility that, should Britain be provoked into using its nuclear weapons, a chain reaction would lead to a total exchange with the United States even when American leaders intended to remain aloof. British forces could also present the enemy with an unacceptable risk of finding himself crippled in the face of a third party. The possibility that the British force might act as a trigger to detonate the larger forces would compel the Soviet Union to approach

any provocation of Britain to nuclear retaliation almost as cautiously as provocation of the United States."

The last word on this argument is from the late Archbishop of York. Dr. Garbett, some time before he died said, "without these weapons the United Kingdom would soon become a defenceless satellite of one of these two great Powers, fearful of incurring the displeasure of either," and to this he added "the possession of the bomb seems to be the one possibility of preserving peace in the years immediately ahead."

#### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ABANDONING THE BRITISH DETERRENT FORCE

Let us imagine for the sake of argument that the Government decided to abandon the deterrent force and its nuclear weapons, as a large body of misguided opinion in this country has been suggesting. What would be some of the results of this change in policy? We have already discussed the subject of any financial saving which might accrue and decided that we might be able to afford a few more divisions, larger tactical air forces, more transport aircraft, and another aircraft carrier or several frigates. The first and inevitable result of this change in policy would be a complete loss of face with the American nation and more than likely the abandonment of the 'inter-dependence' declaration. This would be bound to have its effect not only in the military field but in the development of nuclear power for peaceful uses. In other words we would be rated as a second- or third-rate Power, and with France about to explode her first nuclear weapon we would immediately surrender the leadership in Europe to General de Gaulle. In N.A.T.O. we would be classed with Holland and Belgium as a country with a humble but sincere contribution to make; we might eventually be able to afford to send a few more divisions to Europe but the withdrawal of our nuclear forces from N.A.T.O. would be practically a death blow to an already shaky organization.

There is also the fact that in the next few years China is almost certain to emerge as a nuclear power. We have many great commitments in the Far East which could very easily be threatened by an expanding and ambitious China. Would the United States necessarily be prepared to threaten nuclear retaliation on our behalf because of an incident, say, in Hong Kong? Commonwealth countries like Australia and New Zealand would be increasingly driven towards the U.S.A. for defence with a gradual severance of the links with the 'Old Country' and a great loss to our trade and standing. Pakistan and India might be tempted, in a state of fear, to make non-aggression treaties with the Communists as a sort of insurance policy against future attack which Great Britain would be powerless to do anything about. Consider an attack by the Communists, say, against India with the aim of liberating the growing Communist population of that continent (and already there have been some incidents on the Indian border) America might not answer India's call for help and what could we do with a few extra divisions in a situation of this type? The answer is nothing, absolutely nothing, except appeal to the United Nations, which was hardly effective when Hungary required help. It is not so much a question of our politicians going "naked to the conference table," but a question of whether they would be invited to attend the conference at all. In other words we should become a pawn to any power-thirsty nation, being threatened and shouldered out of one after another of our overseas possessions.

There is also the recent emergence of our Prime Minister as probably, after the death of Mr. Dulles, the leading figure in the West in international politics. Why has this come about? Undoubtedly a certain amount is due to Mr. Macmillan's personal appeal as a world politician, in the Churchillian vein, but his world

standing has only really been consolidated by our emergence as an effective nuclear power. It is unlikely that Mr. Khruschev would have invited him to Moscow if we had not possessed a deterrent, and without the backing of the nuclear weapon he would be regarded as a Spaak, a Nehru, or a Hammerskoeld—exceptionally imaginative but without the finality of real power.

It is not until one examines the alternatives to British deterrence that one really appreciates the full significance of the 'rightness' of the Government decision to develop the bomb and its delivery systems.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Kissinger has likened deterrents and nuclear weapons to the legend of Prometheus who sought to steal the secret fire of the gods and who was punished by being forced to spend the rest of his life chained to a rock. We have certainly in a way stolen the fire of the gods by splitting the atom and we in the West have been since 1945 chained to the rock of deterrence. This may in a way be a punishment, but it has also been a remarkably successful way of keeping the peace; and as long as we stand firm there is no reason why the 'fire of the gods' should not continue to keep the peace for a very long time. However, it is absolutely essential that we should as a nation publicly affirm our confidence in Western deterrence generally and in the independent British deterrent particularly.

Let us hope that the critics will very soon come to understand the broad principles. Let us hope that soon they will realize that deterrents are not big sticks to enforce policy but allow a specific policy to be followed untampered by outside influence. Let us hope that they come to realize that nuclear sufficiency has made not one whit of difference, because Russia is no keener under this state to be destroyed than she was before. Let us hope they realize soon that nuclear sufficiency has only served to highlight the fact that a nation which has a deterrent force and is relying on that force for the maintenance of peace must have the national courage and determination to back that deterrent regardless of the consequences. That is the only possible means of showing the enemy that you are in earnest, and it is the only means of ensuring peace. The more ill-considered criticism we have of the deterrent within the country, the more likely the Soviets will be persuaded that we have neither the motivation or the national courage to back this weapon, and once the enemy come to believe that, then the effectiveness of the British deterrent is irrevocably sabotaged.

The first signs of an economic revival are beginning to show in this country; the pessimists who recommended that we should face the inevitable and accept a position in the world as a second-class Power are being confounded. But it is high time the nation as a whole understood just how much our renewed national vitality and standing as a world Power is due to the Government's unwavering policy to persevere with our independent contribution to the Western deterrent—a policy which has ensured peace for the past decade and which will continue to ensure peace for as far as can be reasonably seen.

## THE "POTEMKIN" MUTINY

By CAPTAIN GEOFFREY BENNETT, D.S.C., R.N.

*Histories of Imperial Russia and the U.S.S.R., when dealing with the abortive risings of 1905, seldom omit to mention the mutiny in the Potemkin (the usual transliteration from the Cyrillic; phonetically it should be spelled Potyomkin). Richard Charques's The Twilight of Imperial Russia and Alan Moorehead's The Russian Revolution are recent examples. But these references are always tantalizingly brief; no details are given. For students of the cinema the affair has been given significance by Eisenstein's Battleship Potemkin, adjudged a classic among silent films; but, from the historian's point of view, this suffers from both dramatic licence and political considerations; it was made in the U.S.S.R. The Revolt of the Potemkin (of which an English translation was published in 1908), by Constantine Feldman, an Odessa revolutionary, is likewise both superficial and inaccurate.*

*Any attempt to remedy these shortcomings is open to the criticism that it is not possible to consult the only presumably accurate records, the reports made by the Commander-in-Chief, Black Sea Fleet, to the Russian Admiralty in St. Petersburg. Nonetheless, a reasonable version of the affair, of which there is none more extraordinary in naval annals, can be reconstructed from other sources, notably the St. Petersburg Official Messenger and British consular reports to the Foreign Office, which include a statement by one of the mutineers.*



FOR a century before 1905 Imperial Russia was boiling with unrest, the people suffering the oppressive rule of an absolute monarchy. At the beginning of the 19th century, 15,000,000 people were serfs, working for 130,000 landowners, of whom the greatest was the Tsar. In December, 1825, the safety valve lifted when the Guards at St. Petersburg mutinied (the Decembrists). Alexander I then made concessions which eased the pressure; but agrarian outbreaks were soon renewed and, though each was suppressed with bloody brutality, by the middle of the century as many as a hundred such disturbances were reported annually.

Alexander II, wiser than his predecessors, realized the need for reform. The serfs were freed in 1861 and the system of government by autocracy was modified. All power remained in the hands of the Tsar and the rich landowners, administered by a strong bureaucracy of officials and supported by the Orthodox Church, but elected county assemblies and town councils were authorized. These steps were not, however, enough. When Alexander II's flirtation with liberalism was brought to an end by his assassination in 1881, his successor had to deal with more than country disturbances. The beginnings of industry in Russia had produced a concentration of factory workers in the cities, among whom there were serious strikes in St. Petersburg and elsewhere in 1882 and again in 1895 and 1896. The people had no other way of demanding relief from want as well as oppression, for those who held the power and the wealth paid wages below subsistence level.

Thus Nicholas II, the last Tsar, inherited widespread revolutionary activity when he came to the throne in 1895. But he ignored it. A man of weak will dominated by the Tsaritsa, he plunged Russia into an unpopular war with Japan, the people believing that it had been instigated by the ruling few for their own aggrandisement. The result, in 1905, when the war proved militarily disastrous, was a wave of strikes accompanied by a nation-wide peasant revolt. In the ships of the Black Sea Fleet the almost illiterate crews nourished a bitter hatred of their officers under whom they suffered a harsh discipline that allowed for no understanding between wardroom and lower deck. Playing no part in the Russo-Japanese war, demoralised by inactivity in the face of the news of the fall of Port Arthur and the destruction of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, they were fertile soil for the seeds of revolution which flourished among the dockyard workers at Sevastopol. Subversive cells were established in every ship, their avowed aim to stir up unrest. An attempted mutiny in 1904 had been quickly suppressed, but the ringleaders had escaped detection, leaving the clandestine cells to continue their seditious work.

In the latter half of June, 1905, Admiral Chukhrin, Commander-in-Chief, Black Sea Fleet, ordered his ships to Tendrovo Bay for gunnery practices before he himself went off on a visit to St. Petersburg. On 25th June (by the Western calendar; until after the Revolution the Russian calendar lagged by 13 days), the battleship *Kniaz Potemkin Tavrichesky*, Captain First Rank Golikov, accompanied by torpedo-boat No. 267, Lieutenant Klodt von Jurgensburg, left Sevastopol in advance of the main body of the fleet. The *Potemkin* (for short), named after Catherine the Great's favourite minister, was of 12,600 tons, a handsome, well-proportioned vessel for her time, with three funnels. Built at Nikolaiev and completed as recently as 1903, she had an armament of four 12-inch guns in two twin turrets, sixteen 6-inch guns, and fourteen 12-pounders. Triple expansion reciprocating engines gave her a speed of 18 knots.

Unfortunately, on 27th June, the sea was too rough for target practice. The *Potemkin* had to remain at anchor in Tendrovo Bay, giving her crew no more to do than the routine tasks of ship maintenance—and to concern themselves with their mid-day meal, for word had spread round the ship that the meat from which their *bortsch* was being prepared was bad. When the cooks reported that it was alive with maggots, Chief Surgeon Smirnov made a superficial inspection and announced: "Those are not worms but flies' eggs; they'll wash off with vinegar. The meat is fit to eat." This edict did not satisfy a discontented crew, but since the regulations allowed no complaints, they could do no more than refuse to eat it.

The executive officer, Captain Second Rank (i.e. Commander) Gilyarovsky reported this to his captain, who promptly cleared lower deck. Addressing his crew, Golikov reminded them that refusal to eat their dinner amounted to disobedience. He then ordered those now willing to eat their *bortsch* to starboard, those who still refused to port. When the great majority went to port, Golikov decided on strong measures to check mass indiscipline. Some 60 of the malcontents were placed under arrest, and Gilyarovsky was instructed to deal with them in accordance with the custom of the Imperial Russian Navy, where disobedience was summarily punished by throwing a tarpaulin over a man and shooting him in front of his shipmates.

The assembled ship's company watched in sullen silence whilst a canvas awning was thrown over their comrades: all knew that it meant a sentence of death. But when Gilyarovsky ordered the guard to fire, no trigger was pulled. Gilyarovsky

reacted by naming one of the guard, Able-Seaman Omelchuk, and ordering him to shoot. This also was disobeyed. Acting on impulse, the frustrated Commander seized a weapon from one of the guard and shot Omelchuk, wounding him so seriously that he later died. This act transformed disobedience into mutiny; members of the ship's revolutionary committee, led by Able-Seaman Matushenko, grabbed the guard's rifles and opened fire, killing Gilyarovskiy and several officers. Whilst other members of the ship's company were obtaining arms, a number of officers tried to escape by diving overboard, but they were fired on in the water, so that few reached torpedo-boat No. 267 safely. Some, however, managed to join their captain in his cabin below.

With the whole crew of the *Potemkin*, some 700 men, supporting Matushenko, either willingly or through intimidation, Golikov tried to deal with the situation by scuttling his ship. But two attempts to do this failed; the officers charged with the task were intercepted by the mutineers. To forestall any further interference with their revolt, the latter decided to arrest their captain. Golikov tried to escape to the torpedo-boat but, before he could dive overboard, he was shot down and his corpse thrown into the sea. The remaining officers were then locked in their cabins, except for Chief Surgeon Smirnov who, not surprisingly, made an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide. The mutineers finished the job for him.

Aboard No. 267, Lieutenant Klodt, lacking the advantage of wireless, decided to proceed to Sevastopol and report the affair to Vice-Admiral Krüger, Admiral Chukhnin's second-in-command. But as soon as he weighed anchor, the mutineers manned the battleship's guns and fired several warning rounds over the torpedo-boat, forcing her to return to her berth with a three-inch shell through her funnel.

Under Matushenko's leadership, the *Potemkin*'s crew elected a committee of 20 to run the ship, to control the considerable sum of money available in the paymaster's safe (some 30,000 roubles—approximately £3,000), and to conduct negotiations with outside authorities. Fired with revolutionary zeal, they pictured the battleship as being in the forefront of a new fight for the freedom for which the Russian people yearned. They composed, for example, this proclamation: "A decisive struggle has begun against the Russian Government, and we hereby inform the foreign Powers thereof. We consider it our duty to declare that we give a complete guarantee of inviolability to foreign ships navigating the Black Sea and to the foreign ports thereof."

Realizing that they lacked the ability to navigate the ship, the committee persuaded Midshipman Alexiev, the assistant navigating officer, to undertake this task. Two junior engineer officers similarly agreed to co-operate with the mutineers. Alexiev was instructed to steam the *Potemkin* to the commercial port of Odessa where, as the battleship's crew knew, revolt was already rife among the workers. Oppressed by the authorities, paid meagre wages by the owners of the factories, they had been angered by the news of 'Bloody Sunday.' This had occurred in January, when the workmen of St. Petersburg had marched to the Winter Palace to appeal to the Tsar to alleviate their sufferings. This peaceful demonstration—when the men were accompanied by their wives and children and led by Father Gapor and other priests of the Orthodox Church it could hardly be otherwise—had been dispersed by rifle fire from a detachment of troops, leaving many dead and wounded lying in the great square in front of the Winter Palace. Moreover, Russia's economy had been strained by the disastrous war with Japan. The factories were dismissing their employees; some had closed altogether.

On 25th June, with the spectre of hunger stalking the streets, delegates from the various factories and workshops in Odessa met to declare a general strike. The police, having information that the delegates included members of the local Socialist Revolutionary Committee, arrested them all. And they found a letter indicating an intention to murder a police officer, a threat which was confirmed next day when two men were arrested near the police station, armed and carrying a document sentencing the police officer to death. A ban was then placed on public gatherings; nevertheless, on the 27th, angry workers filled the streets, whilst the wealthy residents stayed at home behind locked doors and shuttered windows. And late that night, into this veritable gunpowder magazine of incipient revolution, steamed the *Potemkin*, the red flag at her gaff, torpedo-boat No. 267 in company.

The battleship's mutinous crew was assured of a sympathetic reception; nevertheless, to achieve maximum effect, they planned to bury the victim of Gilyarovsky's shot with appropriate honours. Early on the 28th, a boat conveyed the body of Able-Seaman Omelchuk across the bay, 'two hands upon the breast and labour done,' to quote the Russian proverb—but a purpose still to serve. In the harbour it was carried ashore and laid on a bier near the foot of the wide flight of grey marble steps leading up the cliff to the town. (On a visit to Odessa in 1954 I was able to see for myself that those famous steps are still there, albeit now paralleled by a funicular.) One mutineer was left to guard the corpse. The rest of the boat's crew set out on a variety of missions. Some went to buy provisions; others seized two small steamers laden with coal (the *Potemkin* needed to replenish with both); and two delivered letters from the battleship's committee. One appealed to the garrison to lay down their arms rather than support the police in their struggle against the workers. The other was addressed to the French Consul, to be passed to the civil authorities: if there was any interference with Omelchuk's corpse or with the men sent ashore to obtain supplies, "there will be a bombardment of the town from all guns. The crew warn the public of this; in case of firing being necessary, we advise those who do not wish to take part in the revolt to leave the town. We are expecting the assistance of several men-of-war from Sevastopol."

The news that the *Potemkin* was in the hands of mutineers spread rapidly through Odessa. If there were any who did not believe it, they only had to read the inscription on the bier at the foot of the steps:

*Men of Odessa! Here lies the body of Gregory Omelchuk, a sailor brutally killed by the captain of the battleship "Kniaz Potemkin Tavrichesky" for saying "the bortsch is bad." Let us make the sign of the Cross and say "Peace to his soul." Help us to avenge his murder. Death to our oppressors. Hurrah for freedom!*

*Crew of "Kniaz Potemkin": one for all and all for one.*

But there was no doubt of the people's reaction to the mutinous warship. Many boats carried gifts of food out to her; those of her crew who came ashore were treated as heroes. The authorities hesitated as to the best action to take; a threat to bombard the town with 12-inch guns could not be treated lightly. They had, moreover, more than the battleship to worry them; strikers who assembled near Gehr's works had replied to orders to disperse with stones at the police. When a sotnia (100) of Cossacks was called, workmen opened fire on them from the roofs of buildings; the officer-in-charge was wounded; the Cossacks returned the fire with a volley that killed two workmen. News of this affray spread; barricades were thrown up in the streets by angry workers and there were further incidents.

A man named Mordka Zypkin was arrested when about to throw a bomb at troops bivouacked in Cathedral Square ; there were battles between the workers and the police ; two trams were overturned ; at least one policeman was killed. And that afternoon members of the Odessa Revolutionary Committee visited the *Potemkin* and assured them that the workers of Odessa were on their side ; they added the encouraging, but incorrect, information that the rest of the Black Sea Fleet had mutinied at Sevastopol. There is some evidence that a number of women also boarded the battleship and remained there, becoming a subsequent cause for dissension among the mutineers.

A naval supply vessel, the *Viekha*, entered the bay. Her captain hastened aboard the battleship to pay his official call on Captain Golikov. All unsuspecting, he was met by Matushenko and stripped by the mutineers of his uniform ; and his officers were summoned to the *Potemkin* and similarly treated. All were then put ashore except for three, two of whom elected to throw in their lot with the mutineers rather than face the Odessa mob, and Surgeon Golenko who considered his duty to the sick to override other considerations.

That same afternoon arrangements were made for Omelchuk's funeral to take place on the next day. But by this time the authorities had acquired the courage to take firm action against the rebel populace ; a Cossack regiment was ordered to disperse the crowd from around the bier so that the police could take away a body that had become a symbol of the people's resistance. Marching from their barracks, the troops found the streets leading to the port blocked with a mob who would not give way to them. They opened fire and the mob went berserk, indulging in an orgy of looting and arson, shops being ransacked and houses set on fire. Down by the harbour they pillaged warehouses and vessels lying at the wharves and, drunk from the contents of broached casks, they threw the goods into the sea. "With nightfall," said the official communiqué, "fires broke out which soon attained alarming proportions. Almost the whole area of the port was enveloped in flames, for the mob would not allow the firemen to extinguish the conflagration. . . . In the conflagration perished not a few of the rioters and plunderers, who had drunk themselves into a state of stupor."

The Governor called out more troops, the Chief of Police ordered his men to use machine-guns against the crowds, and in time sheer weight of force began to tell. The stones and cudgels of a mob, however numerous, cannot long prevail against disciplined men with swords and firearms. The workers and their wives began to retreat. From streets whose gutters ran with the blood of their companions who had either been shot by the police or hacked to pieces by the Cossack swords, they tried to disperse. But the police had thrown a cordon round that part of the town which lies near the port ; there was no escape for the confused throng. They could only retreat to the harbour by way of the single flight of wide steps down the cliffs.

Relentlessly the Cossacks pressed the mob back, and soon the town was clear of disorder except for a crowd of nearly 10,000 who surged around Omelchuk's bier and up the steps. The troops formed line across the top of the steps and fixed bayonets, then began to advance downwards with a steady tread. Against the savagery of a mob, who counted the Tartars among their forebears, was thus opposed the brutality of the Tsar's troops—and the mob suffered for it. Hundreds lost their lives, shot, bayoneted, trampled to death, or drowned, as the Cossacks descended the steps. They forced the crowd to give way from around Omelchuk's

corpse, pressing it back on to the jetties and into the harbour. The mutinous crew of the battleship *Potemkin*, whose arrival had encouraged the riots that had led to this tragedy, did nothing but watch from their floating grandstand in the bay the smoky glow of the burning town, listening to the crackling of the flames, the shots of the police, and the angry protests and agonized screams of the mob.

Dawn on 29th June revealed a port half destroyed, the city's streets littered with the corpses of the dead, and the grey marble of the Odessa Steps red with blood. Nevertheless, in the words of the official communiqué, "none of the representatives of foreign Powers suffered, each of the 18 consulates being guarded by troops." Nor were there any casualties in the foreign merchant ships in the port, several of which had been asked by their consuls to stand by to embark foreign subjects should the need arise.

A small number of seamen landed to find Omelchuk's body still on its bier; the magnitude of the rioting on the previous evening had given the police other things to worry about. Placing a guard round it, some of the sailors climbed the steps to arrange the funeral. They were arrested but were not held for long; conscious of the temper of the people, the Governor feared a further riot in sympathy with the captives. In return for landing nine of their detained officers, he granted Matushenko permission to bury the dead seaman with the proviso that the escort should be limited to 12 men from the battleship. However, on their return from the grave, this party clashed with the police, who killed three and arrested four of them. The *Potemkin* retaliated by firing three blank rounds and then two live ones, one of which failed to burst, the other damaging a house. This evidence that the mutineers would not hesitate to bombard the town was sufficient to release the arrested men.

News of the mutiny had meantime reached both St. Petersburg and Sevastopol. Admiral Chukhnin hurried south by train; Vice-Admiral Krüger, his second-in-command, sailed with Rear-Admiral Vichnevetsky's squadron which comprised the battleships *Rostislav*, *George Pobedonosets* (George the Conqueror), *Dvenadsat Apostolov* (Seven Apostles), and *Sinope*, and a flotilla of torpedo-boats, with orders to summon the mutineers to surrender, and if they refused, to sink their ship. Expecting them to arrive during the night of 29th, the *Potemkin* cleared for action and burned searchlights as a precaution against surprise attack. But Krüger's force did not appear off Odessa until 0700 on the 30th.

A peremptory signal to the *Potemkin* ordering surrender was countered with an invitation to the admiral to come on board to parley. The mutineers guaranteed Krüger's personal safety, planning to hold him as a hostage. Though Krüger did not fall into this trap, he hesitated to enforce surrender. Matushenko persuaded the *Potemkin*'s committee that there must be a good reason for this; that the admiral was uncertain of the loyalty of the crews of his squadron should they be ordered to open fire on their own countrymen. If the *Potemkin* were to weigh and stand boldly out towards the investing force, it was likely that its men would be persuaded to join the mutiny.

So, flying the red flag, the battleship steamed out to meet the Black Sea squadron, her crew at action stations ready, if necessary, to die in the cause of freedom from tyranny. But they were met with cheers, not gunfire, and the *George Pobedonosets* signalled that she wished to support the mutiny. Thereupon Admiral Krüger ordered his force to retire to Sevastopol. "Why they (the admirals) abstained from opening fire and attempting to destroy the *Potemkin* according to the Emperor

of Russia's order is a matter of the greatest interest, but for the present remains obscure," says a contemporary report. The *Potemkin* went back to Odessa Bay, with the *George Pobedonosets* following astern. On arrival, the latter's captain, Goosevich, and his officers were put ashore.

Five ships of the Black Sea Fleet were now in open mutiny ; the two battleships, torpedo-boat No. 267, and two supply vessels, the *Viekha* and the *Smely*. And to judge by Admiral Krüger's retreat, the *Potemkin*'s committee expected the mutiny to spread. In fact two things happened : at Sevastopol Krüger immobilized his ships' engines and sent their crews on leave ; at Odessa the *George Pobedonosets* failed to share the *Potemkin*'s resolution. Her crew wavered. When, next day, the *Potemkin*'s committee ordered the mutinous force to sail, both battleships weighed ; but whilst the *Potemkin* proceeded to seaward, the *George Pobedonosets* struck the red flag and steamed into Odessa harbour. There her hesitant crew submitted to the garrison commander and asked for the return of their officers. Governor Karangesov promptly went on board and arrested 67 ringleaders who were court-martialled. Captain Goosevich and his second-in-command were relieved and compulsorily retired.

There were two reasons for the *Potemkin*'s decision to leave Odessa. One was the military activity ashore, guns and ammunition being made ready to counter any attempt by the battleship to carry out her threat to bombard the town, and the other was the resolute steps being taken by the civil authorities to prevent further supplies reaching the *Potemkin*. Fuel and provisions being essential if the committee's dream of acting as the spearhead of a revolution was to become a reality, it was decided to seek them in a foreign port. So the *Potemkin*, accompanied by No. 267, set course for Constanza in Roumania. En route they met the transport *Pruth*, flying the red flag ; but seeing no value in her support since she was unarmed, the *Potemkin*'s committee advised her to return to Sevastopol.

The *Potemkin* reached Constanza on 2nd July, saluting that country's flag on anchoring a mile to seaward of the harbour. She was boarded by the captain of the Roumanian cruiser *Elizabeta*, who also received a gun salute, of whom the mutineers asked permission to buy fuel and provisions. This request was telegraphed to Bucharest. Whilst this was being considered by the Government, the *Potemkin*'s crew made an unsuccessful attempt to suborn the Russian gunboat *Psesouape* which was in the port. A more direct attempt to enlist the *Psesouape*'s support, made next morning by No. 267 entering the harbour, was foiled by the *Elizabeta* opening fire on the torpedo-boat.

The Roumanian Government decided to refuse all supplies and to intern the mutinous ships, but to allow their crews to land, guaranteeing their freedom and safety (there was then no extradition treaty in force between Russia and Roumania). This was a generous offer, but the mutineers were unwilling to surrender their ships ; they weighed and stood out to sea again.

The Turkish Government, alarmed at the prospect of the *Potemkin* appearing in the Bosphorus, mined it and issued orders to its batteries that the battleship was to be denied passage of the Straits. The mutineers, however, steamed northwards, to Feodosia on the east coast of the Crimea, where the *Potemkin* anchored on 7th July. The mayor agreed to send off provisions but denied the battleship coal. The mutineers replied with an ultimatum ; the town would be bombarded unless fuel had been supplied by 11 o'clock the next morning. The mayor responded by evacuating the town, and at dawn the mutineers observed the population taking

to the hills. So they sent parties to seize the three colliers lying in the roadstead and tow them out to the *Potemkin*. They had not allowed for the loyalty of the garrison of 600 men who met the battleship's parties with rifle fire and forced them to retire.

This defeat persuaded the crew that their mutiny was doomed to failure. Leaving Feodosia on 6th July, the *Potemkin* returned to Constanza on the 7th. "The reappearance of these unwelcome visitors . . . off the promontory where the Casino is situated, and where a banquet was being held in honour of the Prime Minister, produced . . . great consternation among the inhabitants and authorities . . . who were well aware of their defenceless condition . . . in the event of a bombardment by the crew of the *Potemkin*, rendered desperate by want of provisions and fuel. On this occasion, however, the committee of sailors in command of the mutinied ironclad . . . gave themselves up, as well as the vessel, to the Roumanian authorities."

The last sentence of this contemporary report is not quite true; some of the mutineers elected to return to Sevastopol in No. 267, which did not surrender to the Roumanian authorities. But the majority landed and dispersed to Bucharest and other European towns to disappear into oblivion. Matushenko was last heard of in Geneva. *The Times* correspondent reported: "I have just paid a visit to the surrendered battleship. I found everything on board in a state of wild disorder. . . . The officers' cabins especially have been pillaged, everything worth taking having been removed. There are bloodstains everywhere. . . ."

On 9th July, Rear-Admiral Pisarevsky arrived with the battleships *Sinope* and *Chesma*. The flag of the Imperial Russian Navy was rehoisted in the *Potemkin* and the Roumanian authorities thanked for her safe return. She was then towed by the *Chesma* back to Sevastopol, her boilers having been damaged by the mutineers' use of sea water in them.

Of the mutineers who returned to Russia in No. 267, three were sentenced to death and 52 to long terms of imprisonment. And in August, Vice-Admiral Krüger and Rear-Admiral Vichnevesky were both compulsorily retired for a reason succinctly expressed by the Turkish newspaper *Ikdom*: "The events at Odessa are more shameful than the defeat of Tsushima. . . . The conduct of the admirals is . . . reprehensible. Probably the admirals knew that these men would not obey if ordered to fire on the rebel ship, but . . . this is no excuse. . . . Admiral Krüger, instead of acting thus, showed weakness, and was consequently able to do nothing. By his cowardice he allowed the rebel crews to work their will." There was a greater truth in the same newspaper's more general comment on the affair: "The naval administration is rotten to the core. Officers and men are destitute of the qualities of the soldier (sic)."

Thus, with scarcely a whimper, certainly with no exultant howl of revolutionary triumph, ended the *Potemkin* mutiny. It should have been no more than a minor, but none the less disgraceful, naval episode. It has become a landmark in the history of the Russian Revolution. And the thousands who died on the Odessa Steps that night in June, 1905, are remembered as martyrs in the Communist cause. As for the *Potemkin*, her name was soon discreetly changed to *Pantelimon*, under which guise she survived until the Revolution; then she became the *Boretz za Svojodu*. And in this guise she was destroyed with other ships at Sevastopol on 25th April, 1919, to prevent her falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks, there being neither crew nor fuel to steam her elsewhere.



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## THE BASIC TRUTHS OF PASSCHENDAELE

By CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

**T**IT is astonishing that any soldier, let alone a Staff College graduate, should write as Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke does in his letter on "The Battle of Passchendaele" in the May issue of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL. There he states: "the offensive did not 'bog-down' in the swamps . . . Passchendaele is on the Ypres ridge and the legendary swamps are 20 miles away." It is evident that he did not fight on that front. There are many thousands of soldiers still alive who did, and will know that his statements are ludicrous. There is no 'Ypres ridge'—the town stands in a low-lying plain little above sea-level. Even the so-called 'Passchendaele ridge' is only a slight rise in the plain—a rise of merely 20 to 30 metres in the six miles between the two places. The ground between always turned into deep and extremely clogging mud after heavy rain, and much worse when churned up by bombardment.

It would appear that Brigadier Clarke, in making light of the mud, has been misled by the way Sir James Edmonds minimised it in "The Retrospect" to the Official History that he wrote 30 years after the event, and when approaching 90 years of age. Even at the time, in 1917, his view of the battlefield was only from a desk at G.H.Q., 60 miles behind the front.

Brigadier Clarke, however, has not studied with due care the one contemporary source he himself cites, the diary entries printed in *The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919*. For Haig himself noted on 1st August, 1917, just after his offensive started: "The ground is like a bog." On 12th October, he emphasizes "the very bad state of the ground." Next day he records that "the ground is so soft in places, the D.G.T. (Nash) told us, that he has light engines on the 60-cm. railway sunk halfway up to the boiler in the mud." Moreover, in his despatch, Haig stated that even during the first rain in August "the low-lying clayey soil . . . turned into a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning."

The basic condemnation of Haig's judgment is that he pursued his dream of victory in an area so apt to become 'impassable'. His own admissions at the time make nonsense of what his close assistants and friends, like Edmonds and Davidson, wrote many years later in their old age when trying to excuse and justify his course. They merely reveal how fallible human memory becomes as the years pass, especially when there is a strong emotional motive to distort it.

The truth about the basic cause of the failure was admitted in the otherwise laudatory biography of Haig written in 1929, just after his death, by his friend and Chief Intelligence Officer, General Charteris. There (on pages 273-4) it is frankly stated that "the intricate network of surface and subsoil drains, patiently designed and executed by the Belgian agriculturists, were destroyed by the artillery fire, and the steady downpour of rain transformed the plain into a sea of mud".

Brigadier Clarke is also badly misled, in his assertion that "Petain urged Haig to attack and keep on attacking owing to the state of the French Army," and that even in October "Pétain again begged Haig to continue the offensive, and Foch agreed." There is not a scrap of evidence in Haig's own diary or in any

other *contemporary* record that supports such an assertion. On the contrary, Haig's *Private Papers* show that Haig himself, writing to Robertson on 8th October, just after Pétain's visit, made no suggestion that Pétain wished him to continue the attack, but instead confidently declared that "the 100 French divisions may be estimated as fully equal to an equivalent number of German divisions . . . they are staunch in defence"; and argued that it was unnecessary to take over a larger share of the front from them (at this time the French held 350 miles of it and the British only 100 miles).

The time that Pétain expressed a desire for Haig to continue attacking as a relief to the French was in the spring, immediately after the French mutinies, and long before Passchendaele. But even then he did not wish Haig to embark on any big offensive, least of all in Flanders. The British records of discussions between the two men show that Pétain strongly objected to Haig's plan of attack and its far-reaching objectives. (This is admitted in the O.H. itself: 1917 Vol. II p. 27.) He deprecated anything more than narrowly limited attacks and wanted Haig to conserve the British Army's strength until the 1918 campaign, when the Americans would be arriving. Published contemporary records, too, show that both Pétain and Foch regarded Haig's offensive with grave doubt, even before it was launched. The diary of Sir Henry Wilson, then Chief Liaison Officer at French G.Q.G., records on 11th May, "I went to see Pétain. . . . He is opposed to Haig's plans of attack. . . . He is opposed to big attacks, and favours small fronts and great depths." The diary subsequently records that on 19th May, Pétain expressed the view that "Haig's attack towards Ostend is certain to fail," and that on 2nd June Foch termed it "a duck's march" and considered "the whole thing futile, fantastic, and dangerous. . . . So Foch is entirely opposed to this enterprise." On 9th August Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, conveyed to Haig in a letter, recorded in Haig's diary, Foch's view that "it is hopeless looking for good results on the West Front." Moreover, the secret *Memorandum on Operations on the Western Front, 1916-18* which Haig deposited in 1920 at the British Museum, with instructions that it should not be published before 1940, shows that Pétain's request to Haig that the British should "continue to attack the enemy," and not "relax their activity" was made soon after the French mutinies in May. It also states that Pétain "held the view that large operations with the object of breaking through on the Western Front could obtain no decisive results, and that the best plan for the remainder of the year was for the French and British to carry out small local offensives with limited objectives." This makes it very clear that Haig was fully aware that Pétain did not approve of a big offensive by the British in Flanders, and there is no suggestion that Pétain ever begged Haig to launch such an offensive or continue it.

It was not until ten years after the battle that Haig, in an attempt to justify his action in face of Winston Churchill's indictment, asserted in a letter to a friend that "the mere suggestion of a pause in our attacks in the north at once brought Pétain in his train to see me and beg me to put in another effort against Passchendaele without any delay." Haig, in this letter written some months before his death, had evidently got his memory confused and associated Pétain's appeal in the spring, just after the French mutinies, with the very different situation in the autumn, as the reference to Passchendaele indicates. Davidson quoted this letter in one of his own to *The Times* in 1934 (14th November). The question was subsequently referred to Marshal Pétain, who answered that he had "not exerted any pressure on Marshal Haig in favour of the continuation of the autumn offensive." Pétain's

statement coincides with all the contemporary evidence of 1917. He also said that "to excuse Marshal Haig I replied to Mr. Lloyd George, who asked me verbally my view on the operation, 'One cannot fight at the same time against the Boche and the mud (*la boue*)'."

Haig's mistaken assertion in 1927 was revived afresh, however, after a further 20 years had passed, by General Edmonds in his old age—and, regrettably, inserted by him in the Official History of Passchendaele. Brigadier Clarke's letter shows how it continues to mislead people. It is a pity that the historical facts of the campaign, which had been clarified by research between the wars, should now be again confused by the misleading effects of hazy human memory.

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Mr. J. A. Terraine's article on Passchendaele is more discerning and better balanced. He has the perspicacity to see the hollowness of the retrospective excuses, produced long after the event for Haig's decision, and to reach the conclusion that "the battle was not fought to save the French Army." But even he, perhaps through having come recently to the subject, has been misled by General Edmonds's editorial distortions in several important respects.

Anyone who was in close touch with the preparation of the Official History knows that Captain Wynne compiled the main part of the volume—which conveys so different an impression from General Edmonds's editorial notes, "Preface" and "Retrospect"—and is aware of Wynne's scrupulous objection to having his name put on the volume as thus 'edited'. In this connection, your readers may well bear in mind Wynne's outspoken denunciation of the Official History in your issue of February, 1958, for its habit of suppression and distortion: "The editorial viewpoint throughout is that British Headquarters was right . . . The editing of the volumes, and the comments and conclusions, twist the narrative to the outlook of British Headquarters at the time."

My files contain numerous private admissions by Edmonds during the 1920's and 1930's that in the Official History he felt bound to suppress the truth out of friendship and loyalty to his old comrades in high places, particularly Haig. They also contain frequently repeated comments by Edmonds that Haig was "really a stupid man", that he "merely shoved the thing along", that he could not "grasp anything technical", and had "no comprehension of siege-war matters"—"I have to write of Haig with my tongue in my cheek".

Most significant, too, was a comment by Edmonds in 1935 that he had found a number of passages in Haig's diary which must have been added by him subsequently from later knowledge or else inserted to convey a different impression from what he had written at the time.

Edmonds repeatedly told me that because of his official position and friendships he could not put the hard truth in the Official History, and therefore made his knowledge of it available to me so that it should be made known to military students, as I was in a more independent position. His approval of, and general agreement with, my interpretation of the evidence was made clear by his verdict on my one-volume history of the war as "the best by a long way in any language", and his strong recommendation of it may well have had an influence on its adoption as the official textbook at Sandhurst and other Service Colleges.

These files of mine are available to historians and have been seen by a considerable number. More than a year ago, on hearing that Mr. Terraine was writing an enlarged

study of the Passchendaele campaign intended for the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, I offered to let him go through the files. If he had taken the opportunity he would hardly have been misled by the Official History in the way he has been.

In the 1930's, before Edmonds aged, the risk of any student being thus misled was much reduced. For Edmonds did not confine to me his illumination of the underlying truth, but expressed his real views freely and widely among his friends, and to others who consulted him. Among these was Dr. Cruttwell of Oxford, and the effect of Edmonds's disclosures to him can be seen in his *History of the Great War*, published in 1934.

More surprisingly, Edmonds gave his real views no less frankly to Haig's most severe critic, Lloyd George, and after the publication of Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* expressed his agreement with their judgment of Haig's defects. That becomes apparent from a letter which Lloyd George wrote on 28th November, 1938, after a long talk with Edmonds, referring to the contrast between what Edmonds said in the course of this and what he wrote in the Official History: "He is a queer fellow. His real opinion of Haig coincides with yours and mine, but the exigencies of his environment have driven him to twist his real convictions into their present grotesque shape."

Mr. Terraine, in the opening part of his article, expresses surprise that in 1957 I publicly criticized General Edmonds's distortion of the facts in the Official History of Passchendaele, whereas 20 years before I had dedicated to him one of my books, *Through the Fog of War*. The explanation is simple, though sad. That dedication expressed my indebtedness for his private guidance about the underlying truth, while emphasizing that he "knows more of the history of the War than he will ever write"—a wording which he approved, and would convey to intelligent readers that he could not write the full truth in the Official History. But as he grew older the habit of keeping his official conclusions distinct and different from his real views got an increasing hold on him, and the former became predominant in his ageing mind. Thus he changed from merely soft-pedalling the truth to grave distortion of it (as the main compiler of the Passchendaele volume has emphasized). This growing trend was understandable, but could not be excusable in an historian—especially in one who was entrusted with clarifying the lessons of recent experience for the guidance of the Army in preparing for future emergencies.

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A flagrant example of how he has misled Mr. Terraine, as well as many others, is in regard to the German casualty figures. The *Reichsarchiv* tabulated records cover the whole of the German Fourth Army, which held the sector from the sea to Armentières—a stretch much longer than the actual battle-front. For this army's sector as a whole, the O.H.L. (Supreme Headquarters) casualty figures, in ten-day periods, total approximately 217,000 from 21st July to the end of the year, and 202,000 from 21st July until 10th November—the period embracing the preliminary bombardment and the duration of the battle. The Medical Services' figures total 27,000 less, but these exclude the lightly wounded who did not leave their units.

General Edmonds in our Official History, however, takes the maximum figure of 217,000, and adds a mythical 33 per cent. for lightly wounded—wrongly asserting that these were not included in the O.H.L. figures. He thus inflates the German losses to 289,000. Moreover, he does not make deduction for losses suffered outside the battle-front, or for those outside the period of the battle, or for those inflicted

by the French offensive on our left. It thus becomes very evident that his sole concern with the figures is to make the German losses appear larger than the British. To support his assertion that the German casualty figure did not include the lightly wounded, he goes so far in deceit as to telescope two sentences of the German official history, omitting the keywords of the first, and thereby distorting the whole sense of the purported quotation.

More absurdly still, in a subsequent estimate along another line of calculation he reckons that "the loss of the infantry alone comes to 364,320". From this he proceeds to state that "there seems every probability that the Germans lost about 400,000". This estimate is evidently too much for Mr. Terraine to accept, but he has been sufficiently misled to take as reasonable the figure of "approximately 300,000" for the German losses in the battle.

When there is any doubt or dispute about comparative national methods of reckoning the figure of wounded, the total of dead and permanently missing (exclusive of those taken prisoner) is a better guide. The figures worked out by the War Office after the war showed the British total of *killed and missing* (apart from prisoners) for July-December, 1917, as approximately 94,000 on the whole of our front and the German total on this front as approximately 64,000. (The same table gave the total British casualties as 449,000 and the German as 271,000). Another table gave the number of British wounded who died of their wounds as 28,000, thus raising the British total of *dead and missing* to 122,000; this table did not deal with German losses, whose total of *dead and missing*, on the same ratio, must have been about 83,000. Fortunately, the gap was reduced by the capture of 37,000 Germans compared with only 14,000 British. Even so, it was in sum a very adverse balance of loss for the British. It is obvious that the bulk of the losses were incurred in the Passchendaele offensive, as the only other serious fighting during this six months' period was the brief Cambrai thrust and *riposte*. Thus only a fantastic juggling with figures, such as Edmonds did, could make the total German casualties larger than the British in the three and a half months' Passchendaele battle.

An exact calculation of the comparative losses therein is difficult because the German figures embrace the whole of their Fourth Army, which held a front more than twice as wide as the combined frontage of the British Second and Fifth Armies which attacked it on its Ypres sector, and the northern half of its front included the sector attacked by the French First Army, as well as the Belgian Army's sector. The total *dead and missing* (exclusive of prisoners) in the German Fourth Army from 21st July to the end of the year was 57,000, and it is possible that about 50,000 of these occurred on the sector attacked by the British. The total in the British Second and Fifth Armies was at least 80,000—and this calculation may err on the low side in view of the all-over British total of 122,000 between July and December.

An examination of the figures of dead and wounded throughout the war shows that in the German casualty lists the average ratio was 1 to 2.35 and the British lists 1 to 2.27. That difference in itself shows that the German figure did not exclude the lightly wounded, and thus shatters Edmonds's absurd contention that 33 per cent. should be added to the German casualty figures for a fair comparison.

On the overall average ratio of wounded to killed, and adding the 26,000 prisoners taken by the British, the total casualties of the German Fourth Army come to 217,000. That figure corresponds exactly to the O.H.L. figures—but of this total a considerable

number occurred outside the British offensive front, and also during the seven weeks after the offensive ended.

On the overall average ratio, also, the British casualties come to 278,000—adding the 14,000 taken prisoner. But in this particular period, according to the War Office figures, the ratio was 1 to 2.76, and the total would thus be 315,000. This is close to the figure of 324,000 given in the War Office table for the Passchendaele offensive period from 31st July to 19th November, including the quiet sectors but excluding the preliminary phase of the bombardment and counter-bombardment.

General Edmonds, however, prefers to give the lowest estimate ever produced, approximately 245,000—an estimate made and sent to the British Military Section at Versailles soon after the battle ended. The unreliability of the figures produced by G.H.Q. and the General Staff at that time, and the way they were minimized to justify the offensive, became evident in post-war investigation. A paper produced in October to hoodwink the War Cabinet put the British losses up to 5th October as only 148,000 and the German losses as 255,000!

In sum, from checking and cross-checking the records, it is reasonably certain that *the British losses in the three and a half months of the Passchendaele offensive were near 300,000 at the lowest—while probable that they were more—and that the losses among the German troops facing them on that sector were a little under 200,000.*

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It cannot be maintained that such a disproportionate sacrifice by the British was called for to save the French. Nor is it true that "it did save the French" as Mr. Terraine now contends—after recognizing that the first line of defence put up by Haig's apologists is untenable, and that "the battle was not fought to save the French Army". Hindenburg and Ludendorff never for a moment considered the idea of attacking the French front in 1917, even after the obviously shattering collapse of the French offensive in the spring. Their minds were concentrated on finishing the war on the Eastern Front, their dominant aim being, as Ludendorff put it, "to keep on hammering at Russia in order to bring about the fall of the Colossus". That aim was not achieved until December. Ludendorff was all the less inclined to consider tackling the French since he had been impressed by the vigour of their attack at the Verdun in August, which led him to the conclusion that the French Army "had quickly overcome its depression." Moreover, the logistical difficulties of a large-scale shift of German forces from East to West for a knock-out blow against the French between August and autumn would have been immense.

It is astonishing that some of Haig's old staff officers should, in their desire to justify his Passchendaele offensive, have argued in later years that there was still a serious risk that the Germans might have switched their forces westward and attacked the French before the autumn mud became a check. Such an argument shows that emotional reactions can have more influence than professional education, and that even trained staff officers can talk more amateurishly than the civilian ministers they are so apt to deride for airy ideas about the possibilities of switching large forces quickly from front to front. They could hardly have put up this argument if they had read, carefully and in full, Haig's letter of 8th October to Robertson presenting his case for pursuing his offensive. For there Haig himself emphasizes that the enemy was unlikely to shift any reserves to the West in the near future, and went on to point out that "in the time available for further operations here this year he can do little to affect the situation here by transferring troops."

In trying to justify Haig's continuance of the Passchendaele offensive in October and November, when weather and mud were frightful, Mr. Terraine also argues that the necessity of gaining the high ground "is undeniable", and any halt short of it "was unthinkable". This is an astonishingly naive argument. For any reader of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL who served on the Western Front in that war will be aware that the Germans were on the high ground along most of the front during most of the war—yet it proved quite possible for the British to hold their line on the lower ground. That was the situation at Ypres for the three years previous to the Passchendaele attack, and again after our forces withdrew from the ridge in April, 1918, when Haig evacuated this precariously protruding salient to make his line more secure.

The real reason for Haig's continuance of his offensive is not mentioned, nor apparently recognized, by Mr. Terraine. Yet it was shown very clearly in Haig's letter of 8th October to Robertson, when he confidently declared his belief that "we have brought German resistance so near to breaking point" that a continuance of our offensive might achieve this "at any moment".

The first consequence of his persistence, on such bad ground was to forfeit the chance of a great success at Cambrai—the planned surprise attack, over the dry uplands there, having been put off in order to continue pushing at Passchendaele, thus using up the reserves required to exploit opportunity at Cambrai. It is absurd to blame Lloyd George for this shortage of immediate reserves at Cambrai, as Mr. Terraine does—even General Edmonds does not try such a thin excuse.

The second, and worse, consequence of Haig's persistence at Passchendaele was to produce "the vast depression" of the spirit of the British troops, from which they had not recovered when the Germans took the offensive in March, 1918. By contrast, all observers bore witness to the exuberant confidence of the German troops early in 1918, from which it is clear that the strain of the struggle in Flanders did not affect the morale of the German Army anything like so widely and persistently as it did the British.

The depressing effect of Passchendaele was a deeper cause of the breakdown of the British defence in March than any deficiency of numbers. It is unjustifiable to blame this breakdown on Lloyd George, and his supposed decision "to withhold reinforcements". The figures in Appendix 7 of the Official History, 1918, Vol. I, show that the strength of the fighting troops was only 3 per cent. less at the outset of 1918 than the year before, when they had to undertake the offensive. The total strength, moreover, had risen by nearly 20 per cent. Before the German attack came, the forces in France were reinforced by a further 167,000 fighting troops, equal to an additional 15 per cent.

Moreover, it was the General Staff which advised the War Cabinet that it would be best to keep the general strategic reserve of 120,000 men in England, and their advice was based on Haig's assurance that he was well able to hold his own against a German offensive for 18 days provided that the reinforcements reached him within that period. Haig's own confidence in his power to repel any German offensive is clearly shown in his own diary. On 28th February he wrote: "I must say that I feel quite confident"—and on 2nd March, after expressing his satisfaction with the preparations, added: "I was only afraid that the enemy would find our front so very strong that he will hesitate to commit his Army to the attack with the almost certainty of losing very heavily".

## THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN OF 1917 AND THIRD YPRES

By CAPTAIN S. W. ROSKILL, D.S.C., R.N. (RETD.)

**I**N his interesting article 'Passchendaele and Amiens, I' (R.U.S.I. JOURNAL, May, 1959), Mr. Terraine suggests that the unrestricted U-boat campaign against our merchant shipping, which began on 1st February, 1917, may have had considerable influence on the decision to launch the offensive in Flanders later in that year; and there is indeed ample evidence to show that Admiralty pressure to capture Ostend and Zeebrugge was one of the two big factors which Haig had to take into consideration. The other was, of course, the condition of the French Army. What has not so far been fully investigated is, firstly, how far the views represented by Jellicoe were justified; and secondly, whether the capture of the Flanders bases would in fact have affected the U-boat campaign materially. Mr. Terraine says, correctly but with marked moderation, that the crisis at sea was ultimately "overcome without the Army's aid"; and at the end of his article he writes that "*given the submarine menace* (my italics) there was never any doubt that it [the British offensive] would have to be launched in Flanders." The present writer's purpose is to state the facts regarding the submarine campaign of 1917-18, with particular reference to the Flanders U-boats, and to consider how far the views expressed by the Admiralty representatives to the War Committee, and by Jellicoe to Haig personally, were soundly based.

In the first place there is no doubt at all regarding the seriousness of the situation produced by the unrestricted U-boat campaign. Total Allied shipping losses rose from a monthly average of just under 200,000 tons in 1916 to 881,027 tons in April, 1917, and did not decline very markedly until the autumn of that year. But what proportion of those losses was inflicted by the Flanders U-boats? Volume IV of the German Official History of the U-boat war, which has never been translated into English, gives the monthly tonnages claimed to have been sunk by both the Flanders and the High Seas Fleet U-boat flotillas. Though the German figures have never been checked against actual Allied losses, as has been done for the 1939-45 War, and they are probably on the high side, it is unlikely that the relation between the sinkings achieved by the Flanders and the High Seas Fleet flotillas is much in error.

For the first four months of the unrestricted campaign the German figures are as follows:—

1917	<i>Tonnage sunk by</i>		<i>Tonnage sunk by</i>	
	<i>High Seas Fleet</i>	<i>Flotillas</i>	<i>Flanders</i>	<i>Flotillas</i>
February	...	...	269,327	112,527
March	...	...	289,188	157,464
April	...	...	436,159	136,603
May	...	...	238,899	168,928
			<hr/> 1,233,573	<hr/> 575,522

For the four months June-September, 1917, the aggregate sinkings were 1,039,760 tons by the H.S.F. flotillas and 518,696 tons by the Flanders boats, which about maintains the proportions of the preceding four months. It therefore seems true to say that nearly one-third of our losses probably derived from the two flotillas of UB.III (520-ton) boats based in Belgium, and rather over two-thirds from the

standard type (750-850-ton) boats working from Wilhelmshaven or Kiel; and the former almost certainly sank a higher tonnage per U-boat-day-at-sea. So far the results of the U-boat campaign during the months immediately preceding the Third Battle of Ypres appear to give some justification not only for the Admiralty's anxiety but also for the pressure on the Army to capture the Flanders bases; for the reduction of our losses by nearly one-third would have brought a substantial easement. It is when one looks into the matter more closely, and in particular considers the alternative policies open to the Admiralty, that doubts begin to arise. In the first place, had the Army seriously threatened Ostend and Zeebrugge, the U-boat flotillas based there would undoubtedly have shifted east to German bases and continued the campaign from there. This would have reduced their effectiveness somewhat, especially in attacking our Channel shipping, but it is difficult to believe that their accomplishments would have fallen very appreciably. If that be accepted, then the Admiralty's pressure on Haig at once begins to look more doubtfully justifiable. Secondly, there was already available to the Admiralty a far more certain means of reducing our losses and of sinking U-boats than by capturing Ostend and Zeebrugge—namely by putting our shipping into convoy.

The story of the Admiralty's stubborn opposition to convoy is a long one; and in the light of all previous experience of sea warfare it is extremely difficult to understand. Whatever one may think of Lloyd George's conduct towards Haig and Robertson, he was undoubtedly right over his pressure on the Admiralty to introduce convoy; but he only accomplished his purpose by dismissing Jellicoe from the office of First Sea Lord and replacing Carson as First Lord. Lord Beaverbrook records that "on 30th April [1917], with the submarine peril at its height, the Prime Minister descended upon the Admiralty and seated himself in the First Lord's chair. . . . Lloyd George had staged a deliberate encounter with the Naval High Command, and had emerged triumphant. But he had lost faith in Carson, Jellicoe, and even his Board of Admiralty."<sup>1</sup> Though Beaverbrook was hardly an impartial observer of those events, his version of them is supported by the changes made at the Admiralty and by the fact that convoy was then gradually introduced, our shipping losses began to decline, and the sinkings of U-boats began to rise. Had the Admiralty been prepared to introduce convoy as soon as unrestricted U-boat warfare began, or earlier, not only would the seismic disturbance produced by the Prime Minister have been avoided but Jellicoe's pessimistic prognostications made to the War Committee and to Haig—that we should lose the war unless Ostend and Zeebrugge were captured—would surely never have been uttered. Is it too much to suggest that in that event Haig would have regarded the decision to launch and subsequently maintain the offensive in Flanders in a different light? If that be so, then a share of the responsibility for the appalling losses suffered by the Army in the Third Battle of Ypres must surely be placed at the Admiralty's door.

But convoy was not the only means of reducing our shipping losses and sinking more U-boats, though it was certainly the most effective one. It is disturbing to find in the German history already quoted how very ineffective the Dover Barrage was in 1917. Between February and May of that year the Flanders U-boats made no less than 122 crossings of the barrage, and although eight boats ran into the nets only two were sunk—by ramming. The chief reason for the ineffectiveness of the barrage was that, after three years of war, we still did not have an efficient mine. It is worth remarking parenthetically that in 1939 the Dover Barrage proved extremely effective

<sup>1</sup> *Men and Power*, pp. 155-6.

and, after losing three U-boats on mines, the Germans abandoned the attempt to break out into the Atlantic by the Channel. Secondly, if one accepts the proposition that the capture or neutralization of the Flanders U-boat bases was really vital, was the land offensive the best way of achieving that object? Was not the blocking of the Bruges canal exits, which was not attempted until April, 1918, a far sounder strategic proposition as well as an infinitely more economical operation? Though it is true that the blocking operations did not, we now know, succeed in bottling up the Flanders U-boats, it does seem regrettable that the attempt was not made until it was too late for it to exert much influence on the U-boat campaign. Last of the possible alternatives to the land offensive stands the neutralization of the U-boat bases by bombing raids launched from behind the British lines which, even in those days, might have accomplished a good deal.

In sum, therefore, it does seem fair to conclude that the U-boat campaign should not have been allowed to exert the influence that it undoubtedly did exert on the land operations in Flanders; and that a good deal of erroneous reasoning lay behind the statements made by Admiralty representatives to support the continuation of the land offensive. Lastly, had we then possessed an inter-Service strategic planning authority, it is difficult to believe that the fallacies here discussed would not have been exposed in time to avoid what may be considered errors of some magnitude—the price of which was paid by the British Army.

## SUEZ AND SYRACUSE

By COMMANDER R. A. CLARKSON, R.N.

**M**OST naval officers probably think of the Suez operation of 1956 as a political disaster redeemed by a competent military performance in certain important aspects. There are criticisms of timings and methods, but by and large it is thought that the Services did their jobs. Thus although there was no enemy opposition to speak of for the Navy, the impression of a naval success emerges, based principally on the work of the carriers, whose fire power lent impressive support to the land forces. At the conclusion of the operation naval opinion tended to regard the expedition as confirming the carrier as the basis of the fleet. The 'balanced fleet', as it is called, had done its work in support of the Army in Egypt as it had done earlier in Korea. We were on the right track; post-war conceptions were right. To my mind this is a heretical opinion springing from a failure to appreciate the true role of the Navy. Curiously, it is an error of principle which great maritime nations have made before. I see it this way.

We live on an island at a point in time when the opening rounds of the battle for power in the nuclear age are being fought. Any advantages which we currently enjoy in this battle have been secured either directly or indirectly by our ability to impose our will wherever we chose through the uninterrupted use of sea power. As Sir Walter Raleigh had it: 'Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world and consequently the world itself.'

This is a passage with which few naval officers will disagree. It follows that this country must, if it has not lost the will to keep its place in the world, develop and hold the right amount of sea power from age to age. The methods by which it is done will change as science changes; so far as recorded history shows us, however, the nature of sea power itself does not change. It is perhaps important to recapitulate the main characteristics of this national asset.

The story of modern sea power can be conveniently begun with the battle of Salamis fought between the Greeks and the Persians in 480 B.C. It was one of the decisive battles of the world, representing a victory of the West over the East. Its significance for the sea officer lies in the revelation it provided in the use of ships. The Persian fleet was organized to carry troops in the customary way; the Greeks overcame the handicap of being greatly outnumbered by manoeuvring their ships into a superior tactical position from which they defeated their enemies. Ships were shown to have a value in themselves other than that derived from carrying soldiers. In fact it became clear that soldiers could not be deployed successfully abroad without first winning the sea battle with ships. This required special ships and special tactics, which the Athenian Greeks were quick to learn. Thereafter they sought to win the sea battle with their ships and then exploit it with their troops. These methods brought them great success until they made the error so often made by their enemies and were defeated. In the expedition against Syracuse in 416 B.C. they took their superiority at sea for granted and used their ships as troop carriers. With their ships in poor condition and no room to manoeuvre, they lost their fleet.

This story of a nation which obtained sea power by building fighting ships to defeat their seaborne enemy and later lost it by failing to maintain such a fleet was often repeated. The Saracens, Turks, and Spanish come readily to mind. They failed for two main reasons. Firstly they did not adapt their warships to the needs

of the times. The galley was outrun by sail ; the small manœuvrable ship armed with a big gun could sink the galleon full of small guns and troops. No one of course realized these things until they had been tried, and then it was too late. It is very difficult for men to foresee the need for changes to fundamental ideas upon which they have been nurtured all their lives. The habit of years is strong. It is a matter of psychology that men over the age of 40 find this to be a particularly difficult process. The human tendency is to avoid the problem by pretending it does not exist. This is a major bar to progress requiring a great man to overcome it, especially in this age of very rapid technical advance when it needs a high degree of foresight and sound judgment to see what the sea weapons will be at the end of the time required to re-equip a fleet. In the midst of many marginal improvements one can expect perhaps to find an advance of fundamental importance. This has to be spotted and developed before all lesser projects. In this category in the past can be placed the ship-borne gun, steam, aircraft, and the torpedo. In view of the tremendous scientific activity of our time it would be remarkable if a comparable advance were not with us today. I will come back to this.

Secondly, maritime nations in the past failed because of the inability of their leaders to appreciate the true nature of sea power. The similarity of their histories is striking. There is first the period of the use of sea power to enable the growing state to establish her hegemony over rivals and so permit her trade to flow. In this period warships are used to defeat other warships and sea power is exercised in its classic and most effective role. Then follows the period of wealth and prosperity and consolidation, when the debt owed to sea power is forgotten. Warships are used to transport soldiers, treasure, and impediments and not built to deal with the warships of the enemy in a purely naval struggle for the right to traverse the sea at will. The last phase is always the same. As part of an ideological or a trade war a more vigorous or enlightened enemy builds a better fleet and establishes his superiority for several generations with a Trafalgar, a Lepanto, or a Salamis. The wheel seems to turn from sea power, leading to prosperity which in turn begets complacency, indifference to the true nature of sea power, and—disaster.

Even in times of vigorous naval activity it is possible for a nation to misread the lessons of the past in a disconcerting way. The insistence of the Admiralty during the first World War upon protecting the sea lanes by patrolling rather than saving the ships by convoys is a recent example of this phenomenon. The inability, through Government decision, to provide the fleet with carrier fighter protection by 1939 is another. It arises perhaps from a tendency to fight the next war like the last, and in times of complexity, with new threats arriving, to ignore the first principles and do what seems expedient at the time. These principles, which do not change, are the only safe marks upon which we can rely to steer the right course in times of confusion of thought on national defence policy. It does not matter which period of history is examined, the same fundamental rule applies. The benefits of sea power can only be enjoyed by those nations who are strong enough either to win the sea battle or who have the obvious capacity so to do. Firstly you must beat the warships of your enemy in a successful naval action such as those gained by our eighteenth century fleet and then you are free to do the rest—amphibious operations, attacks on land targets, demonstrations of strength, and so on. Nothing must ever obscure the first duty of any navy to be ready to do battle with the naval forces of the likely enemy. This is a fundamental lesson which was well understood until the first World War. Whatever other demands were made upon our national resources, the

Government always ensured that, ship for ship, our battle fleet was better than any of the likely challengers.

To sum up, therefore, we should look for a fleet which can deal with the likely naval threat of the present and which also takes into account major changes in sea warfare so that strength is maintained in the future. This is the requirement; before deciding how far we go to meet it the following is a personal view of the present strategical arguments.

To begin with, we are still an island and rely upon long distance trade as the basis of our prosperity. This trade will tend to increase as production throughout the world raises the demand for the goods and services in which we specialize. If our livelihood is to be properly insured we remain in need of adequate sea power to protect the ships carrying this trade. This is surely a basic tenet of our defence thinking within which all other concepts of war—cold, global, and limited—should be considered. Unless we can use the sea when and where we want to, we have no real security. This is as much a lesson in common sense as a lesson of history. It is at this point that those who object to large sums being spent on the Navy will produce the H-bomb argument. Of what possible use, they argue, can it be to maintain a seaborne lifeline to this country when it is clear that war of a kind which would be able to threaten the sea routes would also result in the devastation of the homeland? There would be nothing left worth fighting for. The customary, and so far as I know official, answer to this from the naval side is that the nuclear exchange will not be the end of all. There will be some life and therefore some hope of eventual success which will make a 'broken-backed' phase likely. I personally find this argument unconvincing and attribute to it the loss of much public sympathy for a larger Navy. There is, however, another answer to the H-bomb school which is finding increasing support and which is to some extent being supported by the current trend of events in international affairs. It is based upon a growing realization that our Communist enemies do not wish to encompass the destruction of mankind, such as the nuclear exchange would achieve, but its conversion to Marxist socialism. They will not therefore risk the holocaust by provoking a clash between the great blocs. The bomb is more and more seen to be a political rather than a military instrument. By it the great Powers of the East and West achieve a deterrent which polarises military activities against each other. By the use of threats, 'brinkmanship', and the devices of political war, the ideological differences between the two systems are kept alive and the struggle for mastery continued.

In the purely military field, however, action is by no means barred. It becomes legitimate to engage in military aggression in areas where it is clear that the nuclear exchange will not be provoked. These areas become wider every day as the real nature of nuclear war becomes the common knowledge of men everywhere, and aggressive politicians can undertake military adventures outside Europe in the confident expectation that a nation will have to be faced with catastrophe before invoking an H-bomb exchange. Wars will thus tend to be limited in scope and duration. It will not be the policy to provoke a great nation beyond endurance but to achieve its destruction by nibbling away at the periphery of its possessions until it is economically weak and of no account. This concept, introduced militarily by the H-bomb, fits in admirably with the Leninist political conception of the way to achieve the downfall of imperialism by incitement of subject colonial peoples. The melancholy catalogue of lost territories that once belonged to the Western Powers and are now either neutral or hostile to the West shows, since the end of the second World War, how successful the policy of limited aggression can be. Furthermore

the march of the backward races has only just begun. Mankind is on the move again and much of it thinks that we are in the way.

It is thus maintained that limited wars are the most likely of all wars ; that the immense Russian submarine fleet is admirably suited to fight in these wars ; that so far as this country is concerned we cannot defend ourselves without adequate sea power ; and that in these limited wars all weapons will be used short of those likely to provoke an attack by H-bomb weapons. Such a provocation does not come readily to the mind. It must surely involve an attack on the homeland and demand for unconditional surrender, at the least. Sea power is a requirement for our defence which is likely to be needed often in limited wars. The case for adequate naval forces can therefore stand alone upon its merits if we intend to preserve our standard of life ; the alternative is to change the geographical chance that made us into an island.

When considered in this context the present Government attitude as reflected in the White Papers of the last three years will be seen to have little relevance to the core of the naval problem. Our defence strategy gives no recognition to the overall importance of sea power as a vital single asset, but deals with maritime forces in 'package' concepts—something for the deterrent, something else for limited war, more for global war, all ticketed and costed and placed in watertight blocs of priorities on the farcical assumption that the next struggle at sea will be of secondary importance and will not demand the capacity to use the right weapons against the naval forces the enemy is already known to have, but more the ability to support the other forces of the State in their roles. Thus about one-third of the amount of money the Navy has to spare on ships and weapons is devoted to the aircraft and carriers of the Fleet Air Arm, excluding their supporting forces. Carriers have a very limited anti-submarine potential, beyond self-protection, against the kind of submarines they can expect to meet, even in 1959 ; the only seaborne surface targets they can expect to encounter are the *Sverdlos*, which can hardly sway the outcome ; they are still vulnerable against shore-based jet aircraft even if supplied with pickets ; they are able to embark so few of the latest expensive and sophisticated fighters that they cannot hope to defend other surface forces against prolonged shore-based aircraft attacks. On the other hand they are invaluable in providing tactical air support for the Army in those increasingly widespread theatres where the R.A.F. cannot operate ; they can also transport troops and equipment at short notice to the scene of action. These are excellent and desirable things, but they are the side effects of a sea power we do not possess and are irrelevant to our real task of defending our shipping against submarine and aircraft attacks. It may be that the Army require such support in the immediate years ahead ; in that case the money should be found for it, but surely not at the expense of an effective Navy.

Inter-Service co-operation is now at a high level and must remain so if the resources of the country are not to be wasted. No one would challenge this. But co-operation with other Services must never be allowed to obscure the Navy's real purpose of training to win the naval battle. Once we have the fleet that can engage the fleet of the enemy with a fair chance of success (and here the word 'fleet' includes shore-based anti-submarine air forces because sea power can never be gained by ships alone in the future), then we can consider upon what sidelines they can perform to support the Army and carry troops and equipment. A moment's thought will reveal that to think otherwise, i.e. to use naval vessels for

land support without first having enough ships to gain control of the intervening sea, is an absurdity—the biggest cart before the smallest horse of all time. This is an old metaphor but it suggests a descriptive tally for the carrier now being converted to lift Royal Marines and their gear from A to B.

For the above reasons I suggest that current naval policy does not meet our needs in conception, let alone in size. It does not form a basis upon which a fleet capable of dealing with a large navy of fast submarines and shore-based jet aircraft can be built because it displays a lack of understanding of the nature of sea power and the reliance of this country upon it. The H-bomb has changed nothing in this respect. We need a large anti-submarine force of all kinds which can meet an almost unlimited submarine threat in any part of the world. We need missiles for air defence. This must be the basis upon which the rest of the Navy stands and we cannot have it until the conception of the 'balanced fleet', which really means a prestige fleet too weak everywhere to decide the issue in war, is dropped.

It is perhaps ironic that at the time when the major threat to us comes from underwater attack a new weapon should appear on the scene which is not only an answer to the problem but also represents a 'break-through' in naval warfare. Furthermore we have the men and the skill to exploit this weapon should we choose to so employ them. I believe that the nuclear propelled submarine is in the same class as the first ship-borne gun or the first powered aircraft. It is an advance far more important than the advent of steam because it brings not just a new means of propelling warships but a new form of warfare altogether. It is a device which should set the naval world on fire because with it navies once more play the leading part in the defence of a nation. One must not think in terms of the present day craft ; as Admiral Rickover has said, the *Nautilus* is to naval warfare as Orville Wright's aircraft was to air warfare. We are at the beginning of a new age and have many advantages in the race. To begin with, our nuclear scientists and engineers are second to none ; we have the shipbuilding 'know-how' and, finally, our carriers are reaching the end of the road and we are in the position of having to look round to plan the fleet of the next era. It is true that much valuable time has been lost because of the decision (which we may live to regret) to put our best scientists upon atomic bombs and nuclear power stations. The bombs may never be used and the power stations, while giving us more productive power to satisfy markets abroad, do not help to develop the strong hand needed to keep them. The exciting prospects of the new weapon have not been fully realized this side of the Atlantic mainly, I think, because they have been obscured by political and economic issues and the Navy has not been able to get down to the job of planning the new fleet it really needs as opposed to the fleet the Chancellor will permit it to have.

There are two great arguments by which the party politician is able to persuade the electorate to accept a policy for the Navy which leaves us feeble at sea. Let us look at them.

The first argument is based upon the use of allies. We will never 'go it alone' again ; to suggest otherwise provokes an almost hysterical reaction from many a valiant Briton today. This does not mean very much unless it means that we can always rely on the American Navy when we need it. This may be so in the near future in certain kinds of conflicts where American interests coincide with our own. Too much should not be taken for granted, however ; times sometimes change. For example, a very few years ago a large part of the American

nation believed that what went on in Europe was Europe's business, and that we should deal with Hitler on our own. Isolationism is now dead in the U.S.A. for all practical purposes, but that is not to say that political alignments never change, particularly under the stimulus of a trade war. Who can say, when the future of this country may depend upon it, that we shall never again be in a life or death struggle without our American friends to help us? It has happened twice within living memory. This is to state the case on expediency grounds only. But there are moral grounds against relying on American military help which may be even more compelling. The Commonwealth is a big concern and rapidly growing bigger. We bear the leading part in its defence in return for the political and economic privileges it confers upon us. This is surely a duty which we must undertake unless we wish to forfeit our leadership and indeed our own independence in international and Commonwealth affairs. We would do well to remember Emerson's warning, 'Nature has made up her mind that what cannot defend itself shall not be defended.'

It is, however, the so-called economic argument which is more often used and by which the nation has been persuaded to accept a second-line Navy. The world, so it is said, is divided into two economic colossi and we are cut to the bone and can no longer compete. Two world wars have beggared us. The naval Vote in a period of lessening money values moved from £278 million in 1951 to £340 million in 1958, an increase of about 25 per cent. During the same period the following changes in the field of national expenditure have also taken place:—

National Income	...	...	...	...	Up 50 per cent.
Wages	...	...	...	...	.. 53 ..
Food, Drink and Tobacco	...	...	...	..	42 ..
Welfare (Education, Health, Public Assistance, and Pensions)	...	...	...	..	61 ..

Television sets have increased from 1.18 million to 7.76 million and cars from 2.38 million to 4.18 million. (During the same period our prison population has gone up 50 per cent.)

These figures have almost certainly become more striking since the recent rise in national prosperity, and the last financial year ended with a remarkably handsome budget surplus. There was surely enough fat there with which to begin the fleet we really need for our security. In fact, the whole of the disposable surplus went on increased benefits and reduced taxation.

It is a matter of deciding upon what to spend the national profits—benefits to the consumer/taxpayer or the weapons we need to carry out our obligations. It is surely a choice between expediency and duty, ultimately between right and wrong. For those who live in it, the present period of English history has disturbing parallels with Walpole's administration between 1713 and 1742. The watchword is self-interest and the leaders of the nation encourage the people to think of prosperity and comfort. Political power, in fact, goes to the party who offers the most bread and the biggest circuses. In such an atmosphere it is not surprising, to quote Lord Elton, that 'the moral fibre of the nation coarsens and its energies grow sluggish.' I only wish to make the point here that until the political and moral issues are faced there is little hope of getting the money to provide the fleet our interest and safety demands.

The national wealth will continue to be expended on extending the comfort of individuals until the electorate can be persuaded that the writing is on the wall, unless we face up to the grave seaborne threat which hangs over us. This is a matter for honest politicians. The Navy can do little more than plan the fleet it would have if it could, and puts its administrative house in order. The naval officer may perhaps console himself with the thought that Walpole's administration preceded the golden age of the Royal Navy and of the country, and the pendulum must swing the other way soon. After all, for those who remember what it means and believe in good omens, this is the bicentenary year of the *Annus Mirabilis*.

## SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

### I—THE FORMATIVE STAGE

By JOHN ERICKSON



THE military relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China offers a completely new spectacle in the overall development of the Communist military-political system. This is not merely the contact of two armies and the synchronization of strategy, for the altered situation now confronts the Soviet Army with a Communist military instrument which has not been created by the Russians themselves. All 'Red armies,' save the Chinese, have been copybook imitations of the Soviet style. Before

Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union,

Lieut-General Svetozar Vukmanovic's protests at this arbitrary Soviet military hegemony hinted at the possibilities of a major conflict when rival views clashed over the form and function of these 'new' armies. The final breach in relations and the subsequent rupture of military collaboration ended the argument. In the satellite armies there have been revolts and internal struggles for power, but none has developed to the point of breaching the fundamentals of the Communist arrangement for its armed forces, both in relation to the Soviet Union itself and upon the question of development not sponsored by the Russians.

The nature of these 'new model armies,' so self-consciously political, is still somewhat imperfectly understood. Hence an examination of the comparative development of the Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist armies can help to clarify some of the basic processes of the Communist military system. The outstanding fact that the Chinese Red Army was not the product of a slavish imitation of Soviet styles adds more to the pertinence of the questions raised. However, in the whole context of Sino-Soviet military relations, a careful distinction must be made to preserve the real proportions of the situation.

The first distinction is between the two military systems, whether this be the result of environment or deliberate alteration, the second concerns the variance over wider strategic matters; that is, in what manner this force is to be employed and with what objects. These two issues, not always clearly distinguished in discussions of the Sino-Soviet problem, are nevertheless indirectly linked by one equally illustrative point, namely the supposed common sharing of the 'Marxist-Leninist military science.' This rejects 'bourgeois military thought' on the grounds that it is 'adventuristic' and also because the new-type armies develop their own distinctive doctrines based on Marxism-Leninism.<sup>1</sup> The latter embodies a scientific calculation of all factors involved, while the much-reviled bourgeois thought has degenerated into seeking a single all-embracing principle or elevating one arm into a dangerous eminence (in contrast with the Soviet idea of the harmony of all arms).

<sup>1</sup> See a recent example in definitions: H. I. Shatagin, I. P. Prusanov, *Sovetskaya Armiya—Armiya novogo typa*. (The Soviet Army—a new type of Army) Min. Defence, Moscow, 1958, pp. 3-10.

Such bombastic nonsense merely means that foreign influences are now heavily disguised, but the whole process of creating a singular set of theories cannot be dismissed so lightly. Bitter battles have been fought between Soviet soldiers and their political masters over the forms of the new doctrine. Chinese elevation of their distinctive experience into a further extension of these basic ideas—also hidden in the language of 'Marxist-Leninist military science'—signifies that this is not merely a verbal battle devoid of ultimate importance. Real disunity, or even giving the impression of choices, might lead to enormous consequences in the raising and in the relationships of further new armies produced by Asian revolutionary situations.

It can be assumed that the Communist military system, especially where modifications upon a hitherto undisputed Soviet Russian military hegemony are involved, has developed certain sensitive areas. The first concerns the matter of doctrine, for there are explosive implications in what at first sight appear as merely verbal qualifications. The second concerns the very structure of the new armies, for they are at once military and political instruments, in which the scope and operation of the political organs present original problems. Here the manner in which the Party will impose its control upon the military is decided. Paradoxically, in spite of the vast bureaucratized strength of the political administration of the Soviet forces, the matter of political control is essentially a delicate matter, as the dismissal of Zhukov demonstrated. The Soviet and Chinese forces have diverged over this absolute distinguishing feature of the new armies—the function and arrangement of political organs. In addition, since both are professedly 'democratic' armies, special problems arise over the status of the officer and officer-soldier relationships. Finally, there is the difficulty of reconciling the interests of military efficiency with the requirements of ideology; though efficiency may not be sacrificed, added strain is unavoidable. Since Marx neglected to provide a guide to the military organization of the worker-state—as indeed he ignored the whole question of state-form—the subsequent improvisations of Communist military theory are inevitably but breeding-grounds of dispute.

In order to settle this comparative study into a frame of reference, the essentials of Soviet Russian military organization must be briefly described. Basically, the Soviet Army has developed out of the conflict of those two incompatibles, militarism and Socialism. The failure to organize a true 'Socialist army' has led, inevitably, to the triumph of professionalism and a thinly-disguised conservatism or orthodoxy. Secondly, since rude democracy hampers efficient command, officer cadres have emerged as an officer caste. The cardinal point of Soviet organization—*edinonachalie* (unity of command)—developed out of a long struggle between the military and political powers within the Army, finally endowing the army commander with primary responsibility in the place of a dual command of commissar and commander. *Edinonachalie* is much praised by the Army. This, however, must not lead to the dereliction of political duties, to Zhukov's crime of "regarding the Army as his own domain."<sup>2</sup> In short, the aim is the neutralization of the armed forces in what is fundamentally a militarized state. Finally, the exaltation of military technique and a professionalism as ardent as that of 'bourgeois' armies has produced a very 'military' army.

It is a matter for some reflection that these were the very points which Marshal Chu Teh, who will figure much in this account of the Chinese Red Army, criticized

<sup>2</sup> See *Kommunist*, No. 16, Nov., 1958. pp. 3-12.

after his tour of inspection of the Soviet forces in 1958.<sup>3</sup> The interesting point is whether this is due to the present stage of development of the Chinese Red Army, or a consciousness of having evolved a superior system. This Chinese selectivity made its appearance much earlier, for a qualified appraisal of Soviet military models was underlined by Mao Tse-Tung during the great inner-Party debate at Tsunyi (January, 1935) and repeated during his lectures at the Red Army College in Shensi. While arguing that it was not enough to study only the general laws of war, Mao Tse-Tung also insisted that it was useless merely to imitate the Soviet Union:—

“They [the imitators of Russia] do not see that these laws of war and military directives in the Soviet Union embody the special characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army of the Soviet Union. . . . Their argument is; ours, like the war in the Soviet Union, is a revolutionary war; since the Soviet Union has won victory, how can there be any alternative but to follow its example? They do not see that although we must particularly cherish the Soviet experiences of war . . . we must also cherish the experiences of China’s revolutionary war because there are a great number of conditions special to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army.”<sup>4</sup>

It is therefore necessary to enquire first why, and under what conditions, this most significant freedom to pick and choose came to the Chinese Revolution and the organizers of the Chinese Red Army.

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In 1924 the Russians came to China. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. It was Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, organizer of the *Kuomintang*, who requested Soviet aid in political and military matters to facilitate the Chinese revolution. A young officer, Chiang-Kai-Shek, took Sun Yat-Sen’s messages to Lenin at the end of 1923. Russian aid was granted, with the result that an extremely complex set of alliances came into being. The *Kuomintang* and the Chinese Communists joined forces. In 1924 the *Kuomintang* National Assembly accepted the proposed reorganization of the Army, whereupon work began on setting up the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton. A Soviet military mission, headed by K. V. Blukher, the famous Civil War commander, set to work organizing the Chinese National-Revolutionary Army, with M. Borodin acting as chief political adviser. The new Army was built on Russian lines explicitly, and Chiang-Kai-Shek, having studied the Soviet system at first hand, recommended the adoption of political commissars. In late 1924 the first shipment of Soviet arms arrived in Canton.<sup>5</sup>

By the end of 1925 an estimated 1,000 members of the Soviet mission were active in China. The Russian aim was avowedly to bring the Chinese revolution under strict Soviet control.<sup>6</sup> This was much resented by the right wing of the *Kuomintang*; Chiang-Kai-Shek excluded Communists from his own 1st Corps. The Moscow *Komintern*, while trying to control the Chinese movement, was also at the same time the stage for part of the Stalin-Trotsky duel. Stalin was developing his ‘Socialism in one country’ idea, Trotsky advocating the theory of ‘permanent revolution.’ The Chinese Communist Party acted all the while within the limits set for it by the *Komintern*, that is within the *Kuomintang* framework and dependent therefore on the *Kuomintang*’s military instrument, the new Army.

<sup>3</sup> *Pravda*, Aug. 3, 1958.

<sup>4</sup> *Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War*. Peking, 1954, pp. 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949*. Princeton, 1956, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> cf. *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet advisers in China (1918-1927)*. Ed. C. M. Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How. Columbia, 1956.

In 1926 the Northern campaign, aimed at fulfilling the aims of a territorial unity of China, was set in motion, though not with the whole-hearted approval of the Soviet military advisers. Chiang-Kai-Shek was appointed Commander-in-Chief. He proceeded to act vigorously against both the Communists and the power of the Soviet personnel, severely limiting the scope of the latter. When the Chinese Communists, in March, 1927, tried to strip Chiang-Kai-Shek of his power, he reacted by instituting a sweeping purge of Communist infiltrators. The *Kuomintang* was now split into two factions, left and right. The left, supported by the Chinese Communists, demanded the continuance of co-operation with Russia. The right, under Chiang-Kai-Shek, now established in Nanking, demanded the opposite. In July, 1927, Borodin left China, leaving only a small isolated Soviet colony in Wuhan which had been invested by right *Kuomintang* elements.

In Wuhan, the position of the Chinese Communists became desperate. In August, 1927, the leadership of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a founder and later chairman of the Party, was repudiated. Mao Tse-Tung, who put his trust in agrarian revolution rather than urban revolts, moved right away from the Party line with his programme of a 'peasant-worker revolutionary army,' and the creation of *soviets* in China, which the *Komintern* bitterly opposed and utterly forbade. The Chinese Party turned to organizing an armed force very late in this stage of the revolution.

When Mao Tse-Tung organized the 1st Division of the 1st Peasant and Workers Army in late 1927, he was expelled from the Chinese Politburo (of which he had been a member since 1924) and dismissed from the Party Front Committee. About 1,000 men made up this force, which set up a tiny base at Chingkanshan during 1927-28. The *Komintern* finally sanctioned a separate Communist army, though the Communists had not failed to win some influence among *Kuomintang* troops. On 1st August, 1927, at 10.30 p.m., Red troops attacked the 6th Regiment of the *Kuomintang* III Corps; some 30,000 Red insurgents took part in the action.<sup>7</sup> A Revolutionary Committee of Communists and left *Kuomintang*, consisting of 25 members, was set up; for the Communists, Chou En Lai, Chu Teh, He Lun, and others worked here. Liu Bo-Chen was appointed as Chief of Staff, He Lun as military commander, Li Li-San as chief of the security detachments, and Ie Tin as front commander. Chu Teh commanded the IX Revolutionary Corps, Ie Tin the XI, and He Lun the XX, the total force being 16 regiments and 4 battalions.<sup>8</sup>

In November, 1927, during Mao Tse-Tung's retreat before the *Kuomintang* advance, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, a National-Revolutionary Committee was organized. In April, 1928, Chu Teh's 2,000 troops fought their way to Maopin, where they linked up with Mao Tse-Tung's tiny force. Here began not only the life of IV Corps of the Workers and Peasants Red Army but also that fruitful collaboration of Mao Tse-Tung and Chu Teh. They became political commissar and commander of IV Corps respectively. On 4th May, 1928, at Lunshi, the Party Front Committee formally adopted the resolution on the formation of the Corps, which now numbered some 10,000 men, organized in three divisions, the 10th (Chu Teh), the 11th (Mao Tse-Tung), and the 12th (Chen Yi)—or six regiments. But only 2,000 rifles were available.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See M. F. Yur'ev, *Krasnaya Armiya Kitaya 1927-1937*. (The Chinese Red Army . . .), Moscow State University: Inst. Eastern Lang., 1958, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Yur'ev, pp. 13-14.

<sup>9</sup> Yur'ev, p. 33.

The main Party organ had been the Front Committee; in May, 1928, this was dissolved and a special Committee of the C.C.P., with Mao Tse-Tung as chairman, was elected. The Central Committee of the Party, the true central organ, was beginning its underground existence miles away. In July, 1929, the 6th Congress of the C.C.P. assembled in Moscow. Mao Tse-Tung and his followers developed their power and their military nucleus in Chingkanshan, setting up Communist power in the Hunan-Kiangsi-Kwantung border regions. Mao Tse-Tung asserts that Party harmony was re-asserted after the 6th Congress,<sup>10</sup> which "concluded with approval of the emphasis on the agrarian movement." The emphasis was Mao Tse-Tung's own and the 'harmony' was not yet so sweet.

A thorough reform of the Chinese Red Army (to which P'eng Teh-huai's 5th Red Army had now been added) was carried out at the Ninth Party Congress of the 4th Red Army held in Fukien in December, 1929. This established the basic form of Chinese Red Army organization and its conclusions are worth noting:

- (i) The Party leads the Army and not *vice versa*; it is for political work to guide military work. *The Party cannot be separated from the Army.*
- (ii) This Army must maintain the closest contact with the masses.
- (iii) This Army must be free from group egoism and should consider arming the masses as one of its basic tasks.
- (iv) This Army must differ from the *Kuomintang* Army, which is used by the military commanders to monopolize political power.<sup>11</sup>

This last is an extremely important point, expressing Mao Tse-Tung's own concern with the role of military power. Behind the resolutions a full-scale purge cleared out unreliable commanders, attacked the exponents of 'roving insurgentism,' and corrected some malpractice. But fundamentally it aimed at cementing Mao Tse-Tung's own position in the growing power struggle.

At the same time the principles of political work were crystallized. In addition to the political commissars, soldiers' committees trained the soldiers in political practice to implement a very definite brand of 'democracy.' The importance of this is that the Army fell early under a collective leadership, hence the Chinese disparagement of *edinonachalie* and their avoidance of dual command.

The 4th Red Army has a special place in the evolution of the Chinese Red Army, for it is upon these principles that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 12th Red Armies were later organized. In their employment, these forces spread out like a wave, avoiding positional warfare, splitting up and then uniting again, trying always to meet Chiang Kai-Shek's offensives against them while his forces were in movement. In 1929-30 the Red troops moved out into northern Kiangsi; in February, 1930, the formation of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government was decided upon. With the creation of sound 'revolutionary bases' from which to repel attacks, the first Army Groups were formed in 1930. By the end of 1930 ten army corps had been created, with strengths ranging from 2,000-10,000, representing a total of 60,000 men. 'Red Guards,' the local militias, and partisan detachments also increased.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See E. Snow, *Red Star over China*. London (1946 edn.), in Mao Tse-Tung's official biography, p. 167.

<sup>11</sup> Chen Po-ta, *Notes on ten years of Civil War, (1927-1936)*. Peking, 1954, p. 90.

<sup>12</sup> Yur'ev, p. 102.

The Army Groups called for 'Regular' military establishment. In 1930 Red armies had been used to attack cities, which led to considerable loss and failures. This tactic, 'the Li Li-San line,' enjoyed a certain popularity outside Mao Tse-Tung's territory and could work in the Red Army "*against the judgement of its field command.*"<sup>13</sup> In June, 1930, the III, IV, and XII Corps merged into the 1st Army Group, commanded by Chu Teh with Mao Tse-Tung as commissar. The 2nd Army Group (He Lun) grew out of the II and VI Corps, and the 3rd Army Group from the V, VIII, and XVI Corps. The 1st Army Front was the final stage of consolidation.

The first steps towards centralization were taken in 1931-32. Mao Tse-Tung's movement had survived enemy offensives and serious internal dissensions. On 11th December, 1931, the Provisional Central Workers-Peasants Government was elected, with Mao Tse-Tung at its head. Simultaneously, a Revolutionary Military Soviet, headed by Chu Teh, was created, with corresponding organs in the main political administration and the Supreme Staff, headed by Liu Bo-Chen. Yur'ev reports that the Chinese Red Army at this stage consisted of 30 per cent. workers and 68 per cent. peasants, with one-third to one-quarter of the soldiers being members of the Party. The political organs had political assistants in platoons, commissars in battalions, and political sections in regiments, divisions, and higher. Provisional field regulations and disciplinary codes were drawn up, and a Military Academy of the Chinese Red Army brought into being.<sup>14</sup>

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Mao Tse-Tung was not, by any means, the sole agency of the Party. He was still developing the 'Mao Tse-Tung line,' with his Soviets and agrarian revolution. Though willing to acknowledge the Chinese Soviets as useful for propaganda purposes, Moscow did not abandon its technical disapproval nor, presumably, its policy of preferring a Chinese Party Central Committee under its own thumb. In December, 1930, the 20th Chinese Red Army revolted, coming out for the 'Li Li-San line.' The mutiny was suppressed, and in the III Corps P'eng Teh-huai put down a similar move.

This also was part of the process of Mao Tse-Tung's own consolidation of a wider power. The Party's Central Committee had been reinforced by Moscow and carried on with its underground life in Shanghai, which does not suggest that Moscow took to the idea of Mao Tse-Tung as leader of the Party. The latter now forced the issue by suggesting that the Central Committee come to the Sovietized areas of China, for here it was 'safer,' and here, whatever the theories, the real power of Chinese Communism lay. Chou En-Lai now skipped into Mao Tse-Tung's camp. In October, 1933, the 2nd All-China Congress of Soviets met at Juichin, capital of 'Red China'; here the Central Soviet Government (absorbing the Central Committee) was elected. Mao Tse-Tung's political triumph was complete. His 'line' of creating Soviets, organizing a Red Army, and fostering the agrarian revolution was justified by results. Thus for six years—and possibly the six most important years, certainly the most formative—the real Chinese revolution slipped from the hand of Moscow. This is of fundamental importance in considering the genesis of Mao Tse-Tung's military-political theories, which are unique in Communist speculation about war and the military operations of the 'new armies.'

<sup>13</sup> Snow, *Red Star* . . . p. 172 (my italics); this is a very odd statement.

<sup>14</sup> Yur'ev, p. 120-122.

The first theoretical battle fought by Mao Tse-Tung centred on clarifying the new, independent line evolving from his Chingkanshan activity.<sup>15</sup> He had to influence opinion towards seeing the correctness of using Red forces in connection with the agrarian revolution, not merely in co-ordination with urban resistance. This was the first Chinese 'special condition.' The next related issue meant convincing the 'opportunists' that Mao Tse-Tung's conservatism was correct. Small local wars took precedence over great campaigns; rather than fight pitched battles the theory was to open up the rear to the enemy and then annihilate him as 'a line of retreat.'

Abandoning the idea of a quick revolutionary victory, the new war conditions had to be founded upon (a) the agrarian revolution, (b) the armed forces supported by the people, and (c) building up revolutionary base areas. Revolutionary base areas require, in their turn, (i) a sound mass basis, (ii) a first-rate Party organization, (iii) a strong Red Army, (iv) a terrain favourable for military operations, and (v) resources to make it self-sustaining. This permits growth *within encirclement*.<sup>16</sup> These issues were thrashed out at the 2nd Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Areas in 1928.

The potentialities of allowing the urban centres to be engulfed by a rising tide of armed agrarian revolution fitted in with the way in which Red forces increased—from village 'Red Guards' (militias) to district and then county militias, then to a local Red Army, followed finally by a Regular Red Army. All these ideas Mao Tse-Tung summed up in his *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*.<sup>17</sup> This postulates that it is incorrect to regard the civil war as "similar to wars in general or to the civil war in the Soviet Union." While there is a certain similarity with the Soviet Union, "yet this does not mean that we are to make use of this experience mechanically." Civil war is protracted, and while revolution or revolutionary war is fundamentally offensive, this does not preclude defensive phases and actual retreats. Mao Tse-Tung took issue with 'cowering before the enemy' (over-estimation) and 'military adventurism,' the former having cost the loss of the revolutionary base in Kiangsi and the latter the costly and abortive attacks on Chinese cities in 1932. In the main, according to Mao, strategic defence is the only safe policy. In this connection, political mobilization is a major weapon in forcing the idea of strategic retreat upon the soldiers and populace alike. This can be the only answer to campaigns of encirclement and annihilation.

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Strategic retreat was forced upon the Red Armies by the pressure of Chiang Kai-Shek's fifth campaign against them. 'The Long March,' which transferred Chinese Communist power from the south to the north-west, occupied one year, 1934-35. The first stage of the 6,000-mile withdrawal meant breaking the blockade, of which the first line was pierced in Kiangsi on 21st October, 1934, followed by two more lines in Hunan. In Shensi, to the north, preliminary risings had set up a rudimentary kind of Soviet power. In late 1935, the vanguard of the 1st Army Corps, with Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-Lai, and P'eng Teh-huai, entered northern Shensi. This formed the basis for the new North-West Communist base—Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia.

<sup>15</sup> See Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works*. Vol. I, "The Struggle in the Chingkang mountains."

<sup>16</sup> cf. Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 71-72.

<sup>17</sup> Written 1936, also delivered as lectures at Red Army College, N. Shensi. *Selected Works*, Vol. I.

After this achievement, Chinese Communism moved on to a wider horizon. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria had brought her to the borders of the Soviet Union in considerable numbers. The strength of the Russian Special Red Banner Army of the Far East was rapidly built up; with K. V. Blukher in command, tank and air reinforcements were moved in, while the Soviet Far Eastern Command became a self-contained military-economic unit. On its flanks, partly to secure its new Far Eastern rail links and also to check the Japanese, Soviet Russia had strengthened her hold over Sinkiang during the disturbances of 1931-33, at the same time fortifying the Soviet-Manchurian border. Outer Mongolia now passed under strict Soviet Russian control, a process which had begun in 1921.

There was little secrecy about Japan's aim of warring on Russia for her Far Eastern possessions. At the same time she harried Nationalist China. The Nationalist armies had been trained by German specialists after the departure of the Russians; German methods and equipment were spreading among the Nanking troops during the 1930's. F. F. Liu observes that if China could have fielded 60 German-trained divisions against the Japanese, there might have been a different outcome in Asia. In the face of the Japanese threat the Nationalists had not failed to put pressure on the Communists. In 1936 the 'Sian incident,' when Chiang Kai-Shek was kidnapped, was used to begin talks about a halt to the civil war and the formation of a united front against the Japanese. In December, 1936, the situation was critical; after utterly tortuous negotiation and 'face-saving,' serious talks between Nanking and the Chinese Communists opened in March, 1937. The subsequent agreement set an armistice upon the civil war, and out of this the Chinese Red Army emerged as the Eighth Route army, under which name it enters yet another phase of its singular development.

In April, 1937, the Soviet Union proposed the offer of a mutual assistance pact to Nanking. While the Nanking Government hesitated, the 'Lukouchiao incident' of 7th July precipitated the Sino-Japanese war. When China now sought Russian aid anew, she was offered only a non-aggression pact, though arrangements were made for quantities of Russian supplies and weapons—as well as a military mission—to be delivered to China. It is from this point that Soviet books speak of their aid to China.<sup>18</sup> From Lanchow to the Soviet border a newly-constructed road carried Russian war supplies into China. Five flights of Soviet fighters defended Chinese bases in Nanking, Hankow, Chungking, and Lanchow. The new military mission was led by Cherepanov, who had worked in the Whampoa Military Academy in the first mission. In July, 1938, the German specialists were withdrawn and new figures—Zhukov and Chuikov—appeared in China. Cherepanov's Chief of Staff was a rising Soviet officer, Andrei Vlasov; upon Cherepanov's re-call to Moscow, Vlasov acted as assistant to Chiang-Kai-Shek.<sup>19</sup>

Yet about Russian policy as a whole there was a triple deception; first in its circumscribed aid to the Nationalists; secondly, in its support of the Chinese Communists, Nanking's internal enemies; and thirdly, in the pursuit of what amounted to a steady appeasement of the Japanese, a policy which came to full fruition in 1941. Frequent clashes had taken place between Japanese and Soviet-Mongolian forces on the Manchurian-Mongolian border; in July, 1938, Japanese

<sup>18</sup> cf. A. A. Martynov, *Slavnaya Narodno-Osvoboditel'naya Armiya Kitaya*. (The glorious People's Liberation Army of China.) Moscow, 1957. Pub. Min. Defence, pp. 6-7.

<sup>19</sup> Vlasov, later Lieut.-General in the Red Army was captured by the Germans and led the 'Vlasov Movement.' See his *Official Biography* in G. Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*. Harvard, 1952.

troops struck at Soviet positions at a point 70 miles south-west of Vladivostok, on the heights over-looking Lake Khassan (Chang-ku-feng). After heavy fighting, the Japanese 19th Division was finally driven back. This in no way discouraged the Japanese Kwantung Army, who advocated war against the Soviet Union and interpreted the China struggle as a means of securing their rear for the operations against the U.S.S.R.

In his *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese War* and *On the Protracted War*,<sup>20</sup> Mao Tse-Tung developed the military and political lines of the new phase into which the Chinese Communist movement was passing. The first placed guerrilla war into a major strategic setting, providing new roles for the Eighth Route Army and the new Fourth Army (the Chinese Red Army). Mao Tse-Tung argues that the size of China renders guerrilla war more than merely a set of tactical problems, and gives this kind of war more than a co-ordinating function in campaigns. Protracted guerrilla warfare is, he argues, quite a new thing in the history of war, demanding that this form be considered from the strategic point of view, now that it steps "out of the bounds of tactics and knocks at the door of strategy." While 'base areas' are themselves part of the strategic aspect—and Mao Tse-Tung makes a special case for establishing them on the plains as well as in mountains or river-estuary areas—a large base area is to be divided into five or even more military districts, each possessing an independent combat force. The two conditions essential for the transformation of guerrilla units into Regular forces were numerical increase and an improvement in quality. In command, a centralized organization must undertake the strategic planning and one which is decentralized must conduct the operations.

*On the Protracted War* defined, among other things, the nature of the Army's political work. First came the unity of officers and men, second the unity between the Army and the people, and finally the disintegration of the enemy. Great importance must be paid to the indoctrination of prisoners-of-war, an experiment which began on Nationalist prisoners and then was applied to the Japanese (and extended during the Korean War). The Chinese idea of political mobilization, which is a distinctive feature of their developing doctrine, took high priority. In their own Military Academy, run by Lin Piao, these principles were hammered home. Lin Piao, like the bulk of the commanders, was not Moscow-trained. Hence in the Academy (Hung-Chun Ta-Hsueh) the First Section trained commanders and commissars for four months for battalion and divisional posts. The Second and Third Sections' junior officers underwent a six-month political course, and the Fourth Section concerned itself with technical training.<sup>21</sup>

As for Communist military strength, while figures vary a great deal, one Soviet source produces this table of growth.

		8th Route Army	New 4th Army	Total
1937	...	80,000	12,000	92,000
1938	...	156,700	25,000	181,700
1939	...	270,000	50,000	320,000
1940	...	400,000	100,000	500,000
(1944)	...	320,000	153,676	473,676 <sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 119 f. and p. 157 f. respectively.

<sup>21</sup> See Snow, *Red Star* . . ., pp. 108-113, for an excellent description. In 1937, Lin Piao took over command of the 115th Division of 8th Route Army in anti-Japanese operations.

<sup>22</sup> A. A. Martynov, p. 48.

In November, 1938, Mao Tse-Tung again struggled against a faction which questioned his leading ideas for the conduct of war; in *Problems of War and Strategy* he repeated that in China, "the main form of struggle is war and the *main form of organisation is the Army*"<sup>23</sup> Hence the study of military problems is of first importance, even as ". . . in our numerous and excellent innovations we are unsurpassed by any country except the Soviet Union, but here the defect lies in the lack of synthesis and systematization."<sup>24</sup> While Chinese Red troops did carry out operations against the Japanese—some spectacularly successful—there was, nevertheless, a tendency to 'soft-pedal,' to husband resources for the fundamental struggle between Nationalist and Communist. In this matter, political mobilization was a very two-edged weapon.

Meanwhile, on the Soviet-Mongolian border, Japanese troops worked up from a small beginning to a full scale attack. The area of these and subsequent operations was bounded on the east by the Mongolian-Manchurian border, and to the west by the River Khalkin-Gol, a terrain made up marsh and bog.<sup>25</sup> At dawn on 28th May, 1939, Japanese troops attacked with the aim of encircling and annihilating the Soviet forces. By mid-June, both sides having substantially reinforced themselves, the critical phase of the campaign developed. The Japanese had 20,000 infantry, 4,700 cavalry, 130 tanks, 164 machine-guns, 98 anti-tank guns, 170 small-calibre guns, and 250 aircraft. Soviet-Mongolian forces mustered 11,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 152 machine-guns, 186 tanks, and 23 anti-tank guns. Zhukov, commanding the Russian forces, having first contained the Japanese attacks, launched his counter-offensive on 20th August. By the end of the month the Japanese were effectively defeated and finally expelled over the border. Soviet sources claim 18,868 Japanese dead and 25,900 wounded for the July-August operations; Soviet-Mongolian losses are given as 9,284 killed. This latter figure does not seem to tally with the general dispiritedness of the command after the campaign and Zhukov's own unpopularity because of high casualty figures. Khalkin-Gol did, nevertheless, discourage the Japanese from further rashness in this area.

The Germans, with whom the Soviet Union were negotiating about the notorious Nazi-Soviet pact, suspected that these operations represented 'aid to China'<sup>26</sup>. They were mistaken, for it was not a matter of Soviet initiative. While the Japanese were being so discouraged from attacking the Soviet Union, the latter tightened its hold on the rich and strategically important province of Sinkiang. Although in mid-1939 Soviet-Nationalist Chinese friendship had lessened, 500 Russian military advisers were still working in China. But the counter-part of the Nazi-Soviet pact came in April, 1941, when the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Japan. Chiang-Kai-Shek had foiled a Russian attempt to take over Sinkiang in 1940, but this merely strained Sino-Soviet relations even further.

Meanwhile the Chinese Communist forces gathered strength, and in 1941 the new 4th Red Army clashed with Nationalist troops,<sup>27</sup> thus re-opening the internal

<sup>23</sup> Mao Tse-Tung. *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 268. See p. 272—"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." . . . "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party."

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* p. 281 (Vol. 2).

<sup>25</sup> This and subsequent details of the campaign are based on Col. Shishkin, *Khalkin-Gol*, 2nd Edn., Min. Defence, Moscow, 1954. (Khalkin-Gol is also referred to as the campaign of Nomon-Han.)

<sup>26</sup> *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, 1939-41 (U.S. Dept. of State). 1948, p. 20.

<sup>27</sup> cf. F. F. Liu, *op. cit.* pp. 205-206. Chang Kuo-t'ao, a defector from the Party, brought secret documents to show that the Communists were merely biding their time.

breach. While Nationalist China battled with the Soviet Union over the latter's encroachments upon her key frontier-regions, the clash of interests in this matter concerned the established states. The Communists were but an insurgent minority. Nevertheless, in the questions of military systems, whether the state be established or insurgent, there is substantial evidence that during the formative years of the Chinese Red Army, Mao Tse-Tung and Chu Teh produced propositions and solutions substantially different from those of the Soviet Union. It is the conscious selectivity which imparts such significance to these early days. There do exist, as a consequence, legitimate grounds for *a priori* Chinese criticism of the Soviet Russian military system. It is not surprising that the Chinese do not appreciate 'unity of command,' since they applied collective leadership to the Party and Army alike. Even by stressing the special features of the Chinese Revolution and its armed forces, this perforce calls into question the general validity of the Soviet Russian military-political experience.

The stage had been set for the gigantic power changeover in Asia. Between 1941 and 1949, Soviet Russia returned in strength to the Far East, and the Chinese Communist armies passed through yet another stage—perhaps their most important and certainly their most decisive by winning internal victory as the People's National-Liberation Army and bringing Communist China face to face with Soviet Russia.

The primitive 4th Red Army Corps, with few men and fewer rifles, cast a long shadow.

*(To be continued)*

## GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE FIRST PRIZE ESSAY, 1958

By GROUP CAPTAIN P. DE L. LE CHEMINANT, D.F.C.

In a few years' time the fear of retaliation may inhibit both East and West from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against each other. This state of affairs may tempt the Communist parties to increase their efforts to gain limited military and diplomatic objectives by 'nibbling' tactics. Discuss this possibility and the ways and means by which the free world can avoid being 'nibbled to death' in an age of nuclear stalemate.

*"Let them hate so long as they fear."* Cicero.

**B**EFORE considering possible Communist strategy and tactics under conditions of nuclear parity, it is first necessary to be clear as to exactly what that state means in the context of this paper. The suggested effect is given in the words "the fear of retaliation may inhibit both East and West from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against each other." This deceptively simple statement requires examination. It refers, clearly, to the unrestricted strategic use of nuclear weapons in global war and has a different connotation according to whether it is looked at from the Russian or the Western viewpoint.

Russia is not and, in the very nature of things, can never be threatened by conventional forces. Unlike the West she cannot therefore be faced with the choice between destruction and defeat, and elect to initiate nuclear warfare to avoid the latter. If she is to use nuclear weapons it must therefore be in retaliation against Western nuclear attack, or as a deliberate act of policy. Leaving the possibility of Western attack to one side for the moment, there remains the possibility of Russia deliberately initiating global war. Whilst the inevitable final clash between Communism and capitalism is an article of Communist faith, it is, in context, seen as the last despairing act of a capitalist society in its death throes and not as part of the plan for world domination. So long as the Western deterrent remains valid and credible, the chances of Russia initiating nuclear war would seem to be remote either now, when the balance of nuclear power lies with the West, or in a few years' time when that power is in equilibrium. Beyond a certain point mere numbers of weapons mean little; in this matter sufficient is enough. So far as Russia is concerned, therefore, the proposition that fear of retaliation may inhibit her from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against the West can be considered valid.

Not so with the West. Once the resolve of the Western peoples to initiate nuclear war rather than submit to Russian occupation was seen to falter, the deterrent would lose its credibility and would cease to restrain the Russians from the unrestricted use of their conventional forces. Even as matters stand at the moment, Russian retaliation is capable of inflicting terrible devastation on the West; the fact that in a few years' time this power of nuclear retaliation will be much increased must not affect the resolution of the West to use nuclear weapons in the last resort—if it does, nothing can stop the enslavement of the Western peoples. To that extent, therefore, the proposition that the West may be inhibited from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against the East must be held to be invalid.

However, it can legitimately be argued that as the Russian power of nuclear retaliation grows, so will the reluctance of the West to consider that any particular hostile act is of itself of sufficient moment to call for the final sanction of unrestricted

nuclear war. This reluctance may well, as stated in the terms of reference, "tempt the Communist parties to increase their efforts to gain limited military and diplomatic objectives." It is the purpose of this paper to consider the likelihood of this happening, to suggest the possible form of such tactics, and to propose the Western counter. It is assumed that the deterrent remains valid and credible, and that it will therefore continue to prevent any massive attack involving the large scale use of Russian forces. The use of the words "Communist parties" in the terms of reference could be taken to imply an identity of interest or even a common strategy between Russia and China. It is not thought that this is so, and for that reason Russian and Chinese strategy will be considered separately in this paper.

#### RUSSIAN STRATEGY

The basic pattern of Russian strategy during the last 12 years is well known. It has been the outcome of an aggressive and expansionist policy springing from the Russian aim of world domination. The background and cornerstone of this strategy has been the vast conventional armed might of the Soviet Union. These huge armed forces would seem to have, or to have had, three main objects ; to ensure the 'secure base of the Revolution' by guarding against that attack by the capitalist Powers with which the Russian mind has been obsessed, to ensure that Russia would be supreme in military power in the event of nuclear disarmament, and finally to impose a scale and pattern of armaments on the West which the economy of the free world could not support. In two of these objects Russia has signally failed. The very magnitude of her own armed forces has prevented the West from falling into the fatal economic error of trying to match them with conventional armaments and has, as a result, firmly committed the allies to a nuclear policy.

In other fields Russian strategy has met with varied success. Europe has largely been a record of failure ; the Berlin airlift, the emergence of N.A.T.O., and the evident lack of appeal which Communism has for the satellite Powers. In the East, the great victory represented by the emergence of a Communist China, the partial success in Indonesia and in Indo-China, the check in Korea, and the failure in Malaya. In the Middle East and Africa considerable and, up to a point, almost unqualified success. The pattern running through these strategic failures and successes is plain. Wherever Russia has used force or the threat of force, in Europe, in Korea, in Indo-China, in Malaya, she has met with a firm response from the West, and has failed in her object. Where she has met with success it has been due either to the appeal of Communism or anti-colonialism, as in China and Indonesia or, as in the Middle East, to the effectiveness of her subversion, economic penetration, and use of nationalist sentiment.

The lesson of the last 12 years is therefore clear ; the Communist successes have in the main been gained by covert action and, when open aggression has been met with force, Russia has called a halt rather than risk global war. From this it can be argued that the future strategic trend will be to develop the method of attack which has proved most difficult for the West to counter, and to concentrate on covert rather than overt aggression. To reach this conclusion solely on the basis of past experience is to ignore several new factors which may affect Russian strategy, amongst them being the changing balance of nuclear power.

Any attempt to forecast Russian strategy must take account of Russia's difficulties as well as her advantages, and must include an assessment of world strategic problems from the Russian point of view. It is thought that Russia's two most immediate

and major problems are the standard of living in her own country and the satellites, and the spread of nuclear weapons to secondary Powers.

There is clearly a requirement to give higher priority to agriculture and to the production of consumer goods in Russia. It is the tragedy of Communism that, whilst it flourishes amongst the poor and ignorant, it tends to be rejected by the children of these same individuals whom it has made less poor and more enlightened. It is indeed impossible to see how a continued state of uncritical acceptance of the régime can be equated with the large scale higher education necessary to support a strong industrial power. If internal troubles are to be avoided, something will have to be done to appease this new and increasing class of educated Russians. The system will continue to deny them personal liberty, but if their full loyalty is to be retained, their living standard will need to be raised. It so happens that this need for consumer goods coincides with an acute shortage of manpower in industry as a result of the low birthrate during the war. The necessary manpower can only come from the armed forces. This pressure, combined with Russia's realization that in the face of the West's commitment to a nuclear policy her own vast conventional armaments are fast becoming an anachronism, seems likely to lead to a considerable reduction in the size of Russia's armed forces.

The same problem exists in the satellites, though the causes are different. Here it is not a question of a slow awakening to the disadvantages of Communism, but of the complete and persistent failure of Communism to make any appeal, even to the new generation. The danger of this situation to Russia lies not so much in the constant threat of risings but in the harm which these public demonstrations of failure do to the Communist cause throughout the world. Although the actual territories of the satellites are of value to Russia, their peoples are a liability; if any attempt is to be made to convert this liability into an asset it is considered that Russia will be forced into a policy of raising the standard of living in these countries.

While there is danger to both sides in the spread of nuclear weapons to secondary Powers, this would be of greater disadvantage to Russia and would pose her with problems not shared by the West. It may be that countries other than the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia are unlikely to develop the potential to manufacture weapons in the megaton range, but there seems no doubt that France is bent on the production of her own kiloton weapons and that West Germany will have access, under possibly not altogether effective safeguards, to certain low yield American weapons. No one, least of all the Russian leaders, can view these possibilities with equanimity. Even assuming the same level of responsibility in those countries as exists in the United Kingdom and the United States, this multiplication of triggers to global war could not but lessen the chances of lasting peace.

From the Russian point of view this development, besides increasing the menace to her security, could have the added disadvantage of inducing strong pressure from her allies to be allowed access to nuclear weapons in their turn. This Russia could never allow, and she would be unable to avoid demonstrating her distrust of the satellites and the reservations in her attitude towards China. For all these reasons it would be greatly to Russia's advantage to limit the number of nuclear Powers. She might seek to do this by offers of comparatively large scale conventional disarmament which would not only help her with internal problems but which might in addition have such an impact on public opinion as to make even the United Kingdom's continuance as a nuclear Power a matter of great difficulty and embarrassment for the Government of the day.

Having considered the two major problems now facing Russia, and having suggested that her answer to the first will involve a measure of disarmament and, to the second, that same disarmament coupled with an assumption of sanity and peaceful intentions, it is now proposed to review the situation confronting Russia in Europe, the Middle, and Far East and to suggest the strategy she would be likely to adopt were it not for the new factor of nuclear parity. Having done that, an attempt will be made to assess the effect which this factor will be likely to have on Russian strategy.

#### EUROPE

In Europe, in the military field, there would seem to be no possibility of the Russians overcoming the present position of stalemate. The military forces of N.A.T.O., which militant Communism has created, are sufficiently strong to require the use of massive Russian forces to effect any territorial gain. Clear warning has been given that aggression on this scale would be met by whatever force was necessary, and Russia could not take the risk that that force would not comprise the full weight of the allied strategic air offensive.

The main problem to Russia in Europe is the presence of American forces on the continent. It is those forces, which are the symbol of America's commitment to Europe, which give N.A.T.O. not only its strength but its cohesion and resolution. If the American forces were to be withdrawn from Europe, N.A.T.O. would disintegrate and the way would once more be open to the familiar pattern of subversion and *coup d'état*. Although a step towards this withdrawal could possibly be taken by some form of 'disengagement' agreement, this would involve the relinquishment of Russian control in Eastern Europe with its attendant exposure of Communism, a price which Russia could not afford to pay. Whilst, therefore, Russia may be expected to canvas various forms of 'disengagement' as part of her peace propaganda, it is not thought that she would in fact be prepared to make an agreement in that sense.

The more profitable line for Russia to take lies elsewhere. If American forces are the key to the strength of N.A.T.O., the geographical key to the very existence of N.A.T.O. is France. Without the ports, the communications, the actual territory, and the goodwill of France, there could be no N.A.T.O. As recent events have shown, civil war in France is a very real possibility which continues to lie just beneath the surface. From such a conflict Russia alone stands to gain, and she stands to gain much, possibly even the bankruptcy of France, the break-up of N.A.T.O., and the forced withdrawal of American and British forces from the continent. She has two tools ready to her hand—the Communist Party of France and the Algerian insurgents—and it is suggested that her strategy in Europe should be to direct the one, and discreetly support and guide the other, towards a common end, the internal break-up of France.

#### THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East, in common with Africa, India, and the Far East, has many natural conditions favourable to the growth of Communism—ignorance, disease, a measure of hunger, and poverty existing side by side with great wealth. Ironically enough, Russia, standing at the head of a great Empire, is accepted as the self-professed champion of anti-colonialism and as the friend of all oppressed peoples. Russia has not been slow to use these advantages in the Middle East, and has stimulated and exploited Arab nationalism to the great detriment of the West. Although it is apparent that Russian aid and subversion has been instrumental in the success

of the nationalist movements in the area, it is not clear to what extent Nasser in particular is prepared to work for Russia or, alternatively, to what extent he can afford to take an independent line.

In this matter, Russian strategy is clear. It should be to work for the economic domination of the United Arab Republic and thereafter to so control its policy as to cause the maximum practicable damage and embarrassment to Britain and America. This strategy, although it would best serve Russia's interests, is dangerous inasmuch as one of the vital interests of the West is involved. Russia would appreciate that any attempt to deny the Middle East oil to the West would force Britain and America to fight, regardless of the risk of global war. Russia, with her own vital interests not involved, could not afford to intervene in such a conflict and would have to accept the defeat of her lackeys. Thus it is suggested that Russian strategy in the area, whilst working against the allies in every way possible, and seeking to increase the cost and difficulty of obtaining the Middle East oil, would stop short of the ultimate step of denial of that oil to the West.

#### THE FAR EAST

Russia's problem in the Far East in the long term is not the West but China. She cannot view with equanimity the possibility of having 1,200,000,000 Chinese on her borders by the mid 1970's, nor can she, even to-day, fail to have misgivings about the way in which China is becoming accepted by Asiatics and Africans as the fountainhead of Communism. Russian realization that China is an ultimate rival in the bid for world domination will have an effect on her strategy in the Far East during the period under review.

To a Russian strategist the short term situation in the theatre must look most favourable. Whilst Chinese military aggression is deterred by the belief that America would use nuclear weapons, the independence of those Asian countries with pro-Western governments is precarious. Although, perhaps, it is still true that the larger part of the population, like any other peasants, ask only to be left in peace to earn their living, there is an increasing political awareness and a natural tendency to resent and be suspicious of the white man and his motives. To add to the difficulties of the governments, most of the countries concerned have large Chinese minorities who have never ceased to look on China as their home. Without Western military power in the background, Communism would sweep through the mainland of South-East Asia. While it is the threat of American intervention which holds the Chinese armies in check, it is largely the presence of British forces in Singapore and Malaya which prevents the whole area falling as a result of subversion and insurrection. These forces, which can physically prevent this fate overtaking Singapore and Malaya, are, to the countries farther north, the symbol of Western power and determination to resist Communism. Militarily, Singapore with its port, dockyard, air-fields and base facilities is by far the most important of the two ; without Singapore the bases in Malaya would be of limited value.

Thus it is that Singapore, from the Russian point of view, is the key to the Far East, just as France is the key to Europe. The outlook for the colony must seem satisfactory to Russia. On the one hand are strikes, occasional riots, Communism thriving underground and by other names ; on the other is the bedevilling influence of British party politics, the dogma of self-determination irrespective of economic reality. Either way, Russia may well feel that time is on her side and that the internal pressure of the Chinese majority in Singapore together with the external influence of China will succeed in denying the island to Britain.

It is thought, therefore, that Russia will calculate that all is moving in her favour in the Far East and that the area will fall to Communism without the need for further military adventure by the Chinese. It is also considered that the realization of ultimate danger from China will influence Russia in her policy towards that country. It is suggested that she will be at pains to keep China without the knowledge or capacity to produce nuclear weapons and that, in spite of her threats over the off-shore islands, she would be most unlikely to intervene militarily on China's behalf should that country, by miscalculation, become involved in war. Although in such an eventuality Communist 'face' would be at stake, it would be Chinese Communist 'face', and Russia's vital interests would not be threatened.

#### THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR PARITY ON RUSSIAN STRATEGY

It has been argued that, but for nuclear parity, the future trend of Russian strategy would be towards covert aggression and that the emphasis would increasingly be placed on the political and economic offensives. The question remains as to whether nuclear parity is likely to change this trend and to lead the Russians to believe that force, or the threat of force, is once more the surest and most profitable instrument of national policy. Before attempting to answer that question it is necessary to be clear as to what nuclear parity means. It should be measured not in terms of numbers of weapons but in the certainty of devastation. At such time as the Russian means of delivery can be seen to guarantee the devastation of the West irrespective of surprise, loss of initiative, of any other factor, then nuclear parity can be said to exist.

In attempting to assess the effect which this state will have on Russian policy, it is necessary to remember Russian reactions throughout the last 12 years, during which time the West's nuclear advantage has dwindled from monopoly to the present narrow margin of terror. Throughout this period Russia would seem to have observed two main rules ; she has kept her own forces out of direct conflict with any nation of the free world, and has not allowed open aggression by proxy to threaten the vital interests of either Britain or America.

In this matter it is pertinent to consider whether the even greater reluctance to resort to war which nuclear parity will bring will of itself lead to a reappraisal of allied vital interests. This is a question over which it is impossible to dogmatize, but there is no doubt that changing world conditions do tend to modify what a country conceives to be its vital interests. To be reminded of this fact it is only necessary, so far as we are concerned, to think back 30 years to the vital interest of having a navy capable of outfighting the combined fleets of the next two biggest maritime powers in the world ; 20 years to the vital interest of maintaining the integrity of the Indian Empire ; and far fewer years to the vital interest of controlling the Suez Canal. It is considered that the allied vital interests could at the moment be defined as :

- (a) The territorial integrity of the allies and of those nations so situated that their loss to the Communist *bloc* would threaten allied security.
- (b) Middle East Oil.
- (c) Freedom to trade.

This last rather loose definition is intended to cover any act which might imperil that level of trade necessary to the continued economic survival of the West, and in defence of which freedom the allies would be forced to act irrespective of the risk of war. It is suggested that this freedom must remain a vital interest of the allies

for as far ahead as can be foreseen, and that Middle East oil will similarly continue to be vital to the Western economy until such time as the industrial use of nuclear power has become commonplace. It is thus only the first category, the territorial integrity of the allies and of certain other nations, over which the Russians may consider that the allies will be prepared to modify their view.

Although Russia may calculate that under conditions of nuclear parity she may be able to push the West a little harder than before, the same ultimate deterrent will exist. For that reason it is considered that, at least initially, she will continue to be at pains not to bring her own forces into action and not to threaten any interest which is clearly vital to the allies. Should she decide to probe militarily at the free world, it is thought that she would do so by proxy and would be cautious both in the matter of leaving a clear line of retreat and in ensuring that there was no risk of the selected conflict spreading by miscalculation into global war.

#### CHINESE STRATEGY

As stated earlier in this paper, it is not thought that there is such a thing as a Russian/Chinese strategy. In the long term the interests of the two countries diverge, and it is held that Russia will not lose sight of that eventual divergence in her policy towards China in the shorter term. However, for the present and for the next few years, covering the period when nuclear parity will be reached, the interests of the two countries coincide. During this time China may reasonably expect full Russian support and, within limits, co-operation in the policy she may elect to follow, always provided it does not run counter to the Russian line.

In order to decide what strategy China is likely to follow, it is necessary to review the major policy considerations facing the Chinese. It is thought that the Chinese will be well aware of the ultimate danger of Russia but that, in the face of their more immediate problems, are unlikely yet to have formulated a national aim sufficiently long term to embrace that particular difficulty. The Chinese may well be surprised at the astonishing speed with which their influence has spread and at the way in which the world has taken them at their face value as the new colossus. Being realists, however, they will know that until they become an industrial power they will remain, by modern standards, a paper dragon. The first aim of Chinese policy must therefore be to become a modern industrial power, and the speed with which this can be accomplished will be affected not only by the drive and resources allotted to the task but also by the measures taken to slow down the rate of population increase. Even allowing them greater success in their industrial revolution than that gained by their Russian prototype, it is not thought that they can come anywhere near their target in less than 20 years. During that time industrialisation must remain very much their primary aim, and they will therefore be most loth to take any action which might jeopardise its success. To that extent, therefore, quite apart from considerations of disparity in armaments, they will wish to avoid becoming involved in limited war on a large scale.

The Chinese will be aware of the adulation and respect accorded them by many millions in the rest of the Far East, and will know that these Asians, together with a growing number of Africans, look to China as the fountainhead of Communism and as being the eventual true leader and champion of the oppressed or under privileged. The Chinese will be mindful that such followers feed and multiply on success, and it may therefore be expected that China will attempt to bring off a cheap victory over the West wherever and whenever opportunity may offer. It

is suggested that the present campaign<sup>1</sup> against the off-shore islands is just such an instance. China knows that the allies are divided on the issue because there is some measure of justice in China's claim and, more especially, because the islands are not vital to the West. For precisely that reason the Chinese are sure that the Americans will give way rather than risk war. The other consideration underlying this present campaign is China's desire to be admitted to the United Nations. Her exclusion from that assembly, and the slight which this implies, carries with it grave loss of face and it is to be expected that this issue will continue to cause trouble until resolved to China's satisfaction.

As a Communist Power it will remain China's policy to work for the overthrow of capitalism and to oppose the allies to the limit of her capacity. It has been argued that that capacity will be deliberately restricted during the next 20 years or so by her concentration on her prime objective of becoming an industrial power. During that time it is considered that it will be Chinese strategy to avoid becoming involved in any large scale limited war but, at the same time, to seize any opportunity which may occur for cheap success or aggrandisement.

#### THE THREAT TO THE WEST—CONCLUSIONS ON RUSSIAN AND CHINESE STRATEGY

It has been suggested that, to Russia, the experience of the last 12 years should indicate that her ends will best be served, at least temporarily, by the abandonment of force as an instrument of policy. The allies have demonstrated that they unite in the face of danger and that they are prepared to meet force with force. It has been argued that there is military impasse in Europe, that the Middle East is too dangerous a theatre for military adventure, and that, at least in Russian eyes, the Far East is inevitably lost to the allies.

But these arguments ignore the factor of approaching nuclear parity, and there can be no doubt that this factor may well encourage the Russians to think that the balance of advantage may once again lie in favour of a policy of aggressive expansionism in spite of the attraction and logic of the alternative course. Should they decide that this is so, it is thought that, at least in the first instance, they would move with caution and would continue to observe their previous practice of not using Russian forces and of not concentrating against any interest or territory which was clearly vital to the allies. However, if sufficiently financed, armed, and reinforced with volunteers, Indonesia would not need much encouragement to annex Timor and to be ready for an attack on Dutch New Guinea and British North Borneo should the policy of aggression be seen to pay. China could be induced, indeed, it would be in line with her need for cheap victories, to take Macao. More dangerous, but still relatively safe in terms of triggering global war, would be the annexation of Hong Kong. Next, perhaps, might be a full scale United Arab Republic attack on Aden. Should the reaction of the allies have been found to be consistently indecisive and ineffective, it would be but a short step to Chinese attack on Korea, and then against Formosa or southward through the Protocol States to Thailand and Malaya. At about this stage in the time-scale Russia might well feel sufficiently emboldened to use her own forces, making Iran or Finland her first victim.

This programme, or some similar pattern of events, could well unfold in the face of allied impotence or lack of resolution. The Russians could calculate, with little risk of being proved wrong, that the West would not deliberately initiate

<sup>1</sup> Written in August, 1958.

global war on any of those issues. Furthermore, as this aggressive policy met with increasing and unchecked success, uncommitted countries would lose faith in the West's ability to defeat Communism and would hasten to align themselves with the Soviets. The moral effect of such a pattern of Soviet success could be disastrous for the West. Belief in the inevitability of Communism and in the futility of opposing the Communist Powers could quickly take root, and these beliefs, manured by the inane sincerities of the pacifists, could bring forth the choking weed of all-pervading defeatism. If this happened, the deterrent would be seen to have lost its validity and nothing could save the West from the horrors of Soviet domination.

Thus, the allies must be prepared to meet three possible methods of attack. Firstly, Russia may attempt to lull the West into a sense of false security by adopting a new, more liberal-seeming policy. By so doing she might hope to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to minor Powers, and thus encourage dissension amongst the allies while giving fresh impetus to latent pacifism amongst the Western peoples. Furthermore, by seeming to conform to the dictates of international law and capitalist practice, her political and economic penetration of the uncommitted countries would be more difficult for the Western Powers to counter, and would be made more attractive by the addition of benevolent aid to the appeal of the Communist dynamic. Finally, such a policy would have the advantage of freeing resources which would allow of raising the standard of living in the Soviet Union, in the so called Peoples Democracies, and in East Germany. The second method of attack open to the Russians is to concentrate on a policy of aggressive expansionism such as that already outlined. Such a policy would have small beginnings but, if Western resolution and capacity were lacking, could gather swift and virtually irresistible momentum. The third possibility confronting the allies is that the Russians may apparently pursue the first course until such time as, judging the allies sufficiently divided, irresolute, and militarily ill-prepared, they switch to a policy of open aggression. Irrespective of Russian design, it must be expected that China will seize any opportunity which may offer of cheap national aggrandisement.

#### THE WESTERN COUNTER

Whatever strategy the Russians may elect to adopt, the allies will need to be prepared to fight both on the politico/economic and on the military fronts. In this section of the paper the Western counter to both these forms of attack will be considered.

#### POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

The political and economic aspects of the cold war, that struggle which has been imposed by Communism on the free world, are perhaps the most difficult to counter. It is no part of a military paper to make detailed proposals on this issue, and it is intended merely to set out the essentials of the problem and to indicate the broad policy which should be followed by the West.

There are, at least in theory, basically two ways in which the creed of Communism can gain ground—by persuasion and by coercion. In the first instance, Communism could become the wish of the majority in a country such as India, which combines a low level of literacy with a low living standard, quite independently of any outside pressure or propaganda. Almost by definition the West, which has no charter to impose its will on the uncommitted countries of the free world, could have no quarrel with a Communism spread in this way and which could be seen to be the result of peaceful democratic processes and to be the wish of the people. Should Russia decide to go whole-heartedly for a policy of outward liberality and

of seeming reason and moderation in her international relationships, there is a danger that Communism could seem to spread in this way and be correspondingly difficult for the West to fight. This toothless Communism lacking, as it would, the element of militant expansionism, would nonetheless prove deadly to the West.

Although the allies should remain alive to the possibility of such a switch in Russian policy, it is thought probable that the factor of approaching nuclear balance will encourage the Russians to continue the spread of Communism by coercion. The West is therefore likely to continue to be faced by the familiar cold war pattern of propaganda, subversion, and *coup d'état* or, as in the case of the Arab bloc where religion remains an obstacle to the growth of Communism, by increasing the use of the 'moneylender' principle by which domination can be achieved through economic aid gradually turning to economic control.

The West is not organized or equipped to meet this cold war attack. Its principal members stand branded as colonial and exploiting Powers while the leaders of the new world empire pose as the protectors of the oppressed peoples of the uncommitted countries. The West is not good at propaganda, it has no cohesive plan to meet the Communist attack and, above all, it has no dynamic to oppose to Communism. It has been frequently argued during the last ten years that the West must set up a political organization to fight the cold war which would parallel existing organizations in the military field. It is argued, correctly, that the importance of winning the cold war is at least as great as that of being prepared to fight a global war, and that therefore comparable resources should be allotted to the task. Where it is thought the argument fails is in its insistence on fighting the Communists with their own weapons. Even if identity of view and interest amongst the Western powers were sufficient to set up a central political directing force, the allies lack aptitude for the task. Propaganda, vilification, subversion, incitement, coercion—these are not Western weapons.

The one big advantage which the West has over the Communist Powers in the cold war lies in its incomparably greater material wealth and resources. If used correctly, this weapon should be decisive, for the one sure way of defeating the spread of Communism is to produce conditions under which Communism loses its appeal. This attack on poverty, on disease, and on ignorance which has been going on in a comparatively minor way should be intensified, and aid on a large and increasing scale, devoid of all conditions or obligations, should be given to the backward and uncommitted countries. Only if Western politicians become convinced, and Western peoples persuaded, of the soundness and long term economy of this investment can the foundations be laid for that state of peaceful prosperity which will ultimately make Communism an anachronism.

#### MILITARY

Politicians, professors, philosophers, ex-ambassadors, priests, pacifists, scientists, and statisticians have all contributed to the welter of confusing and contradictory thought on military strategy in the past few years. Out of their ideas, and from parallel military thought, three main lines of reasoning have evolved. These three theories all spring from the assumption of a balance of nuclear power leading to strategic paralysis and the consequent inability of the West to counter limited aggression.

The essence of the first theory is that, just as fear of retaliation would prevent the West from releasing the full weight of its deterrent, so would the fear of hostilities

spreading to global war prevent the West using low yield nuclear weapons to meet a limited attack. The parallel of Korea is cited where, for precisely this reason and in spite of having a virtual atomic monopoly, the Americans refrained from using these weapons even for the limited purpose of causing the Chinese withdrawal beyond the Yalu. It is argued that, even if politicians could be found with sufficient resolution to order the use of the weapons, nothing could prevent their spread from the immediate battlefield to the back areas, that it would be impossible in practice to differentiate between tactical and strategic targets, that there would be an inevitable increase in the yield of the weapons as the exchange continued and that, in consequence, the spread to global war would be inevitable. It is concluded that the West has no choice but to equip itself to meet limited aggression with conventional forces.

The second theory rests on increasing the credibility of the deterrent to the point where the Communists will believe that any but the most minor incident will be met by massive retaliation. The argument runs that without effective civil defence measures a deterrent policy is both incomplete and unconvincing to the enemy. It is held that if the necessary preparations were made—including deep shelters, an evacuation policy, emergency transport arrangements, emergency ports, stockpiling of food and medicines, and indoctrination of the population—it would prove possible to fight an all out nuclear war with a sustainable level of casualties. The fact that this was clearly seen to be possible, together with the evident preparedness and resolution of the West would, so it is claimed, deter the Communists from even minor aggression.

Neither theory—admittedly here presented in barest outline and without the benefit of advocacy—carries conviction. Any argument leading to a policy based on meeting limited Communist aggression with conventional weapons only is an argument in the Communist interest. The second line of reasoning seems unrealistic to an extreme. The claim on which it rests—that casualties could be kept at an acceptable level in all-out nuclear war—is highly suspect, and would appear to be the result of the statistical equivalent of the pseudo-theological argument which proves conclusively that Jesus Christ never existed. Even allowing the validity of this claim, the policy advocated would never command the support of the Western peoples. Furthermore, even if the argument is reduced to the second stage of absurdity by allowing the credibility of both assumptions, the policy would fail. The Russians would undoubtedly respond by adopting a similar strategy and, with both sides believing that they could survive a nuclear war, disaster would be brought immeasurably closer.

The third theory which has been advanced is that of the graduated deterrent, and it is in some adaption or modification of this theory that the solution to the Western problem is thought to lie. There is some variation in individual proposals but, broadly, it is held that the West should seek agreement or, alternatively, make a unilateral declaration of intent to restrict the use of nuclear weapons in limited war. It is proposed that limitations should be placed on the weapons to be used, on the types of target to be attacked, and on the area within which attacks would be made. This theory seems to have foundered on both sides of the Atlantic on the argument that it is not practicable always to distinguish tactical and strategic targets—for example, the enemy supply depots and airfields concerned in the limited war might be adjacent to cities, which would be considered strategic targets—that there would be no means of knowing whether the enemy was observing the weapon

yield limitation and that, in any event, allies on whose territory such wars might be fought would find these proposals most unwelcome.

However, as there are no satisfactory alternatives, some version of this theory of graduated deterrence must be found which can be made to work. Since in this coming era the doctrine of massive retaliation against limited aggression will stand finally discredited and impotent, and as it is unthinkable that the West should so far play into Communist hands as to plan to meet limited aggression solely by the use of conventional forces, the conclusion is inescapable that the West must have an intermediate sanction which it is both capable and willing to apply. The arguments against the theory arise primarily from artificial difficulties which have been created by the desire to codify any action which might be taken, and to agree with the Communists precisely what rules should apply to limited war. It would be difficult to draw up rules of procedure of this type, it would be more difficult to get the Communists to accept them, and it would be impossible to ensure that they observed them. But these difficulties are largely illusory. There would be nothing to gain from producing a set of rules for the conduct of limited war to which the other side might well not conform. Similarly, a unilateral declaration of intent would merely serve to expose the tactical thinking of the West and to impose severe restrictions on allied freedom of action without giving any compensating advantages. In the event, the Communists will conform to allied procedure in the common interest of limiting the war irrespective of previous agreements or declarations.

To clarify and test this point, which forms the crux of the whole argument, it is necessary to see how this form of deterrence might work in practice. It is most unlikely, at least for as far ahead as it is profitable to look, that the allies would find themselves unable to deal with any potential aggressors, other than the Russians or Chinese, solely by the use of conventional forces. Therefore, a limited war of a scope sufficient to make the use of nuclear weapons a possibility automatically postulates the use of Chinese or, just conceivably, Russian forces. The direct use of Russian forces implies limited war in Europe or the Middle East, or the use of such forces in concert with the Chinese, possibly to supply the nuclear potential which China lacks. It has already been stated that it has been Russian policy to keep her own forces out of direct contact with the West for fear of provoking global war. Whilst this policy might change under conditions of nuclear parity if no other sanction than massive retaliation was available to the West, it would be most unlikely to do so if the West stood ready poised to respond with whatever force was necessary.

However, for the sake of illustration, it must be assumed that the Communists decide to initiate a limited war involving their own forces. The most credible theatre for such a venture would be the Far East. The main body of troops involved would almost certainly be Chinese conventional forces of a strength too great for the West to contain without the use of nuclear weapons, and for the purpose of this illustration it must be assumed that they would be supported by a Russian 'volunteer force' having a nuclear potential. Such a war would, by definition, be limited in its aim—probably, on the Communist side, the acquisition of certain territory—and would have the parallel and highly important object of testing Western reaction when faced with the need to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. On the Western side the aim would be limited to restoring the *status quo*.

Once it became established that large scale aggression had taken place, the first hurdle facing the West would be the vital need of getting a quick political

decision to use nuclear weapons. Although this is not a military problem, the armed forces of the West will be impotent if it is not resolved with speed when the need arises. It is probable, indeed almost certain, that the politicians who show the courage and resolution to take this decision will insist on exercising the closest control over the use of the weapons, extending not only to yield but to type of target. Once the decision to use nuclear weapons had been taken, and their yield and targets specified, the first weapon would be put down on the enemy line of advance, probably with little attention to lethality, but with the primary object of showing that the West was in earnest.

The enemy would then have the choice, firstly, of retaliating against any allied land forces which might have been stationed in, or have reached, the territory which had been chosen for invasion or, secondly, of withdrawing. It is maintained that the third course which is popularly advanced, that of retaliation against the allied air or naval forces which had initiated the nuclear strike, is invalid. Given an equal desire on the part of the Communists to avoid global war, and it cannot be denied that this consideration would be paramount on both sides, it makes no sense to argue that the enemy would choose to pursue a course so obviously perilous to world peace. It is suggested that once the allies had shown their resolution by exploding the first weapon or weapons, the Communists would withdraw and content themselves with making considerable capital out of the demonstrated inhumanity of the West.

However, it is possible that the enemy would decide to continue their attack. This decision would, it is thought, be taken on pure time and space considerations—more precisely, as the result of a calculation that the territory could be overrun before sufficiently strong allied land forces could be deployed in its defence. In this calculation it is thought that the Communists would exclude the possibility of attacking allied ports of entry as, to do so, would invite retaliation deep in their own territory with consequent unacceptable risk of global war. Should the Communist calculation be proved ill-founded in that the allies were able to deploy forces strong enough to turn the Chinese advance, the Communists would have no choice, short of risking global war, other than to withdraw within their own frontiers. Similarly, should the reverse hold true, the allies would, in their turn, have no rational alternative to that of accepting limited defeat.

Whatever theories may be held about the detailed conduct of future limited war, the one clear and unassailable fact which emerges is that both sides will be obsessed with the need to avoid the catastrophe of global war. It follows from this fact that both sides are likely to refrain from any act which might bring that disaster nearer. It is submitted that the fighting of a limited war, when tactical nuclear capability has become conventional, is just such an act. It is therefore held, given certain essential conditions, that a tactical deterrent to limited war can be evolved which will prove as successful in the future as the strategic deterrent to global war has been in the past. The necessary conditions are that the West should have the weapons, the means of delivery at the right time and place, and, above all, should be clearly seen to have the resolution to use them should the need arise. Should this resolution be lacking, not only will the deterrent to limited war be ineffective but, in time, the credibility of the strategic deterrent will come to be doubted.

Thus it is that the West, in addition to maintaining the strategic deterrent to global war at the highest pitch of efficiency, must be prepared to build a tactical deterrent to limited war and must, at the same time, be ready to fight small frontier

wars with conventional arms. This is a difficult and expensive task which will demand a high degree of unity and common purpose from the nations of the West. It will demand a higher degree of interdependence and a greater willingness to sacrifice national sovereignty than has so far been forthcoming. It will demand enlightened thinking from politicians and flexibility of mind from military leaders. It will not be easy, but there is no other way.

#### CONCLUSIONS

In the approaching age of nuclear stalemate, Russia may pursue any one of three strategies. She may intensify her peace propaganda and, by switching to an apparently liberal policy, attempt to quieten the fears of the West whilst concentrating on the political and economic aspects of the cold war. Secondly she may, if she doubts the solidarity and resolution of the West, attempt to heighten and extend her policy of aggressive expansionism. The third strategy open to the Soviets is to adopt the first course until, judging the unity and resolve of the West to be sufficiently undermined and weakened, the moment seems ripe to switch to open aggression. It is this third possibility which the West must be prepared to counter. Side by side with this Russian threat, the West must be prepared to meet Chinese aggression, though this is likely to be limited to comparatively minor ventures which might seem to offer the chance of cheap prestige victories. In any incursion against the West both Russia and her lackeys will be careful to avoid threatening the vital interests of the allies so long as the strategic deterrent to global war remains both valid and credible.

This Communist threat will require to be met in two ways: by political and economic action and by military preparedness. On the political and economic front, the West should not attempt to meet Communism with its own weapons of propaganda, intrigue, and economic control. Rather should it use the advantage of its superior wealth and resources in seeking to produce, throughout the uncommitted parts of the world, conditions under which Communism loses its appeal.

Militarily, the West must be prepared to fight minor wars with conventional weapons and it must also stand ready to use nuclear weapons in limited war against the Communist Powers themselves. In order to get this degree of preparedness, unity, and resolution, which alone can succeed in deterring limited war, the West will need to accept a greater degree of interdependence and to sacrifice a larger measure of national sovereignty than it has heretofore been willing to entertain. As a background to this military preparedness it is axiomatic that the strategic deterrent to global war must remain both valid and credible.

All these measures, political, economic, and military, will entail much sacrifice of treasure. But the Governments of the free world must face the issues with which they are confronted and, substituting their appropriate nationalities, would do well to echo the words of William Pitt:—

“ We must recollect . . . what it is we have at stake, what it is we have to contend for. It is for our property, it is for our liberty, it is for our independence, nay, for our existence as a nation; it is for our character, it is for our very name as Englishmen, it is for everything dear and valuable to man on this side of the grave.”

## HAWKE'S BLOCKADE OF BREST

By G. J. MARCUS

**A**S between Great Britain and France, the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) was essentially a struggle for maritime, colonial, and commercial supremacy. The British policy, which from 1757 to 1761 was in the hands of William Pitt, was to contain France in Europe while he concentrated the national energies on a full-scale offensive against Canada. In 1759, while the issue of the North American campaign was still uncertain, events in Europe moved to a crisis. Towards the end of 1758 a rival to Pitt had appeared in France in the person of the Duc de Choiseul, who now took over the direction of the war; and, to relieve the pressure on Canada, revived an earlier project of Marshal Belleisle's for the invasion of England.

Choiseul at the outset had hoped for the active assistance of neutral Powers aggrieved at British interference with their commerce. The attitude of Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Spain was becoming increasingly hostile. In the oft-quoted words of the late Sir Julian Corbett, "It may be taken as a law of maritime warfare, which cannot be omitted from strategical calculation with impunity, that every step towards gaining command of the sea tends to turn neutral sea powers into enemies. The prolonged exercise of belligerent rights, even of the most undoubted kind, produces an interference with trade that becomes more and more oppressive." But Pitt, appreciating to the full the gravity of the danger, wisely went part of the way towards removing their grievances; and France was left to attempt the invasion project alone. An army of 20,000 men from the Morbihan in Brittany was to sail for the Clyde, under the escort of the combined Brest and Toulon squadrons; thence, after disembarking the Army, the French fleet was to proceed north-about round Scotland and down through the North Sea to cover the passage of 50,000 troops from Flanders to the Essex coast.

The war on the continent had meanwhile taken a bad turn, and Hanover was again in peril; on 14th October, 1758, our ally, Frederick II of Prussia, was surprised and defeated by the Austrians under Marshal Daun at Hochkirch; and next year a ring of hostile armies closed in on his dwindling forces. The Austrians overran Saxony and threatened Berlin; the Prussians were heavily defeated by the Russians on 23rd July at Züllischau, and on 12th August at Kunersdorf. Frederick II's plight had now become so desperate that he was contemplating suicide. But the Austrians and Russians failed to follow up this victory, and by their inactivity they allowed the King of Prussia to reorganize his forces, which he did with astonishing promptitude and dispatch. Frederick II's recovery after Kunersdorf is one of the miracles of history.

Meanwhile in England there was increasing alarm at the threat from across the Channel. By far the greatest part of our Regular Army was out of the country: there were 27,000 British men in America, 10,000 in Germany, 5,000 at Gibraltar, and 4,000 in Africa. "You know, I suppose," wrote the Duke of Newcastle in April, "that flat-bottomed boats are preparing all along the French coasts." But Pitt stood firm. Notwithstanding his colleague's increasing apprehension, and his demand for stronger forces at home, he declined to recall a single vessel or regiment from overseas, relying upon the existing system of defence. He stationed a strong corps of Regular troops in the Isle of Wight and ordered a large fleet of transports to be held in readiness at the Nore to carry them to any part of the British Isles

which might be threatened with invasion ; he also promulgated a number of measures for calling out the militia. But first and last, his main bulwark against such a descent was a Channel Squadron stronger than anything which the enemy could send against it. At a Cabinet council on 9th May it was decided that in ten days' time Sir Edward Hawke was to proceed to Torbay with 18 of the line to watch Brest.<sup>1</sup> On 13th May Hawke hoisted his flag in the *Ramillies* at Spithead, and a week later sailed from Torbay.

Throughout the first three years of the war—1756, 1757, and 1758—the Admiralty had relied on the time-honoured system of watching Brest from one of our western ports. Anson's instructions of 9th May to Hawke had indeed been framed on these lines.<sup>2</sup> But the situation confronting him was, in the Admiral's judgment, too critical for him to retire with the squadron from the vital post off Ushant, and in the campaign of 1759 he abandoned the old policy altogether in favour of the new strategy of the close blockade.

" In the afternoon [of the 24th]," he observed three days later, " I sent the *Minerva*, supported by the *Nottingham*, to look into Brest water. Next morning they returned, and acquainted me that they saw very distinctly eleven sail in the Road, all which they judged to be large ships of war, with their colours hoisted, yards & topmasts up, and topgallant yards across. One of them carried a flag on her mizentopmasthead ; and another a broad pendant on her maintopmasthead. They all seemed ready for sailing. . . . Upon the whole I do not think it prudent, as they may soon be joined by more from Brest Harbour, to leave them at liberty to come out, by returning to Torbay, till I shall receive further instructions from their Lordships, or the wind shall appear to be set in strong westerly. I have detached the *Rochester* and *Melampus* to keep a constant watch over their motions, and the *Prince Edward* cutter to run between us with intelligence."<sup>3</sup> On 4th June the Admiral reported that there were now 17 sail in the roads and reaffirmed his intention of remaining off Brest until further orders.

On the following day, however, with the wind backing to the south-west, it blew a heavy gale ; and on the 6th he was forced to bear up for Torbay. Attempting to regain their station on the 11th, " turning down Channel at noon under close reefed topsails," Hawke's squadron was on the 12th, off the Lizard, " surprised by a violent storm," which did not abate until late in the evening, and in the course of which the *Hero* lost all her masts, and the *Torbay* her main course and other sails. " On Monday morning," wrote Hawke on the 13th, " I was joined by His Majesty's sloop *Albany* sent from Plymouth with the topmasts mentioned in a former letter." The Admiral especially commended the acting lieutenant of the *Albany* for his courage and forethought to their Lordships. " He behaved remarkably well in the gale of wind by preserving the topmasts for the squadron at the utmost risque, and notwithstanding the remonstrances of the whole company for cutting them away. He prudently considered, when the *Hero*'s masts went, she might want them." It was not until the 21st that Hawke was back off Ushant again and was relieved to learn from Duff, who was keeping watch close inshore, that the enemy were all there. " I am very happy," he observed, " after all the bad weather, in having

<sup>1</sup> B.M. : Add. MSS., 32, 887-32, 891, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> P.R.O. : *Adm. 2/1331*, 9th May.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid. 1/92*, 27th May.

got safe on my station again before they should stir."<sup>4</sup> In the ensuing months the governing factors in the investment of Brest were the gales, the cleaning, refitting, and victualling of ships.

From first to last the strategy of the close blockade was based on the fundamental fact that hard westerly gales which obliged the Channel Squadron to bear up for Plymouth or Torbay would equally prevent the enemy from getting out of Brest ; and that a shift of wind which enabled the French to leave port would also serve to bring the blockading force back on its station. But there was the possibility that if Hawke were compelled to seek shelter by a westerly gale, as soon as the weather moderated the enemy might put to sea before the blockading force could get back on its station again. There was also another danger. When in the autumn of 1757 Hawke had been sent to intercept de la Motte on his return from North America, he had been driven back into port by the same gale which had brought the enemy squadron safely into Brest. The same mischance could—and, in point of fact, did—recur during the blockade of 1759.

From time to time it would become urgently necessary for Hawke to send in some of the ships—which were not yet coppered—"to clean and refit for Channel service" : thus weakening the squadron with which he was blockading the enemy in Brest. The difficulties inseparable from cleaning and refitting must be expected to increase when, on the approach of the Equinox, strong westerly winds were to be apprehended.

The health of the ships' companies was a vital factor in the blockade. It is to be observed that Hawke's ten weeks' cruise in the Channel in 1755 had been brought to a premature end by the spread of sickness which wrought havoc on the crowded mess-decks. "Had I staid out a week longer," he had then informed the Admiralty, "there would not have been men enough to have worked the large ships ; they fell down so fast." Already remonstrances had been passing between Hawke and the Admiralty on the subject of pressed men and bad beer ; already he was appealing for regular and adequate supplies of good beer "as the best preservative of health among new-raised men."

"Hygiene and supply," the late Sir Herbert Richmonde declared, "are fundamental elements affecting both strategy and tactics." Much of the sickness which ravaged the crowded mess-decks is to be attributed to the poor quality of the provisions supplied to the Navy. Many an Admiral had had occasion to complain of insufficient and bad supplies. Incompetence, neglect, and at times corruption on the part of those responsible for victualling the Navy lay at the bottom of these evils.

During the whole course of the blockade Hawke waged a stubborn and on the whole successful struggle against the lethargy and incompetence of the dockyard, victualling, medical, and other authorities. As his biographer has truly observed, "The least weakness in giving way to the traditions of bureaucracy on the questions of victualling, cleaning, and dispatching back again his ships, would have left Hawke powerless on the day of battle, with sick crews, ships that would not sail, and officers worn out with the endless fatigues of cruising in gales of wind and on a lee shore."<sup>5</sup>

From the reports of the inshore squadron it was apparent that the French were unlikely to leave port for some time. "The operations of the enemy indicate a long cruise for the squadron," Hawke reported on 3rd July. "In order to preserve it in a condition to keep the sea, I propose to send in two ships of the line to clean at

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 1/92, 6th, 8th, 13th June.

<sup>5</sup> Montague Burrows, *Life of Admiral Lord Hawke* (1883).

Plymouth every spring [tide]. I have begun with the *Fame*, who has got a very malignant fever on board, and the *Bienfaisant*, whose rudder is not to be depended on. They are both above six months foul. I have also sent in the *Actaeon* as convoy to the victuallers, & kept the *Swallow* to repeat signals till her return." Shortly after, when the two frigates *Colchester* and *Coventry* rejoined the fleet after a cruise, they also had to be sent in to clean and refit. "Complaint having been made to me," observed Hawke, "that the tops of the *Colchester* were all to pieces, I sent my carpenter to inspect them, and he having reported to me, that they were in so bad a condition, that the ship could not remain at sea, I have sent her into Plymouth Sound to get them repair'd, & in the meantime to heel, scrub, boot-hose-top,<sup>6</sup> revictual, & then proceed to join me with the utmost dispatch. The *Coventry* also being very foul, & in want of every necessary, which could not, without hurting them, be supply'd from the great ships, I have sent her in to clean. When I shall be join'd by the *Sapphire* I believe that must be her fate too. . . . P.S. The *Sapphire* is come in since my writing the above, and being in want of everything, I have sent her into Plymouth Sound to heel, scrub, boot-hose-top and revictual." "The *Venus* and *Southampton* both want revictualling," he continued on 10th July. "Beside the former is very foul, and the latter's cutwater & head very loose. So I have sent them both in to clean. I hope they will be able to rejoin me in seven or eight days." On the 13th he sent in the *Prince Edward* cutter to clean and hasten the ships from Plymouth. Later in the month, however, the increasing activity of the enemy at Brest caused the Admiral to change his mind. "The *Hercules*'s company being very sickly," he wrote on the 23rd, "I sent her in to heel and refresh her men ten days in port. For the disappointment I met with by the two first I sent in not saving the spring, has induced me to alter my plan, and give orders for no more line-of-battle ships to clean." "In my former letter," he continued the following day, "I sent their Lordships the dispositions I had made of my squadron. I never desired or intended to keep more line-of-battle ships than equalled the number of the enemy, which is now augmented to twenty-two. I have at present twenty-three, and seldom have had more than twenty-four, and that only during a day. If ships take up a month, by cleaning, from the time they leave me to their return, it will be impossible for me to keep up the squadron. The only practicable way is to heel, &c., and confine them to ten days in port, for the refreshment of their companies, in case they should miss the spring. . . . As soon as the weather shall be fair I shall send in the *Mars* and the *Firm*. In port at present the *Hero*, *Fame*, *Bienfaisant* & *Hercules*." He was the more emphatic on this latter point, in view of the fact that the Admiralty had recently sent an order that several ships should be sent in at a time for cleaning and refreshment. "Their Lordships will give me leave to observe that the relief of the squadron depends more on the refreshment of the Ships' Companies than on cleaning the ships. By the hurry the latter must be performed in (unless the ship continues a month or five weeks in port, which the present exigency will by no means admit of) the men would be so harassed and fatigued that they would return to me in a worse condition than when they left me. This made me prefer ordering some of them to heel and boot-hose-top only, remaining at rest for ten days in port, and at their departure bringing such a quantity of fresh meat as would keep sweet at this

<sup>6</sup> "The meaning of the word 'boot-hose-top,' which is of frequent occurrence in letters of those times, is to heel over the ship as far as possible, to scrape or burn off the grass, slime, shells, barnacles, &c., which adhere to the bottom of a wooden vessel long out at sea, and to daub it over with a mixture of tallow, sulphur, and resin, as a temporary protection." (Burrows, *op. cit.*, p. 376.)

season, two or three live bullocks and twenty live sheep. The present bottoms of the new ships in particular are better and will last longer than if they were, by cleaning, to be burnt off, and get a pease-porridge<sup>7</sup> one in their stead. However I shall endeavour to comply with all their Lordships' directions in such manner as, to the best of my judgment, will answer their intentions of employing me here. But as to myself it is a matter of indifference whether I fight the enemy, if they should come out, with an equal number, one ship more, or one less."<sup>8</sup>

The Secretary of the Admiralty replied, on 13th August, to the effect that, since Hawke was of the opinion that cleaning the ships would be prejudicial to the health of the men, "which must be particularly attended to," and that giving them boot-hose-tops would answer the purposes, their Lordships would leave it to him to give such to the ships he might from time to time send in, "as he should judge best for the Service."

"Their Lordships," the Secretary continued, "have ordered the rigging you represent the *Ramillies* to be in want of to be got ready at Portsmouth and sent to Plymouth, for her. I have also their Lordships' commands to acquaint you, that his Majesty's Ship the *Foudroyant*, is now ready at Spithead, and will proceed to join you immediately, which will make thirty-two sail of the line under your command, including the two fifty-gun ships, which their Lordships hope will be a sufficient force for the services entrusted to your care."<sup>9</sup>

The commanding officer at Plymouth, Commodore Thomas Hanway, was now hard put to it to satisfy the pressing demands alike of the Admiralty and Sir Edward Hawke for the speedy return of the latter's ships. On 24th August he was directed to hasten the return of the *Hero* and *Hercules*. "This morning," observed the Commodore on the 31st, "the *Minerva* proceeded to join Sir Edward Hawke which will on Sunday be followed by the *Hercules* and *Juno*, and soon after by the *Hero* and *Resolution*, their masts being all in and all possible diligence used in equipping them, which has been retarded by the badness of the weather." On 10th September the Admiralty sent orders for the *Rochester* to proceed to Plymouth to be cleaned and refitted with the utmost dispatch."<sup>10</sup>

Like Boscawen, Hawke spared no pains to promote the health and well-being of his ships' companies. "The squadron will soon want butter & cheese," he wrote on regaining his station on 21st June, "which must be sent to the rendezvous." "The victuallers have supplied the squadron with beer," he reported on 2nd July, "for at least six or seven weeks." A week later the *London Evening Post* published a letter written by some officer on board the *Bellerophon*. "We have a fine Fleet," observed this correspondent, "all in high Spirits, and well. I am a little surprised that you lazy, idle Fellows don't make a Motion for supplying the Fleet with fresh Beef, from Ireland, which would keep all Englishmen in good Health: They send us Beer and Water enough, but no fresh provision nor Greens for our People. If the French don't chuse to come out, we shall have a Four-month Cruize, and consequently the Scurvy will prevail amongst the Seamen, whom I look upon as the strength of the Nation. I wonder how a Parcel of Land-drones can see poor Jacks suffer so." "I have not yet received the supplies of butter and cheese, beef, pork, &c.," Hawke told the Admiralty on 23rd July, "insomuch that I cannot

<sup>7</sup> A mixture of tallow, sulphur, and resin.

<sup>8</sup> *Adm.* 1/92, 3rd, 10th, 13th, 23rd, 24th July.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 2/526, 13th August.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* 2/526, 24th August, 10th September; 1/802, 31st August.

help regretting the want of a commanding officer at Plymouth to see all orders executed with the expedition and punctuality necessary. As I shall not now have it in my power to relieve the whole squadron, and must in all probability remain here a considerable time, will their Lordships give me leave to recommend to their consideration the sending out live cattle now and then, under such regulations as shall be thought proper." "I am extremely glad," he acknowledged on 24th July, "to find their Lordships have ordered bullocks and sheep for the preservation of the sick. I hope such numbers will be sent as that the ships' companies may have a share, to prevent their falling down in scorbatic disorders." "A quantity of bread will be returned to you by the *Elizabeth*," he informed the authorities at Plymouth, "though not altogether unfit for use, yet so full of weevils and maggots that it would have infected all the bread come on board this day." Complaints concerning the beer and the victualling arrangements at Plymouth continued to recur in the Admiral's official correspondence. "Our daily employment is condemning the beer from Plymouth, insomuch as that article is becoming very scarce in the squadron. Give me leave therefore to repeat my entreaties for beer being sent with the utmost expedition from the Eastward." "The beer brewed at your port is so excessively bad that it employs the whole time of the squadron in surveying it and throwing it overboard," he protested to the authorities at Plymouth; at the same time he informed the Admiralty, "The beer brewed at Plymouth is in reality so little relief to the squadron that I have sent in orders to send me no more of it. Our daily employment is condemning of it, which embarrasses us many ways. I have therefore sent this express to intreat their Lordships will send us beer from the Eastward as far as possible, and directly to the rendezvous without touching at Plymouth." "As the Portsmouth, Dover, and London beer held good to the last," he complained on 28th August, "I look on it as a demonstration that the badness of the Plymouth beer was owing entirely to a want of the due proportion of malt and hops." On 14th September Geary came on board the *Mars* with three of his captains to examine the beer—with the result that 77 butts were condemned as "not fit for the men to drink." "The supplies of beer and water arrive so slow," Hawke protested on 1st October, "and the continual disappointments I meet with from the Plymouth beer, with which the clean ships are supplied, not lasting in a condition to be drunk above a week, I am afraid may occasion the breaking up of the squadron."<sup>11</sup>

Hawke's remonstrances had not gone unheeded. That summer and autumn the letters passing between the Admiralty and the various port authorities exuded an altogether unprecedented promptitude, energy, and drive. The Admiralty on 29th June gave orders for a supply of butter and cheese to be sent to Plymouth, whence a convoy would transport them to the fleet. Live bullocks for the sick were also to be provided, Hawke was informed on 19th July. To the Commissioners for victualling the Navy the Admiralty wrote on 2nd August: "Having directed the Navy Board to cause four of the transports at Spithead of between two and three hundred tons each to proceed under such convoy as Vice-Admiral Holburne is ordered to appoint to Plymouth there to return the provisions to your office, and to be employed in your service in carrying live cattle to the fleet under the command of Sir Edward Hawke, and to cause the said transports to be properly fitted for carrying the said cattle: you are hereby required and directed to cause live bullocks and sheep to be sent in the said transports to Sir Edward Hawke accordingly, not only for the use of the sick, but for the well men to be served

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* 1/92, 21st June, 2nd, 23rd, 24th July, 28th August, 1st October.

with it by turns. You are also to provide cabbages, turnips, carrots, potatoes, and onions, and serve them for the use of the men on board the said fleet, taking care the pursers account for the same in some of the species of provisions." On the 13th Hawke was informed by the Admiralty that all his requests were to be met and that the four transports were to be constantly employed "in carrying out to you live stock and refreshments for the use of the sick ; and the surplus is to be distributed amongst the well of your squadron." On the day before he received this letter he had been joined by the *Juno*, "which sailed from Plymouth with nine victuallers, one with dry provisions, three with beer, two with forty live oxen, two with two hundred and forty-eight sheep, and one with cabbages, onions, turnips & carrots, which," the Admiral declared, "will prove a great relief to the ships' companies." Already the Commissioners for victualling the Navy had received orders to adopt special measures for preserving the beer sent out to Hawke's squadron. On the 20th the Commissioners were directed by the Admiralty to order the *Catwater* sloop at Plymouth to be kept constantly going to the squadron with roots, greens, and apples without convoy. "Their Lordships have ordered you all the beer from the eastward that can be provided," the Secretary of the Admiralty told Hawke on the 22nd, "and they have ordered all there is both at London, and Portsmouth, to be sent out to you, and have directed every means to be used to supply the ships under your command with what is good ; but the Commissioners of the Victualling inform the Lords, that the uncommon hot weather this summer, has occasioned the beer to spoil." The Commissioners received a further "prog" on 5th October, when their attention was drawn to Hawke's reiterated complaints, "for the ships under his command arrive so slow, and the continual disappointments he meets with from the Plymouth beer not being in a condition to be drank in a week's time will, he fears, occasion the breaking up of the squadron under his command, which at this time would be of the most fatal consequence to this country, wherefore their Lordships command me to repeat their directions to you, to cause every thing that is possible to be done, to supply those ships with whatever may be necessary belonging to your Department, & to observe to you, that if they should be obliged to return into port for want of timely supplies being sent from your office, you will be answerable to the publick for the same."<sup>12</sup>

In a letter addressed some time before to one of his relatives by Lieutenant Thompson of the *Dorsetshire*, the writer expressed no little satisfaction at the welcome, if somewhat belated, improvement in their victualling arrangements. "Tho' you truly think upon this fleet your lives and fortunes depend," the lieutenant observed, "yet to support the people in it, you have at last considered fresh provisions are necessary :—it is a pity this charitable thought did not occur sooner,—for alas ! we are very sickly ; besides, there is such an abuse in the provisions sent out,—that immediately on their arrival, a third part have been condemned not fit to eat."<sup>13</sup>

The victualling of Hawke's force off Brest this year marked, indeed, an era in the history of the blockade. To and fro between the squadron and the southern naval ports, as regularly as the weather allowed, sailed the well-laden fleets of victuallers under convoy of the *Swallow* and the other sloops. "No fleet employed on similar service," observes Laird Clowes, "had ever before been so amply supplied with beer, provisions, or vegetables."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 2/83, 2nd, 20th August ; 2/525, 29th June ; 2/526, 19th July, 13th, 20th, 22nd August, 5th October.

<sup>13</sup> Edward Thompson, *Letters of a Sailor* (1767), II, 114.

<sup>14</sup> *Adm.* 52/761, 825, 858, 1051 ; Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy* (1898), III, 223.

It was the regularity and sufficiency of these supplies which enabled the hard-worked crews to remain all these months at sea. Naval officers of the first and second World Wars will appreciate to the full the formidable difficulties involved in shepherding large and unhandy convoys, in calms, fogs, and head-winds, across the chops of the Channel.

Even in the earlier stages of the campaign mention is made from time to time of trouble with the victuallers. On Hawke's return to his station off Brest, after the bad weather in June, the victuallers under convoy of the *Swallow* had given their escort the slip, and bore away to the westward. Thereupon Hawke sent the captain of the *Swallow* to look for them in the western ports, with orders, should their masters refuse to accompany him, "to put careful persons from the sloop on board them, and bring them to my rendezvous." A few weeks later, on 23rd July, the *Melampus* had continued difficulty to induce a sluggish convoy of victuallers to make more sail. Always there was this tendency of a convoy to proceed under an easy sail and to straggle.<sup>15</sup>

In the middle of the summer came frequent spells of thick weather—that bugbear of convoy escorts.

"Made the signal and weighed and came to sail with 9 sail under our convoy," the master of the *Juno* recorded on 10th August. "Thick fogg: keep firing guns as a signal in the fogg. . . . Thick fogg: keep firing guns every oure. 2 of the convoy in sight." "Thick fogg," he added on the 11th: "fired guns every hour as a signal for the convoy." When they were about nine leagues to the south-eastward of the Lizard the fog lifted awhile, and the *Juno* sighted eight of her convoy. On the following day the fog came down again. "Thick fogg . . . fired guns as a signal for the convoy." Later the fog cleared off: "8 sail of the convoy in sight." On the 13th the *Juno* and her convoy joined company with the fleet. "Delivered some beer to his Majesty's ship *Actaeon* with 36 butts of beer. Received from her 15 empty butts." On the return passage the *Juno* had good weather. "Made sail and parted company from the fleet," noted her master on the 18th, "with 7 smale vessels under convoy. . . . Fine with the convoy all in company."<sup>16</sup>

As the season advanced the difficulty of victualling the fleet increased. "I have at length distributed the provisions," wrote Hawke on 10th September, "but taking beer & water out of these small vessels if the weather be westerly takes up a vast deal of time, & is not to be done if it blows fresh."<sup>17</sup>

The deficiencies of the medical service were another of the Admiral's perennial anxieties. An incident which occurred towards the end of the present campaign serves in fact to remind us that the era of *Roderick Random* belonged to the very recent past.

The Navy Board had lately expressed resentment at the summary dismissal, by Hawke, of the surgeon of the *Nottingham*. The Admiral therefore wrote, in explanation of his action: "I have received your letter of the 17th inst., in answer to which I am to acquaint you that there was no mistake in Mr. Wright's being ordered by me to be discharged, and the reason marked on the pay list. The *Nottingham* was wanted at a moment's notice to cruise in the Goulette at Brest, a station which required every man in her to be ready at a call. [There was] No

<sup>15</sup> *Adm.* 52/1051, 943.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* 52/906.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 1/92, 10th September.

probability of being able to try Wright by a Court-martial for his disobedience of orders and other dirty crimes: nor could I, in the circumstances the ship was then in, hourly, in the face of the enemy, admit of sentries being kept on so worthless a fellow. As the least inconvenience, or rather for the real good of the service, I ordered him to be discharged, and his crime noted on his list of pay, for your information. I shall not enter into a dispute with you about my authority as a Commanding officer, neither do I ever think of inconveniences or prejudice to myself, as a party, according to your insinuations, where the good of the service is concerned. Enclosed I send you a letter from Captain Lendrick relating to Wright. By the *Melampe* this day I have sent in Mr. Joseph Cock, whom you appointed to be surgeon of the *Duke*. His infirmities rendering him incapable of his duty, he has applied to be sent home: the surgeon he was to supersede, though very old, still continues in the ship."<sup>18</sup>

The underlying principle of Anson's blockade was so sound that Pitt's confidence in our naval defensive was entirely justified. The French found themselves faced by the same dilemma which had confronted them in 1756. During the age of sail navigational conditions in the Channel were, in fact, unfavourable to France. Eastward of Brest there was no harbour for heavy ships, no port which could compare with Portsmouth or Plymouth—only tidal harbours which could take no more than a limited number of small craft. So long as the blockade held, our continental foes were powerless to strike at us. Anson's prompt and vigorous action had secured the effective control of home waters. The flotilla forces massing in the French Channel ports were blockaded by stronger British flotillas and supporting cruiser squadrons. Since the French had no heavy ships in their Channel ports it was impossible for their transports to cross until their battle fleet came up into those waters and cleared the way for the passage of their army.

The failure of the flat-bottoms at Havre to achieve anything—Rodney's bombardment of 3rd–5th July played havoc among the hostile shipping: though another attempt two months later proved abortive—had resulted in increased activity in the Brittany ports. As the summer advanced, Hawke extended his blockade to the transports and troops which were assembling farther down the coast. On 15th August Captain Roddam was directed to cruise with a small squadron as far south as L'Orient, and instructed to make the destruction of the enemy's transports, rather than his warships, his principal object. Hawke next decided to attempt the destruction of the French flotilla. Duff was directed to cruise with a squadron between Port Louis and Nantes and to take Reynolds's division under his command. But before the new orders could take effect Reynolds reported that the transports at Nantes had slipped out of the Loire with three frigates and sailed northward to join those at Vannes; that he had pursued them in Quiberon Bay, and that they had taken refuge in the River Auray. Leaving most of his squadron in Quiberon Bay to watch the enemy's invasion forces at Vannes, Duff then took up his post with the *Rochester*, 50, and a few frigates off the Ile de Groix to blockade St. Louis.<sup>19</sup>

After the defeat, on 19th August, of Clue's squadron in Lagos Bay and the frustration of their plan to effect a concentration at Brest, the French resolved to press on with their invasion scheme with the Brest fleet alone. Their commander,

<sup>18</sup> Q. Burrows, *op. cit.*, pp. 385–6.

<sup>19</sup> *Adm. 2/526*, 22nd August; 1/92, 26th August; Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, II, 29 *et seq.*

Mons. de Conflans, hoped to avoid a general action : yet nothing was more certain than this, that our Channel Squadron would continue to make the hostile flotilla their primary object.

So long as the blockade of the French arsenals held, the chances of successful evasion were slender indeed. During the ensuing weeks, though Hawke varied his dispositions from time to time to meet the changing situation in the Bay, the Western Squadron, on its post off Ushant, with its detached divisions and single scouting cruisers continually patrolling the enemy's coast, remained the pivot of our naval defences : effectively securing the Channel against the French battle fleet, covering our expeditions overseas, protecting the western foci of British trade, and harassing those of the enemy. When the wind was easterly, the main body of Hawke's fleet occasionally stood in to St. Mathieu Point. In hard westerly weather, his rendezvous was some 15 leagues  $W\frac{1}{2}S$  of Ushant. The advanced squadron—the strength of which varied from week to week—lay for lengthy periods off St. Mathieu Point or to the southward of the Black Rocks. Frigates kept a vigilant watch on the Passage du Four and the Passage du Raz. At the same time the second division of the French invasion forces, stationed in Flanders, was blocked in by a cruiser squadron under Commodore Boys. A third division lying at Havre was held by Rodney's force ; while a supporting cruiser squadron, under Sir Piercy Brett, lay in the Downs.

Throughout the long blockade it was the tireless vigilance of the inshore squadron which, first under Duff and later under Hervey, made it impossible for the French to get out of Brest unobserved. This was clearly understood by the enemy. "Our marine officers," stated an intelligence from Paris towards the end of 1759, "attribute all the misfortunes of our fleet to the intrepidity of that little squadron that was so long cruising this year at the very entrance of Brest."<sup>20</sup> These few crews were, in fact, the eyes and ears of the fleet, enabling Hawke to cruise far out to the westward in the full knowledge and confidence that he would receive timely warning of any impending move on the part of the enemy. Their mastery of the intricate navigation of the Iroise and the neighbouring channels, no less than the successes that they scored in a series of minor engagements, had a moral effect which must not be underrated, and emphasized the ascendancy which the Navy had established, even in the Bay of Brest, over its rival.

In the meantime Hawke with the main body of the fleet remained on his post off Ushant, often out of sight of the land ; only entering the Iroise from time to time when the wind came northerly or easterly, and at the news, as on 22nd July, that the enemy was coming out of Brest.<sup>21</sup> Throughout the long months of the blockade the great cabin of the *Ramillies* was the nerve-centre of all our dispositions in the Bay. To it came the reports of the detached squadrons and cruisers and the latest foreign intelligence transmitted from Whitehall ; from it went Hawke's dispatches to the Admiralty, his communications to the commanding officer at Plymouth and the victualling department, his orders to his subordinate commanders. The burden of responsibility which the Admiral took upon his shoulders was immense. He must needs be careful and troubled about many things : the situation in the Mediterranean, the issue of the war in Germany, and the news from North America ; the transports massing in the Bay ports and the condition of the enemy fleet in Brest ; the serious outbreak of sickness in the *Sandwich* and several other of his ships ; the trouble with

<sup>20</sup> *Q. London Evening Post*, 13th December, 1759.

<sup>21</sup> When Hawke closed the land the French immediately retired within the roadstead.

the *Bienfaisant's* rudder ; the coming and going of the victuallers and their escorts ; the inconvenience—not to say impossibility in certain weather—of exercising his powers of holding courts-martial on his station ; the necessity for sending ships into port without dangerously weakening his force ; the limited force of frigates and other cruisers at his disposal, and the urgent problem of deciding between the claims of his scouting squadrons and the necessity for providing frequent convoy escorts ; the recent inquiries from the Admiralty concerning the gunlocks of the fleet.

By the middle of the summer the most serious difficulties at least had been overcome. The enemy's main fleet was securely blocked in, and so long as Hawke remained on his station could not possibly emerge from Brest without fighting and defeating its stronger opponent. Similarly the French invasion forces were closely watched by our scouting squadrons and cruisers, and dare not put to sea till the latter were driven off. Apart from the chronic deficiencies of the Plymouth beer, our victualling arrangements were working with reasonable efficiency ; and increasing supplies of fresh meat and vegetables were arriving for the use of the ships' companies. Day by day the fleet cruised to and fro in the open sea and in calm weather occasionally lay at anchor. The crews were periodically employed in sail-drill and gunnery practice. Though there were recurrent outbreaks of sickness in some of the ships, the general level of health was good.

During September Choiseul's invasion project continued to hang fire. Intelligence reaching the British government from Brest, dated 1st October, served to show that not much progress had been made in the face of Hawke's blockade. " *Rien ne se développe encore sur nos projets ; on dit toujours qu'on fera, et on ne fait rien. Les Anglois nous tiennent toujours en échec, rien ne peut entrer ni sortir.*"<sup>22</sup> In October, however, there were significant signs of activity in the Brittany ports, as the French began to prepare in earnest for the embarkation of their troops under the escort of a force of frigates and smaller vessels, in the Morbihan. It was then learned that the Duc d'Aiguillon had arrived to assume command in his headquarters at the Jesuit seminary in Vannes.

With the approach of autumn the hard blockading service began to tell, with ever-increasing effect, on both the captains and their ships. Hervey and Tyrrell had to take to their beds ; and the latter was obliged to go ashore, followed later by Captain Parry of the *Kingston*. Several of the ships were now reporting more or less serious defects. As early as 10th September Hawke had declared that the *Windsor*, " which is so leaky, as to have been in danger of foundering," must go into port immediately. On the 14th the *Torbay* had to go to Plymouth for an extensive refit which kept her there for over four weeks. By the following month the *Royal Ann* had also sprung a leak and was forced to go into port. In the last week of October the *Chichester*, having sprung her bowsprit, had to be sent in to refit. A few days later she was followed by the *Melampe*. After their arduous inshore work off Brest the *Monmouth* and *Nottingham* were leaking so badly that eventually both these ships had to be sent home ; the *Foudroyant* and *Anson* had presently to go into port on account of the " sickly state of their companies " ; and in the second week of November Hawke had to part with the *Duke* and also the *Sandwich*, which, being " very sickly," was ordered to stay in Plymouth Sound in order to send her sick to hospital. By this time even the flagship, the *Ramillies*, was in a very bad way.

The days grew shorter and the winds rose ; finally a succession of westerly gales scoured the perilous lee shore, and Hawke was again compelled to let go. " Yesterday

<sup>22</sup> *Adm. 1/3945*, 1st October.

and this day the gale rather increasing," he reported from Plymouth Sound, on 13th October, to the Admiralty, " I thought it better to bear up for Plymouth than the risk of being scattered and driven farther to the Eastward. While this wind shall continue it is impossible for the enemy to stir. I shall keep the ships employed night and day in completing their water and provisions to three months ; for at this season there can be no dependence on victuallers coming to sea. The instant it shall moderate I shall sail again." On the following day he again addressed the Admiralty. " Their Lordships may rest assured there is little foundation for the present alarms. While the wind is fair for the enemy's coming out, it is also favourable for our keeping them in ; and while we are obliged to keep off, they cannot stir."<sup>23</sup>

Two months after Clue's defeat in Lagos Bay, Conflans received from Louis XV the permission that he had been seeking to attack the British blockading squadrons off Brest and the Morbihan. He was, in fact, given a free hand ; it was now up to him. The moment appeared propitious for the proposed attempt. At the very instant Conflans received these instructions Hawke had been forced off his station and was lying storm-bound in Plymouth Sound. As soon as the weather moderated, there was a chance for Conflans to slip out of Brest, pick up the transports in the Morbihan, and shape his course for Scotland. Why, then, did he make no move ? The answer apparently lies in the state of the Brest fleet and the ships' companies.

The truth was, Conflans's force was in no condition to keep the sea ; owing to the long blockade Brest was almost destitute of the necessary stores and supplies, and for the same reason the crews lacked training and experience. Some weeks later Captain Guébriant of the *Orient* declared that he had not thirty prime seamen on board his ship. It is significant that Conflans had no intention of fighting a general action if by any means he could avoid it.<sup>24</sup>

With winter fast approaching, Hawke warned the Admiralty that with the worsening conditions he might be forced to run for Torbay. " Single ships may struggle with a hard gale of wind when a squadron cannot," he wrote on 5th November ; " it must always, by wearing, lose ground in working against a strong Westerly wind in the [Iroise] Channel, where it cannot make very long stretches, but more especially if it should blow so as to put it past carrying sail. If for the future this should happen I shall put into Torbay, as I cannot be induced to think there is sufficient room for so large a squadron, or water, for the three-decked ships in Plymouth Sound at this season of the year."<sup>25</sup>

During these final weeks the dockyard " mateys " at Plymouth, under pressure from Hanway, had been working with might and main to get Hawke's battered ships ready for sea again. Some time earlier the Admiral had remarked irascibly to Hanway, " I have had tolerable experience of the duty of a commanding officer in port, & always did, and still do, look upon his attention to the Victualling office, as the principal part of it : as without being properly and seasonably supply'd with provisions, the rest of the ships fitting will avail little. May I ask what is become of the *Magnanime*, *Revenge*, *Defiance* and *Actaeon* ? It would have been greatly for the benefit of the service if they could have been ready to have joined me while the Easterly wind lasted. . . . I earnestly desire that immediately on receipt of this, you will, with any wind, dispatch all the line-of-battle ships that are ready, the frigates, and without fail, two of the best cutters."

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 1/92, 13th, 14th October.

<sup>24</sup> Lacour-Gayet, *La Marine militaire de la France sous Louis XV* (1902), pp. 326 et seq.

<sup>25</sup> *Adm.* 1/92, 5th November.

The *Burford* and *Coventry* had been refitting at Plymouth since the early half of October ; towards the end of the month the *Actaeon*, *Chichester*, and *Hercules* also came in. When the *Melampe* arrived in the Sound on the 31st her log states that she found there the *Magnanime*, *Revenge*, *Burford*, *Defiance*, and *Prince Edward* cutter ; all of which, having cleaned and refitted, were now getting ready for sea. Day after day the work went steadily on. Ship after ship came up into the Hamoaze : discharged her sick into hospital : got out her ballast and guns : heeled and scrubbed her sides : overhauled her rigging : passed into the hands of the caulkers, carpenters, and joiners : took on board her boatswain's and carpenter's stores : completed her water and provisions—puncheons of beef, pork, peas, and oatmeal, bags of bread, casks of flour, suet, and cheese, firkins of butter, and butts of beer : took in her ballast and guns, weighed and came to sail, and dropped down into the Sound.

Early in November, Hawke, as he had feared, was driven off his station by a westerly gale and obliged to bear up for Torbay, leaving frigates to watch in his stead. "After several efforts," he told the Admiralty, "not being able to get to the westward of the island with the squadron, I was obliged on the 7th to carry all the sail I could to the northward. The gale continued very hard between the NbW & NWbN, and at noon of the 8th the Start bore NbW distant 9 leagues. Moderated a little in the evening, I worked under the Start by 8 in the morning of the 9th and till afternoon entertained some hopes of being able to keep the sea, and get to the westward. But the wind increasing at W. by N., I was obliged and lucky enough to get in here last night in the *Ramillies*, with the *Union*, *Mars*, *Waspight*, *Hero*, *Kingston*, *Torbay*, *Dorset*, *Namur*, *Swiftsure*, *Temple*, *Royal George*, *Revenge*, *Resolution*, and *Success*. This morning came in the *Montague* ; the *Essex* is at anchor about 2 leagues without, and in sight the *Sandwich* and *Duke* working up under their courses. If the wind does not abate, I am in doubt whether the two latter will be able to fetch this place. I found the *Anson* here, not having been able to get into Plymouth." Hawke was presently compelled to shift his flag from the *Ramillies*, which "having for some time past complained greatly, & been water log'd whenever it blow'd hard," to the *Royal George*. The whereabouts of a hostile squadron under Bompart, whose arrival from the West Indies at some French port was almost hourly expected, was at this time causing the Admiral considerable concern. "It blows a mere frett of wind [i.e. a heavy gale] from the NW," he continued in his dispatch. "Bompart if near may get in, but no ships can stir from any port of the enemy in the Bay. The instant the wind will admit of it, I shall get to sea again."<sup>26</sup>

On 7th November Bompart's sudden arrival off Brest, on the wings of the same gale which drove Hawke off his station, had revealed to Conflans the absence of the blockading squadron. The latter immediately ordered Bompart's seasoned crews on board his own ships. When on the 14th Hawke's fleet again stood down Channel towards their station off Ushant it was already too late : the birds were flown. "The same wind which carried us from Torbay," as the Admiral later observed, "carried Conflans from Brest."<sup>27</sup> On the same day the enemy had got away to sea with a north-westerly breeze and shaped a course for the Morbihan, a hundred miles or so to the south-eastward. By midday on the 16th the fleet was half-way to its destination, having reached a point about twenty-three leagues west of Belleisle. That afternoon, however, the wind came easterly and rapidly freshened to a gale, with heavy seas. The French were obliged to bear up and run ; and it was not until the

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 1/92, 10th November.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 1/93, 17th November.

afternoon of the 19th that they were again on their course and within seventy miles of the island. Towards the evening the wind dropped and they lay becalmed. Then, shortly after midnight, it began to blow fresh from the WNW. Conflans signalled the fleet to proceed under short canvas, so that they should not make the land before daylight ; and, just before dawn, he hove-to. He was by this time about seven leagues west of Belleisle.

Before Hawke could recover his station he received news of Conflans's departure from Brest. Early in the afternoon of the 16th, some forty-five miles to the west-north-west of Ushant, our fleet encountered four British victuallers returning empty from Duff's squadron in Quiberon Bay. From the master of one of them, the *Love and Unity*, Hawke learned that on the day before, about seventy miles west of Belleisle, they had sighted Conflans's fleet, comprising eighteen sail of the line and two frigates, standing to the south-east. Both from the intelligence communicated to him from Whitehall and from Duff's most recent report it was apparent that Conflans's destination must be the Morbihan, where d'Aiguillon's troops and transports were assembled in readiness. Hawke immediately followed in pursuit under a press of sail, and in the afternoon of the 20th came up with the enemy outside the entrance to Quiberon Bay. All that day the wind and the sea had been rising. Action was joined in a north-westerly gale, only a couple of hours before dusk, on one of the most hazardous lee shores in Europe. Hawke's fleet pursued Conflans into the bay and utterly defeated him. His victory was the prize of consummate seamanship and a resolute acceptance of all risks to attain a supremely important objective of naval warfare—viz., the destruction of the enemy's fighting fleet. "When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales on the day of action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast they were on," the Admiral declared in his dispatch, "I can boldly affirm that all that could possibly be done has been done."<sup>28</sup>

Hawke's blockade of the enemy fleet in Brest may be said to have initiated a revolution in naval strategy. By resolute and dogged perseverance he had developed a system of refit and maintenance undreamed of in former times. "Never before had a fleet been able to keep the sea for such a time," says Laughton, "nor did any fleet again do so for the next forty years." At the end of his long vigil off Ushant he had achieved the most complete, the most dramatic, and the most decisive victory gained by Englishmen since the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Quiberon Bay has been justly described by Professor Lewis as "the greatest of all 'chace' victories." The bringing of Conflans's fleet to decisive action in such surroundings, in such weather, and at such an hour was an achievement, an eye-witness declared, of which "all seamen speak with admiration," and which "very few men would have had the nerve to hazard." It was indeed far more a victory over the elements than over the French. It was incomparably the finest feat of its kind in all our naval history ; and it establishes Hawke for all time in his place amongst the foremost fighting Admirals of his own or any other age.

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 1/92, 24th November.

## A SIGNAL OFFICER IN NORTH RUSSIA, 1918-1919—IV

By BRIGADIER R. CHENEVIX TRENCH, C.B., O.B.E., M.C.

**A** FEW days before G.H.Q. moved south to Beresnik, for the blow that was to break the Bolshevik army on our front, a dinner was held in Archangel for the surviving officers of Elope to celebrate their year together, and the C.-in-C. was present. My record of the occasion is, "Elope dinner; very dismal," but I should have applied the description to myself and not to the party, for I was tired and beset by care. Three days later I boarded the ship that was to take me up river and found that my sleeping accommodation was to be a bench on which I should have to scramble for a place with junior Russian officers. With me was a colonel, the head of our Ordnance Services. We looked at the arrangements "Q" Branch had made for us, had our kit put ashore, and 'swept' out' in a huff.

When I recounted this at lunch the head of the Medical Services, Colonel Thom, who was in the mess, looked at me and said, "You are sick: you will come up in my hospital ship." I began to thank him, but he interrupted me, "Not as my guest. A hospital ship cannot carry fit combatant men. You go as a patient." And so I went, in great content, pampered and cared for, basking in hot sunshine tempered by the river breeze, up the smooth, mile-wide channel between white cliffs edged by a strip of green, with the perfect sky over all. After a few days in bed with a temperature, I recorded on 7th July, "an extremely busy ten days with demobilization problems complicating the war and several of my officers and men, and myself, sick part of the time"; and a few days later, "I am getting a bit stale after a pretty stiff year, and am not too fit generally." It was not a confession that I liked to make, even to my diary, but things soon began to look better. I had done what was possible for communications in the back areas, and was free to turn to the more rewarding duty of preparing for the advance.

The picture in the new brigades was brighter. In the school of experience their Signals recovered quickly from a fumbling start, as such fine material was bound to do. After a conference held by the C.-in-C. in his headquarters ship, the *Retvisan*, I could visit brigade headquarters and battalions with a clear idea of what was planned and of how best to help commanders and their signal officers. Trips up the river were sometimes by launch, and launches were used for the despatch rider service, but most of my visits entailed long, care-dispelling hours in the saddle, accompanied by my orderly. A typical entry runs, "Rode to Seltso and back, on the Vaga, a few days ago; a 44-mile ride. . . . Got back 3.30 a.m." For that trip the accepted route first followed the west bank and then crossed by ferry to the east, but I found that a battery mule had sunk the ferry with a well-directed kick, and so I continued along the west bank to the level of my destination on the opposite side. There I left orderly and ponies and crossed by a small boat to Vaga Column headquarters. They wanted



to know how I had come, told me that no parties less than 10 strong were allowed on the west bank south of the ferry, and gave me a troop of Cossacks for my return.

We had to go through forest where enemy patrols might be met, and I looked forward to seeing something of real Cossacks, those almost legendary horsemen and warriors. It was soon clear that the prosaic virtues of silence and alertness, the tactical pedantry of a point on the track ahead with a link to keep the main party in view, had no appeal for them. They rode in a cheerful, noisy bunch without a care in the world. However, it is unwise to expect too much of allies. Our Cossacks at least dressed the part and added to the war a picturesque, light-hearted touch. On their first parade with British equipment each man had carried his Mills bombs slung round him by a thong through the pins. They could drink all comers under the table. One of my duties in the early days had been to get to know our various allies, and I had deputed Rorke to make contact with the Cossacks. He found them at one of their parties. They hailed him in with acclamation and he returned with the report that they were the finest fellows imaginable. The sentiment was evidently mutual, for they afterwards taught him their dances and initiated him, I gathered, into blood brotherhood. In the course of the fun one of them shot himself through the foot, and for some weeks paraded Archangel on crutches, a wounded hero.

The advance was to be a British and Russian affair. The French had had one aim during the war, the defeat of Germany, and as we have seen, after the armistice they would fight no more. For the Americans also, victory over the Central Powers had been won. Whatever the war might now be about, it was no longer any concern of theirs ; Europe, they knew, was incurably wicked and no good could come of continued embroilment there, so they, too, had left the fight. They had been staunch in the field, the only major allied contingent untainted, from beginning to end, with mutiny. Our own position was less simple. We had thought that our country, in declaring against the Bolsheviks at the crisis of the world war, had acquired a new adversary ; but it was not long before we came to recognize an old one, protean but familiar, the hater of liberty and the enemy of man's spirit. We knew our old opponent in the issue between light and darkness, that war in which there is no discharge. If we, in North Russia, saw it as an issue to be decided in arms, it must be remembered that we were a community of soldiers in the field, in a world that was just emerging from four years of fighting.

Other, more immediate, pressures moved us. Were we to desert those who had taken up arms against Bolshevism with our encouragement and needed our help to keep themselves in the field ? Kolchak was in Siberia, Deniken and Yudenich were advancing from the south and west. Were we to give up, when the enterprise might be moving to a successful end if we fought on ? We were committed to leaving the country before another winter shut us in, but until then we must do our best for our allies. Even this was begrudging by a faction at home, and "Hands off Russia" became a political cry : it sounded better, for general consumption, than "Hands off Communism."

It was, then, to be a British and Russian affair, but there was one Russian unit in a class by itself. It was known as Dyer's Regiment, from the name of its first commander, a young Canadian and a leader of men. Its conception was a venture of faith on the part of the C.-in-C., on which we all built high hopes. It caught the imagination, and I wrote home on June 1st, "There was a first-rate King's Birthday ceremonial today. They took the opportunity to present colours to Dyer's Regiment, and they and the new brigade (from England) marched past, 6,000 strong. Dyer's

is a regiment of toughs of all descriptions. The C.-in-C. found the Russian prisons full of unfortunate men suspected, probably quite rightly, of being Bolsheviks, and just left there with no records, no trial, and no definite term. So he had them out of it, put them into a special disciplinary battalion under one Dyer, with the headquarters and half the company officers British, where they got decent treatment and real stiff discipline. They are now the best Russian troops out here and very proud of belonging to the Slavo-British Legion. All deserters, bad hats, etc., go to them, and the British subalterns turn them into good soldiers."

Five weeks later, on 7th July, on the Dvina front, one of their companies murdered four British and three Russian officers in their beds, and about 100 of the mutineers succeeded in crossing to the enemy. The regiment was disarmed and sent to the base for use as labour. Here was tragedy; the treacherous murder of these young officers, the best we had to give; the shame and public degradation of fighting men; perhaps above all the lost endeavour and the betrayal of vision and faith. I wrote at the time what we all felt deeply, "Very hard on the C.-in-C., who set great store by them for the regeneration of this part of Russia." It had been easy for the Bolsheviks to introduce, as deserters, a few trained agitators; we had often remarked on how easily led the Russian was, and here was the reverse side of that quality. Such a people seemed destined to tyranny.

The tragedy of Dyer's Regiment left the other Russians on the Dvina front unshaken, but it was followed a fortnight later by the worst mutiny of the campaign, and the last. The Russian garrisons at Onega and Chekuevo, our westernmost defences, murdered their officers and handed over their positions to the Bolsheviks, and the whole western flank stood open. As at Bolshie Ozerke, the enemy failed to exploit his opportunity. The C.-in-C. flew down from the Dvina front to deal with the emergency and the rot was stopped by the action of British, Australian, Polish, and Russian troops under Brigadier-General Turner. The loyal Russians included the 6th Northern Rifle Regiment, and I had heartening reports of the conduct of their signal company. These two mutinies were a disturbing preliminary to our coming offensive.

To secure a good starting line on the Dvina front Graham, now Brigadier-General, had made a limited advance on 20th June; his success was gained solely by Russian troops, for co-operation by a British battalion miscarried. The main attack to follow was to be under Sadleir-Jackson, while Grogan commanded on the Pinega front, guarding the eastern flank of the allied position as Turner guarded the western. Grogan's command was chiefly Russian, because most of his own brigade had gone to strengthen the Dvina and railway fronts.

The C.-in-C. now carried a burden that he could share with few, for after long uncertainty he knew by the end of June that Kolchak had shot his bolt and would now never reach Viatka, let alone Kotlas; before the end of July he was in full retreat. His end is outside our story but may be mentioned here. In January, 1920, after prolonged misfortune and on an assurance of safe conduct to Vladivostock, he placed himself in the hands of the Czechs, who handed him over to the Bolsheviks for execution. For fear of the effect on Russian morale if Kolchak's failure should become known, the C.-in-C. told three men only; Brigadier-General Walshe, the Chief of the General Staff; Brigadier-General Needham, the Administrative Staff Officer, and General Miller, the head of the Russian government. To the rest of us, through the weeks to come, he gave no hint of this collapse of hope. It made no difference in the immediate task, which was to destroy the Bolshevik army facing us.

The Navy formed a base at Troitsa, Jackson's headquarters, on the east bank of the Dvina. Apart from active operations, they had an unending, dangerous duty in dealing with the hundreds of floating mines that the enemy set adrift, and we were saddened by their casualties. We were disagreeably surprised to find ourselves outgunned by Russian craft up the river, carrying heavier metal than anything we could mount.

That summer the water was unusually low and the level continued to drop alarmingly. Lord Ironside tells us that this, and the need to strike while the Russian morale was good (and it was then very good) led him to fix on 10th August for the disengaging blow. He was not the man to sit in the pocket of a subordinate charged with responsibility for an operation, and on 26th July he withdrew his headquarters to Archangel, leaving only an Advanced G.H.Q. at Beresnik. I stayed on there, thinking that I could be more useful at that spot, which had become the central hub of communications, than 180 miles away in Archangel.

On 2nd August Advanced G.H.Q. closed at Beresnik. Still I stayed on. The air was more congenial than at Archangel, and I had work there for a few more days. On that day I visited Sadleir-Jackson and his signal officer at Troitsa, and rode round the positions on the east bank, and on the following day those on the west. I was greatly reassured by all that I saw, and wrote, "This company has profited by its month in the field and improved very much. It is now a trained signal unit." There was no more I could do to help either Whishaw or his brigadier and I should be better out of the way, so I returned to Beresnik on the 4th. G.H.Q. evidently thought I had played truant long enough, and I found there an urgent recall to Archangel. On the next day Lieut.-Colonel Robin Grey, of the newly formed R.A.F., flew me down, making a diversion up the Pinega River to visit Grogan's headquarters, and we had an aerial view of the river, with its ominously dwindling channel and emerging sandbanks.

A pressing duty after return to Archangel was to visit Vologda Force to see what the Signals position was on the western flank, after the loss of Onega and Chekuevo; so on 10th August I took the train to Oberzorskaya for a four-day tour, returning on the 14th, well pleased as usual by all that I had found under Conway-Brown's leadership. Colonel Stokes, the Chief Engineer, now invited me to join his little mess and I accepted gladly. He was a man of remarkable ability and a delightful companion, and he became later the Chief Engineer of de Beers mines.

For the coming battle on the river, Sadleir-Jackson had under him his own brigade, a battalion of Grogan's brigade, and a Russian brigade under Prince Morousy. The signal plans are best described in Lord Ironside's words, "His communications were most impressive. He and the commander of the flotilla were linked with cable and field wireless, while all the separate bodies going round the flanks had field wireless and one cable following as the advance proceeded. He even had an observation balloon, manned by the Navy. All messages were to be in free English with no ciphers to delay matters." Wireless sets and cable drums were carried on pack ponies. A feature of the operation was the extensive use of visual signalling, especially between land forces and ships. On 10th August the attack went in. About a quarter of the force was employed in a frontal assault and the rest in wide enveloping movements against the enemy's flanks and rear. Within a week the enemy on this front was destroyed as a fighting force, and more than 3,000 prisoners and 20 guns were taken. Our losses in killed and wounded amounted to 145.

After the action Captain J. E. B. Tinker, R.E., of Dvina Force Signal Company, was missing, but in a day or two he cast up, like a hound that has stayed back to

hunt alone, with a party of 20 men, carrying several of their own wounded, and escorting some 300 Bolshevik prisoners. Many of them, no doubt, could be better described as deserters. He had had a stiff time, wandering in swamp and forest, and was glad to be back. He was given a well-earned Military Cross, and the Military Medal was gained by several men of the company.

Now it remained only for the British forces ashore, with no enemy in a position to molest them, to withdraw to Archangel and there take ship for home, but the final disengagement was not as simple as that may sound. General Miller meant to continue the fight, and we had to leave him with a Russian army in position, with its own system of command and signal communications. General Ironside had till now commanded the whole allied army, with his brigadier-generals commanding international formations, and the extrication of the British components involved a great deal of unscrambling. Nowhere were the two nationalities so closely knit as in Signals for, from the base forward, British and Russian elements had grown into a single living organism.

The withdrawal of the main force down the river presented problems of its own. True, they had nothing to fear from the shattered Bolshevik army, but when it became known that we were off, the mental climate changed. The Russians knew that they had nothing more to get from us; as foreigners, we had never pretended that we were loved for ourselves, and there was no saying how they might now behave. Again I quote from Lord Ironside's book, "At the best we hoped to be able to slip away under cover of the Russians and embark in peace. At the worst we might have to disarm the Russians." So the withdrawal down river was a critical operation, needing careful timing and close contact with G.H.Q.

I continued to lose men by demobilization, and on 5th September I wrote home, "I am gradually loosing my heavy hand over the Russian telegraph system, withdrawing British operators who are helping and supervising, and generally leaving them to their little selves, so things will go a bit wrong." They did indeed, and there began for me one of those experiences familiar to signal officers, when everything goes wrong at once, when the gods are hard to reconcile and every step is pursued by implacable fate, the struggle avails nothing and the labour is vain. My record for 12th September has the entry, "Continuous gales for a fortnight now, and no wire communication south of Yemetskoe since the 7th. The Russian staff withdrew the civil telegraphists and linemen from Beresnik and Morjegorskaya without my permission, making it impossible to do tests or effect repairs from those places. The 100 miles of line between Yemetskoe and Troitsa (Dvina Force Headquarters) is in the blue, broken down by falling trees with no means of getting at the faults." At the same time the G.H.Q. wireless station at Troitsa broke down, and I had been so stripped of men that I had no one there to mend it. Contact with Dvina Force was lacking, at a time when it was most wanted.

There remained only the old, time-tested prescription: to go on trying. For the line breakdown I sent Major G. M. Gordon, two mechanics of the civil telegraphs, and an interpreter up in a special launch to land at various points, test the line till they had found all the breakdowns, and make temporary repairs. For the wireless failure, through the kindness of Robin Grey, I sent Captain L. G. Hosking in an aeroplane to Dvina Force Headquarters. For the Russian staff I created such hell as lay in my power, but our control was passing. Line communication was restored by the 14th after seven days of breakdown, and wireless on the 12th after four days. We were paying the price of withdrawing from the field in the middle of operations, and sending

home without replacement, men providing signal communications, and it was coming expensive. We were saved from the full penalty by the Navy, whose help and co-operation never failed and who now carried our more important messages. In his account of the withdrawal Lord Ironside writes, "This manœuvre depended greatly upon communications on the Dvina, and these we had in the naval vessels' wireless instruments."

Relations between the Press and the Army were less happy than they have since become, and we were indignant when we read in the papers, *The Times* especially, reports of our situation calculated to spread alarm and despondency at home. Journalists came out and sent back criticisms of the C.-in-C. Partisans to a man, we greatly resented this. Of one offender I wrote, "We are all very much annoyed by a long article . . . crabbing the C.-in-C. but being quite kind and patronizing about him . . . (here I named the correspondent) a scrubby little person. . . . Most of his facts are nearly true, but he seems to catch hold of them all by the wrong end"; and again, mixing my metaphors a little in my indignation, I complained that our commander was "the butt of every jackal."

In the middle of August General Lord Rawlinson arrived with a small staff. His rôle was to co-ordinate and supervise the evacuation of both the Archangel and the Murmansk forces, and he brought with him Colonel Carey, a senior signal officer. General Rawlinson found nothing to alter in the C.-in-C.'s arrangements, and remained a figure of authority in the background. I showed my plans to Colonel Carey, and he treated me with a like consideration. When, on the night before we embarked, my breeches were stolen from my billet, he lent me a pair of his own; they did not fit very well and I could not approve of the cut, but they saved me from the slovenly expedient of returning home in slacks.

When it became known that we were really going we were assailed with protests, ranging from heart-rending appeals to bitter abuse. I heard it put that we should annex Archangel as a colony. We had such a lot of these that we could surely manage one more; it would only be a little one. None of us could feel happy about leaving, but we should have felt a great deal worse if the local Russians had done more for their own salvation during our stay. Those who had done the least were the most frantic in their panic; the few who had throughout done their best faced the situation manfully. Chief among them was General Miller. He would fight on; he would launch an offensive; and its sweeping success might well tip the scales and lead to a general Bolshevik collapse. We had often noted the Russian propensity to make grandiose plans without considering the means of carrying them out; while we were in control we could smile at this, but it now took on a tragic significance.

The harshest comments on the Archangel Russians came often from their own countrymen, but whatever their deserts, the position of the townsfolk, especially those who had been associated in any way with the allies, was pitiful. The British government offered passage, for all who wished to go, to the newly liberated Baltic states, or to South Russia in anti-Bolshevik hands. About 6,500 availed themselves of this, but the great majority shrank from abandoning everything and beginning life again among strangers. Our War Minister at the time was Mr. Winston-Churchill, and he wrote, "I can see now the pale faces and staring eyes of the deputation of townsfolk from Archangel who visited me at the War Office at the end of July, 1919, to beg for further British protection, to whom I had to return a 'dusty answer.' All these poor workpeople and shopkeepers were soon to face the firing parties."

As our forces withdrew, the hand-over went steadily on. Not that the Russian staff work appeared to improve very much ; inept to the end, late in August when the business of transfer was at its height, they removed my Colonel Reinbot whom I had trained on with such pains to be their chief of Signals after me, and replaced him by a Colonel Baioff whom I could only describe as "perfectly useless." I pondered whether I should insist on his removal, but concluded that it was beyond our power at that stage to save the Russians from themselves.

The withdrawal began on 10th September. As the distance shortened, it became a purely British concern and we knew where we stood. Signals shed their dependence for long-distance lines on the Russian Telegraph Department, which was already reverting to type, and got into their stride for the last lap. There were to be five stages, finishing on an inner defence line round Archangel, which had long been prepared though few of us knew of it. The communications for this position demanded attention and new place names occur in my records. "Visited Metchka and Lyavla . . . found things only fair and in need of ginger, which they got." "Visited Rikashika and saw Emerson. Carey took me." The entry for 22nd September runs, "All forces now within Archangel defences. Russians at Pinega, Morjegorskaya, Onega, and south of Emptsia on the railway." So Onega was back in White Russian hands. Its recapture was the fruit of a most successful local offensive under the Russian command, helped by two companies of Australians and supported by R.A.F. bombing. Whatever the position might be in Archangel, the morale of the Russian troops was then at its peak and this action undoubtedly played its part in protecting our withdrawal.

Through the phases of embarkation the force, ashore and afloat, showed a menacing front calculated of itself to discourage attempts to molest it, and none were made. Z-day, the day of embarkation, was fixed for 27th September. On Z-1 day the force ashore was in four sectors ; the right, centre, and left sectors on the inner defence line and the town sector behind them. Afloat were the guns of the Royal Navy, and the ships included a monitor mounting a 15-inch piece ; its very appearance had a daunting effect, whatever its real value might have been in close support of troops ashore. General Miller, loyal and co-operative to the last, imposed a curfew for the final, critical 24 hours. My signal instructions for Z-1 day provided for G.H.Q. closing ashore and reopening in s.s. *Czaritsa* at 1600 hours. At the same time a G.H.Q. report centre was to open in a barge up the river ; on Z day at 0330 hours this report centre was to close. The communications to be provided for each phase were laid down in detail, with especial provision for the town sector artillery and the naval O.P.s. No linemen were to be left out on test points after midnight on Z-1 day.

All went as planned. On 28th September I sailed in s.s. *Czaritsa* and our adventure was over. It had begun with a company of Marines in Murmansk in April, 1918, it drew into its orbit 18,000 British and Dominion troops, without counting allies. In 15 months of war I had not seen a shot fired and had rarely heard a shell burst.

We left behind a well-equipped, confident White Russian force of 25,000 men, and after our departure General Miller launched his offensive, which met with the usual sweeping initial success. His army collapsed in the counter-offensive that followed, and in three months all was over. To quote again from Sir Winston Churchill, "The Soviet Government established its rule on the shores of the White Sea, and mass executions, in one case of 500 officers, quenched the last hope of

Russian life and freedom in these regions." Before the year was out all resistance in European Russia was at an end. Yudenich had failed before Petrograd and Deniken's over-extended front in the south had collapsed like a pricked bubble. The anti-Bolshevik armies, attacking from the perimeter, were separated by immense distances ; they had no national government behind them, no central control, no agreed policy for the vast territories behind their fronts, no agreement on what the war was about. They were crippled by their own dissensions.

Before we sailed I was asked if I should like to be seconded for service in Poland at the head of their wireless organization, at a salary that sounded fabulous compared with what I should have as a captain in England, but I was exhausted and sick for home, and not all the alien gold in the world would have tempted me. On leave at home it remained only to await the publication of the despatches, to see what our commander had to say about our services, and we in Signals awaited them eagerly enough. Our eagerness was misplaced, for our work was not referred to. That is what I think the moralists sometimes describe as being good for the soul, and perhaps they are right, but I found it difficult to answer letters from my officers, who asked whether we had, then, done so badly.

My experience in Russia left many impressions on my mind, and I am prompted to put two of them on record. First, I came more than ever to appreciate and delight in my own countrymen above all others : I coined a maxim for the guidance of my children to be. "Travel abroad," I should advise them, "travel abroad and narrow your mind." Secondly, I was impressed with the unwisdom of interfering in other people's revolutions.

*(Concluded)*

## THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

By G. H. HURFORD, F.R.HIST.S.

*This year the Royal Naval Reserve has reached its centenary, an event which has been fittingly commemorated in London and other parts of the country.*

A ROYAL Commission was appointed in 1858 to enquire into the manning of the Royal Navy, and on its recommendations the R.N.R. was established by the Royal Naval Reserve (Volunteer) Act of 1859 for the entry of seafaring men, not to exceed 30,000. The force grew slowly and this figure was never reached in peace time. Authorized numbers were not easy to realize. In 1900, when 23,000 were voted and only 21,129 were borne, it was represented that the compulsory training was unpopular owing to the low pay as compared with what the men could earn at their proper vocations in fishing, yachting, or merchant ships, and the length of time they were required to give to training.

Commissioned ranks in the R.N.R. were created in 1861, when the Admiralty was authorized to enrol masters and mates of the Merchant Service who had the necessary certificates to serve as officers, up to a total of 400 (130 lieutenants and 270 sub-lieutenants). In contrast to the better understanding and co-operation which now prevails after service in war, the first R.N.R. officers were not always welcomed by the Navy. One captain, R.N., gave evidence in committee in 1869 that he "objected altogether to the principle that officers of the Mercantile Marine be employed in the Naval Reserve" as he considered that there was a "sufficiency of naval officers who are well fitted for the work"; and even in 1879 Admiral Sir Augustus Phillimore urged that commissions "should be confined to a very limited number." From 1864, engineers and assistant engineers were enrolled. Midshipmen were added in 1872 from among cadets educated in the *Conway* or *Worcester*.

The R.N.R. provided the Royal Navy with an invaluable body of officers and men with sea experience ready for any emergency. In practice there was nothing new in this. For centuries, officers and men had passed from one Service to the other—Nelson himself once served in a merchant ship. When the expansion of the Royal Navy became urgent in the 'nineties after the passing of the German Navy Acts, it was found that while ships could be built in two or three years, more than double that time was needed to train a lieutenant; and there was a shortage of watch-keepers. Permanent R.N. commissions were therefore granted in 1895 to 100 officers of the Merchant Service, of whom 90 came from the R.N.R.; in 1898 a further 50 R.N.R. officers were so transferred. They were irreverently known as the 'hungry hundred' and 'famishing fifty.' Further transfers owing to fleet expansion were made in 1913 and 1937. The *Supplementary List* on which these officers were borne was abolished in March, 1938, and the names merged in the general list.

An Accountant Branch was established on a permanent basis in 1904. In the same year the rank of Commander, R.N.R., was introduced (a few officers had for some time previously been permitted to retire with the rank of commander). The rank of Captain, R.N.R., was instituted on 22nd June, 1914.

By 1910 the potential menace of the mine had been realized, and to assist in coping with it a Trawler Section of the R.N.R. was formed and the rank of Skipper introduced. This organization was greatly expanded in the first World War, and at the 1918 Armistice included 39,000 officers and men, of whom 10,000 were employed in minesweepers and the others in the Auxiliary Patrol.

In the two world wars, ten officers and two seamen of the R.N.R. gained the Victoria Cross, the first awards being made to one officer and one rating for service in H.M.S. *Hussar* at the landing in Gallipoli in 1915. In both wars, a large number of senior retired officers of the Royal Navy, many holding flag rank, volunteered to serve in lower grades in the R.N.R. In the second World War there were about 190 R.N.R. commodores in the Atlantic and North Russian convoys alone, of whom 23 were killed or died on service; 15 of these had come from the retired list of the Royal Navy.

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The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was established in 1903 under the Naval Forces Act of that year for the reserve training of officers and men other than those in the Merchant Service. There had been an earlier force, the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, from 1873 to 1891. After the fleet was mobilized in 1914, surplus officers and men formed the Royal Naval Division and rendered distinguished service in the land fighting.

Seven awards of the Victoria Cross were made to R.N.V.R. officers and men in the first World War, and one in the second. Development of its officer personnel in the second World War was phenomenal; out of 68,000 officers in naval service at the peak period, 44,000, or 64 per cent, held R.N.V.R. commissions. Two branches, the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Forces, were officered very largely by the R.N.V.R. Submarines, as well as destroyers and frigates, were commanded by officers of the force and at least one submarine had an all R.N.V.R. wardroom.

As its jubilee fell in 1953, Coronation Year, celebration of the event was deferred until 1954, when H.M. The Queen reviewed 2,000 officers and men on the Horse Guards Parade. Her Majesty then said: "I feel sure that Drake and Nelson, were they at sea today, would be glad to have such volunteers under their command."

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In fitting recognition of the manner in which officers and men of both Reserve had responded to all the calls made upon them, the Admiralty announced on 31st March, 1951, that with the approval of King George VI the wavy stripes on the uniform of R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. officers were to be abolished and the dress assimilated to that of their brother officers in the Royal Navy.

Amalgamation of the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. was announced in Parliament on 4th December, 1957, and took effect on 1st November, 1958. In a message to the fleet on the latter date the Board of Admiralty said:—

"The unification of the Naval Reserves affords Their Lordships a welcome opportunity to express their appreciation of the services rendered in the past by the officers and ratings of all branches of the Reserves both in war and peace.

"Their Lordships are confident that the fine spirit of volunteer service shown in the past will continue to increase as a result of this new partnership and that the reorganized Royal Naval Reserve will grow in efficiency to meet the ever-changing needs of modern warfare."

Until the amalgamation, the Reserves had no direct link with the Royal Family. With effect from 1st November, 1958, the Duke of Gloucester was appointed Honorary Commodore in the Royal Naval Reserve.

## CORRESPONDENCE

*(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)*

### RELIGION IN THE SERVICES

*To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.*

SIR,—The topic on which an article appeared in the May JOURNAL with the above title is an exceedingly important one, for there are very great problems involved, possibly affecting our survival as a nation. One had hoped, therefore, to find the matter discussed both intelligently and informatively. Unfortunately, Major Gourlay's article is neither; one has to read very little of it to realize that he is concerned with one denomination only, that of the Anglican Church. If this is his outlook—and I have no doubt it is, for I have found it among many other officers—there is no wonder that there is a problem.

In what follows I shall do my best to avoid controversy, and will confine myself to verifiable facts, and to first- or good second-hand experience. I must first say that I am a Catholic.

Little or none of what Major Gourlay says applies to members of the Catholic Church. Had he been informed, however, he might have been able to make some valuable points concerning Catholics. From my own experience, I do not think a great deal of what he says applies to Protestant non-Anglicans either.

The fundamental trouble is that the Anglican Church, ever since it was founded as a State Church by Henry VIII, has never commanded a majority of the population even of England as its adherents—I do not consider the rest of Great Britain, let alone of the British Isles. The Anglican Church has found its adherents from one geographical area, roughly south of the Trent and east of the Severn and Tamar, and outside that area from one social class, that of the aristocracy and upper-middle class. Even inside that area, that class tended to be more loyal to the Anglican Church than any other. All other segments and sectors of the country have regarded the Anglican Church as a State Church, existing by State support; the official religious organ of the State. Against this, non-conformity has always protested, and was for a time, together with Catholics, also persecuted for their protestations.

This background survives to this day and it does religion in the Services much grievous harm. Catholics do not have to attend Protestant services, but I have encountered many non-conformists who have strongly resented having to take a part in official military Anglican services. I may say I have also encountered sincere Anglicans who have expressed great resentment at having a non-conformist chaplain attached to their unit; so it works both ways.

Men are brought up in their families with certain religious beliefs; rightly or wrongly they regard those beliefs as correct and others as wrong. They get into the Services and find that for some inscrutable reason those different beliefs no longer are allowed to matter. No wonder they question them, no wonder when they come from a strong non-conformist area they resent being forced to attend Anglican services.

Naturally, Church unity is an admirable thing to strive for, but it does men's minds grievous harm when the Services are used, willy-nilly, as a hot-house for forcing such unity. If upper-class Anglicans would only realize how much of a minority they are in, they might then have the humility to approach the whole problem from a different angle, to encourage their men in the beliefs they learned at their mothers' and fathers' feet. There is the kernel of the problem for the Services, and it is a pity that Major Gourlay could not see it.

However, since Catholics number 10 per cent. or more of the Services, I should like to make a few comments on their position. Over and over again, I have found young National Servicemen, who are practising Catholics at home, lapse almost totally when in the Services. They are in a Protestant environment (and often a resentful and agnostic environment in the ranks) which does not believe in getting up on Sunday mornings but in having a 'kip' instead. Great force of character is needed, either in the man or in the padre, to drive men to church in such an environment. Many men are weak; but speaking generally, Catholic chaplains have been both weak and few. I have only met two good Catholic chaplains in the Services; both were excellent and compared well with the average of civil priests (to coin a term). The majority were very bad, lazy, and often—well, I won't say what they were addicted to!

My inquiries lead me to suppose that Catholic priests can only become chaplains with the permission of their superiors, and most regrettably, though slightly understandably, their superiors just will not give permission to good men because of the crying needs of the parishes. This policy has been short-sighted because a great mission-field lay open for chaplains in the Services, and the best men should have been allowed to go; not so many would have been needed, and less harm would have been done to parishes than to the soldiers. One cannot expect a soldier to pay much attention to his religious duties when the priest visits the unit once in six weeks, which happened within my experience. One cannot expect a Catholic family to do their duty when, finding themselves in need of spiritual advice, the Catholic chaplain was nowhere to be found (having gone off to an aunt for 48 hours—no address left behind) and they had to approach the Anglican chaplain—another experience.

On the general quality of chaplains, my experience has been that while Catholic priests are almost invariably the superior of Anglican clergy in civil work, in the forces the Anglican chaplains have usually been very good indeed, and certainly above the average, *in peace-time*, of Catholic chaplains. Generally, non-conformist chaplains have either been good or average—I have not encountered a bad one.

As I see it then, there are two problems; one general to all denominations, and another particular to the Catholics. It is up to the Catholic community to look after their own problem, but it is to some extent bound up with the main one—the official standing of the Church of England. That will only be set right when officers realize that, at home, their place of worship is quite different from that of their men, and that they must not, therefore, seek to impose their own religious background on their men. This realization will need official backing from the War Office. Can that possibly happen so long as the Church of England remains an official State church?

ROWLAND BOWEN,  
Major.

20th August, 1959.

SIR.—I was very interested in Major Gourlay's article "Religion in the Services" in the May, 1959, issue, as I made a study of the military outlook on religion over a period of 11 years, covering periods of hot war, cold war, and peace, in North-West Europe, the Middle East, Austria and Germany, the Far East, and the United Kingdom.

These theatres can be classified as follows:—

(a) North-West Europe	...	...	Hot War.
(b) Middle East	...	...	Cold war (Palestine) and peace with limited local leave facilities (Canal Zone).
(c) Austria and Germany	...	...	Peace with abundant local leave facilities.
(d) Far East	...	...	Cold war.
(e) United Kingdom	...	...	Peace with frequent week-end leaves to homes of parents.

In each case the attitude of the soldier to religion varied to a very marked extent.

I have nothing to add to Major Gourlay's comments on the upsurge of interest in God during hot war, but I do think that, in times of peace, out of the deterrents to church-going listed by Major Gourlay only two—the last two—are the real basic deterrents.

Sub-dividing peace into two further categories—peace in a foreign country and peace in the United Kingdom—a further aspect comes into consideration in the latter, the home influence. In a static unit, where men are able to go home most week-ends (particularly if the unit is one with county connections, stationed in that county), their religious activities are, to a very large extent, governed by their parents' influence.

It is very rash even to approximate average attendances as a generalization throughout all units for, as Major Gourlay pointed out, so much depends on the chaplain, but I am prepared to stick my neck out and put forward these figures as a pretty good standard for any Army unit. I have listed the attendances under two headings—optimum and poor—where in the first case the unit has a first-rate chaplain with the utmost backing from the Commanding Officer level, and in the second case the unit has a chaplain with little, if any, personality or interest, and/or there is no backing from the Commanding Officer level.

Setting	Attendance		Remarks
	Optimum per cent.	Poor per cent.	
Hot War	... ... ...	90-100	50-60
Cold War	... ... ...	60-80	10-25
Peace—with very limited local leave facilities.	8-15	0-5	—
Peace—with abundant local leave facilities.	3-10	0-1	—
Peace—in United Kingdom...	1-15	0-3	Dependent on the proximity of homes and frequency of week-end leave.

(Compulsory parades are, of course, not considered in these figures.)

Basically, therefore, when soldiers are within reach of a good club or leave centre, they will probably spend their Saturday nights there, and will take their Sunday morning 'lie-in' as a right and privilege, while those who may wish to have an early evening on Saturday and go to church service on Sunday morning are, in most cases, discouraged from doing so by the ridicule or abuse from the others.

How then can we defeat this inherent sloth? I would put forward the following suggestions as a partial, and only very partial, solution.

We cannot defeat idleness or laziness as such, but we can at least remove some of the barriers. It is well known that the objection to church parades as such was, as far as the soldiers themselves were concerned, not the fact that they were forced to go to church, which certain politicians with no military knowledge sought to make out, but the formality of the parade, with the detailed inspection, on which in all probability they would 'lose their name.' Now, most units permit soldiers to wear civilian clothing to church, which is most sensible, but this is not enough, there has got to be some coercion to stimulate the energy to force lagging feet out of this torpor.

I feel it is a great pity that a system, which was practised shortly after church parades were abolished, is not reintroduced on a modified basis. This system was simply that every man had to report to the orderly warrant officer/non-commissioned officer outside

the church ten minutes before the service was due to begin. Nobody was forced to attend the service, but in the units I was with who tried the system, there were very, very few who, having made the effort to get up and report, failed to attend the service.

The modifications to this system I would suggest are:—

- (1) No man should be 'detailed' more than once a month.
- (2) Known voluntary church-goers should not be placed on the detail register.
- (3) Civilian clothes are permitted.
- (4) The man who is 'detailed' should be given a choice of attending either Matins or Evensong.

Finally, may I, with due humility as a layman, make two suggestions to chaplains on how to make services more attractive to Service congregations:—

- (1) Choose well-known hymns and have competitive singing, i.e., one half of the church singing one verse and the other half the next, with the third verse all together, announcing which half sang better than the other.
- (2) During the sermon, based on a simple theme, ask the congregation to answer some simple question—not biblical, but of general knowledge in connection with the theme.

These may seem revolutionary, but I recently attended a service where these methods were employed by an outstanding chaplain, and the effects were truly remarkable. It was, as Major Gourlay describes it, salesmanship of a very high degree.

J. B. BUCKMASTER,  
*Major.*

17th September, 1959.

SIR,—An interesting article in the JOURNAL for May gives some reasons for the decline of religious observance.

The truth is that the old practices of holding family prayers and going to church on Sunday, gratefully to thank God for benefits received during the week, have largely been relinquished. A self-sufficient public are little inclined to acknowledge His help in their daily lives.

Fear of an enemy's missiles in war, or fear of some impending calamity, draw people to church, for the occasion, to pray for safety; so also do colourful religious ceremonies or the address of a popular preacher set amid fine music. But attending weekly service in church as a duty to the Almighty is usually considered rather unnecessary. The dignified service—however dull the parson's brief sermon—the beautiful prayers and hymns, the often enthralling stories from the Old and the New Testaments, the lovely ancient building alone, make insufficient appeal; an extra hour in bed or an extra hour's recreation seem more attractive, though a good choir and a well-played organ induce larger congregations.

The character of nations and persons short of loyalty to the Almighty is generally lower than with those who feel they ought publicly to worship and serve Him.

One recalls the prayer of the old Cavalier knight before the battle of Naseby, 1645: "Oh Lord! I shall be busy today and may forget Thee for a little while; but pray do not Thou forget me."

J. L. JACK,  
*Brig. General.*

23rd September, 1959.

SIR,—Those who read Major Gourlay's thoughtful article in the May number of the JOURNAL may be interested to know how one aspect of this problem is tackled at the School of Military Engineering, Chatham.

The congregations at Divine Service in our Garrison Church on Sundays consist almost entirely of families. Few soldiers come, for the reasons given by Major Gourlay

and also because in a static training unit in this country a great many men go away on week-end leave. We therefore have a mid-week service during normal working hours—at 8 o'clock each Wednesday morning. Attendance is entirely voluntary. Any man who wishes to attend is allowed to ; the remainder either attend a talk on current affairs by one of their squadron officers or, if permanent staff, go about their normal routine duties. Dress is ordinary working dress. The only burden imposed is that those attending must march there in an orderly body, the church being about half-a-mile outside the barracks.

The service is made as attractive as possible and is quite short—a hymn, prayers, lesson, address, final hymn, national anthem. The Royal Engineers' band (strings and wind) accompanies the organ, with the Director of Music conducting. The lesson is carefully chosen and is read by a junior officer. The padre gives a simple and straightforward address. There are flowers on the altar, the church is warm in winter, and the pews are comfortable. Quite a number of men attend.

P. S. BAINES,  
*Lieut.-Colonel.*

28th September, 1959.

### FOCH AND HAIG

SIR,—When we are young we all have our heroes, and Marshal Foch is a very worthy one ; but why is it necessary, in order to build up his reputation, to disparage British Commanders and their troops in the first World War ? This is what Major Gibson has done in his well-written article " Foch, the first Supreme Commander " (JOURNAL, February, 1959, p. 93). The author belongs to a generation that did not fight in that war. He has had to search for opinions among those who have written about it. His preference has been for those of Lloyd George and for certain military critics, now discredited on this subject. It has been a common cliché among them that Passchendaele was so terrible that no one who was there could talk or write about it. This is nonsense.

As a young Infantry officer I fought throughout that war (except when wounded) on the Western Front. I can speak from personal experience about all the battles of Ypres from 1914 to 1918. The Somme, the German offensive against the 5th Army in 1918, against the Portuguese on the Lys a month later, and others of lesser importance. This insistence by the war correspondents and critics that the fighting men were dumb was an attempt by them to discount any home truths which might tell another story. In his article, the writer is at pains to quote some of the diatribes of Lloyd George against Haig and Robertson. I can assure the writer that not once in four years of war did I hear a single word of criticism of our chief by front-line troops. In the long hours of darkness in trenches or with working parties which could not operate in daylight, there was little we did not learn of the soldiers' thoughts about the war; chiefly football and love (in that order).

Major Gibson dismisses the 3rd Battle of Ypres in one contemptuous sentence. " On 31st July, the British attack went in, and after three dreadful months, foundered on the swamps of Passchendaele." We have heard these identical words before ; the writer is not the originator. However, Mr. J. A. Terraine, in his thoughtful article on this battle, has dealt adequately with this thoroughly dishonest verdict. (JOURNAL, May, 1959, p. 173.)

The German attack of 21st March, 1918, is treated by the writer in a similar manner. Major Gibson says : " On 21st March, 1918, Ludendorff launched his great bid for victory. Thirty-five German divisions ' smashed into and rolled over ' Sir Hubert Gough's 5th Army of 21 divisions and drove hard for Amiens." The writer does not say how this came about. The extension of the British front in January, 1918, to Barisis (on the edge of the St. Gobain Forest) in order to release French troops to the reserve, had grave consequences on the eve of the German attack. Haig now had to hold 130 miles of front with the same number of troops with which he had previously held 80 miles at a time when Russia was still in the war. The effect was only too apparent to us in the 5th Army. One division was on a wide front in great depth. Even in the battle zone

we were very thin on the ground. We did not know then what we know now. Lloyd George withheld the necessary reinforcements at home for which Haig was asking so urgently on behalf of 5th Army. Major Gibson does not mention that the 3rd Army, who were approximately twice as thick on the ground as 5th Army, was also involved. Nor does he mention that the 35 German divisions were only the first wave. By evening on 21st March no less than 64 German divisions had entered the battle. The major tactical defeat which 5th Army suffered was due to factors over which neither the Commander nor his troops had any control. In the battle itself some of the most heroic episodes of the war passed unnoticed in the controversy that followed.

One further point calls for comment. The writer tells us that as the German offensive of 1918 came to a halt, only Foch foresaw the future. He says: "Foch saw the writing on the wall. In spite of the pessimism of British G.H.Q., he realized that the time had come to strike and strike hard."

One cannot accept this statement. About 10 days before 21st March, Haig visited 5th Army front. He stopped with us to speak to the C.O. and company commanders. He was very frank. He told us that the odds were against us in numbers and guns, etc. After saying briefly what he expected of us, he went on to say that this was Germany's last throw. The offensive must be halted, and when that had been done, the German Army would be in retreat by the end of the year.

A fortnight later we were to receive confirmation from another source. On the fifth day of the battle, we captured a young Sturm-Truppen unit-leader. We expected him to be very cock-a-hoop. The reverse was the case. He said: "Germany is beaten. The German Army has not got the strength to complete this victory. We suffered terribly on the Ypres front."

In conclusion may I suggest that Major Gibson is in no way to blame for his otherwise excellent article about a great French leader. In his reference to British leaders and troops he is the victim of a distortion of history.

J. E. UTTERSON-KELSO,

*10th September, 1959.*

*Major-General.*

#### THE BATTLE OF PASSCHENDAELE

SIR,—Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke in his letter of 7th March, calls the statement that "after three dreadful months the offensive bogged down in the swamps of Passchendaele" a 'shibboleth.' Later in his letter he says, "the legendary swamps are 20 miles away."

If Brigadier Clarke is right, I would like to know why so many field companies R.E. (mine included), assisted by infantry carrying parties, were employed during those three months in laying down beech slabs to form wooden roads in that area.

It is a long time ago, but my recollection is that it was because the whole area was an artificial swamp, and so wheeled vehicles could only move over those wooden roadways. Many batteries, when relieved, had to leave their guns behind in the swamp because they could not get them out. In places the swamp was so bad that infantry in fighting kit could not advance; yet they were ordered to do so.

Towards the end of the battle my division, the 7th, was ordered to Italy. Never shall I forget my joy at leaving Passchendaele, and escaping from the leadership of Haig, the man who ordered his troops to advance over a terrain which he never came to see for himself.

W. A. F. KERRICH,

*19th August, 1959.*

*Brigadier (Retd.).*

SIR,—I wonder if Brigadier Clarke and Mr. Terraine in their references to Passchendaele in your May issue are not unduly influenced by the relevant volume of the British official history. It would be interesting to know how and why this volume finally became an outright defence of the Third Ypres operations. During 1942-43, when I was making preliminary studies of recently completed air operations for the Air Ministry, I found myself occupying part of a large room which was shared by the staff of the Cabinet (Military) Historical Section, some of whom were still busy recording the history of the first World War. In the bay next to mine was the narrator who was compiling the Passchendaele volume. On several occasions the facts that he was studying were apparently too disturbing for him to absorb in complete silence, and some such muttered phrase as "Dreadful, dreadful" escaped his lips. In conversation I gained the impression that he was moved to these exclamations not only by the conditions and the casualties, but also by various features in the conception and conduct of the campaign. It therefore surprised me greatly, when the volume eventually appeared in 1948, that the work of the narrator was nowhere acknowledged, and that the dominant features of the volume were a 'Preface' and 'Retrospect' from the pen of Sir James Edmonds, the editor of the series, in which all the standard criticisms of Passchendaele were strongly rebutted.

This was greatly at variance with what I had expected, and was perhaps the more curious in that Sir James—a wonderful old man of superb energy, intelligence, and wit—was, in conversation, capable of destroying more military reputations within a few moments than anyone else I have ever met. At all events it seems certain that Sir James, as editor, gave this volume a tone very different from that of the exclamations of my neighbour, the officer who was actually doing the detailed work on it. Students of the volume might perhaps therefore be well advised to distinguish very carefully in the Preface between what is fact supported by the subsequent narrative, and what is assertion supported, if at all, by evidence which does not appear in the narrative.

Mr. Terraine, incidentally, makes a good deal of the need to continue the offensive until the 'high ground' of the Passchendaele ridge was reached. The main map in the official history shows this ridge as 40-60 metres high. It also shows that by 4th October the foremost British forces were either on this same ridge (south of Passchendaele) or on ground that was 20-40 metres high (west of Passchendaele). To gain these last 20 metres or so of height along the remaining length of the ridge—not perhaps all that important when aeroplanes were continually available for observation—cost our forces more than 100,000 casualties. Whether the enemy lost rather more or rather less, this seems the complete negation of good generalship. Passchendaele, it seems to me, had only one unquestionably good effect. Its appalling wastefulness, like that of the earlier blind slogging on the Somme, bit deep into the minds of Sir Winston Churchill and the younger officers who were to be our future leaders in the second World War—with the result that the British Army's share in the second conflict was conducted, thank God, on very different lines.

7th October, 1959.

DENIS RICHARDS.

#### THE SOVIET NAVY

SIR,—On page 132 of the February, 1959, issue of this JOURNAL, the reviewer of *The Soviet Navy* (edited by Commander M. G. Saunders, R.N.) expressed the hope that a Russian assessment of the book might be contributed to the JOURNAL. The only known response, alas, has been a lengthy political invective against the editor and individual contributors to the book. It appeared on 1st April in the Soviet naval newspaper *Sovetskiy Flot* over the name V. Katerinich, and the full translation can be seen in the R.U.S.I. Library. The following extract shows its general tone: "From so malevolent a team of contributors one cannot expect any sort of objective account of the Soviet Navy.

The authors were governed by the task they had set themselves: to malign the Soviet Union and in this way to justify the naval arms race in the United States and the other N.A.T.O. nations."

2nd June, 1959.

M. G. SAUNDERS,  
Commander, R.N.

### SEA-AIR STRATEGY AND SUBMARINE WARFARE

SIR,—Amongst those who have studied with interest Admiral Björklund's articles on Sea-Air Strategy and Submarine Warfare there will no doubt be many officers of the Royal Navy. It is with the greatest diffidence that one ventures to comment on his findings in the teeth of that great and very senior Service, nor is it to be expected of them that they disclose their strategies, but some points do appear to need clarification.

"A submarine war has no deadly effect if it is not combined with unlimited warfare." Unlimited warfare today connotes the use of nuclear weapons. Is it to be assumed in this contingency that the system of convoys is to be finished with? Admiral Björklund says that IRBM/ICBM cannot be effectively aimed at so small a target as a warship at speed at sea. I return to this later but in terms of scores of merchant vessels and their escorts, spread over miles of sea, moving at seven to ten knots, this is near enough to the static for even the present degree of accuracy in missile gunnery which in any case is based on blast effect. In the event we are more likely to experience stand-off bombing by aircraft at extreme range or attack by torpedoes homed on and set to under-run their target or surface-to-surface missiles fired from submarines. Since it would appear that each convoy would require a task force as anti-submarine escort, the size and value of the target would become such as to make 'wastage' tactics an acceptable risk to the enemy. A technique of nuclear minelaying, bearing in mind the Russian aptitude for this exercise, would probably be even more effective.

It does appear that a policy of extensive dispersal en route with heavy defensive concentrations of air cover and sea patrols in focal areas would be less inviting, with small convoys of two or three well-armed merchant vessels capable of like speeds as an alternative. It may be said that our politicians have lost the next war even more certainly than is usual, for several reasons, one being our almost total dependence on oil fuel. Refineries would cease to exist very soon after the outbreak of war but some degree of supply could be maintained by modern oversize tankers, but not if, capable of 17-18 knots, they were compelled to sail in convoy with elderly tramps.

Am I quite out of order?

29th September, 1959.

E. E. GERVASE-DAVIES,  
Flight-Lieutenant.

### TOO FEW INFANTRY

SIR,—I should like to reply briefly to Captain Page's interesting letter in which he criticizes some of the points raised in my article "Too Few Infantry." Captain Page considers that:—

- (a) Overseas bases can have strategic disadvantages if the political situation has not been carefully evaluated before they are established.
- (b) R.A.C. units should take their part as infantry in the Cold War.
- (c) Headquarters and other installations cannot be expected to make further economies in manpower.

Having had some experience of overseas bases which have irritated the *amour propre* of the locals, I entirely agree that the establishment of overseas garrisons is fraught with problems. On the other hand I would refer Captain Page to Secretary of State Lansing's note to Mexico in 1916, in which he said: "The first duty of any Government is the

protection of life and property. This is the paramount obligation for which governments are instituted, and governments neglecting or failing to perform it are not worthy of the name." So long, therefore, as we take it upon ourselves to govern other races, so long must we remain responsible for the lives of the ordinary citizen in the street, and in my view this involves us in maintaining overseas garrisons in support of the civil power.

I should qualify this, perhaps, by saying that I am not quarrelling with the Government's decision to form a strategic reserve in this country; in the light of our limited resources it would seem the most sensible thing to do. But I do believe from my own experience that there will still remain a requirement for *some* troops on the ground in potential trouble-spots overseas. I claim no particular credit for foresight but I did say in my article, "We may well be requiring more infantry before we are much older, and probably in Africa." The Nyasaland troubles followed three months later, and there will be others.

As for the contention that R.A.C. units should function periodically as infantry, I would merely say that already we have to take on the roles of armoured cars, tanks, and basic training units, and I think this is about as much as we can manage. The tank crewman can be employed to operate as an infantryman, of course, and the time may well be coming when tanks are organic to infantry battalions. But at this moment there just is not enough armour to go round, and the manpower available in the all-Regular Army will not allow any additional armoured units. No—we have in our armoured car role a contribution to make in the cold war. Let us stick to our own last.

And finally, this vexed question of Headquarters staffs. Speaking from my own experience as a Commanding Officer, when I was always desperately short of officers at regimental duty, and now as G.S.O. I of an active division, I cannot accept Captain Page's contention that Headquarters "cannot be relied upon to make further economies in manpower" (I am not in a position to question whether base installations should be able to do so). 'Relied upon' is probably the operative phrase, since 'Parkinson's Law' remains the one constant operating factor of the mid-twentieth century. Certainly at Divisional Headquarters' level significant cuts in manpower could be made, given the will to do it, and the provision of the necessary electronic equipment to eliminate the fantastic waste of man-hours which exists at present. I do not doubt that the same is true of all Headquarters up and down the line.

J. D. LUNT,  
Lieut.-Colonel.

5th October, 1959.

#### RETIRED PAY

SIR,—The matter in this letter may be of interest to a large number of retired officers, many of whom are members of the R.U.S.I.

Retired Pay is granted at an annual rate. Officers who have had a change of rate because of commutation or for any other reason are advised to check the payments received from H.M. Paymaster General at the time of the change. The method adopted by him to fix the amount due for the split period can operate to the disadvantage of the recipient. He divides the annual rate by 12 and apportions the amounts for the split period by the relationship between the days in the period and the total days in the month. The fallacy of this method is that the month is not an exact twelfth of the year. A simple example will show how this method works as against the correct method of apportioning an annual rate for split periods.

An officer with retired pay of £1,200 a year commutes £600 on 21st August.

The Paymaster will give him, from 1st April to 31st August:—

		£	s.
April, May, June, July, at £100 a month...	...	400	0
20 days in August (at £1,200 a year) $\frac{20}{31} \times \frac{1,200}{12}$	...	64	10
11 days in August (at £600 a year) $\frac{11}{31} \times \frac{600}{12}$	...	17	14
		<hr/>	
		£482	4

What the officer should receive from 1st April to 31st August:—

		£	s.
142 days at £1,200 a year = $\frac{142}{365} \times 1,200$	...	466	17
11 days at £600 a year = $\frac{11}{365} \times 600$	...	18	0
		<hr/>	
		£484	17

The officer loses £2 13s. Why should he?

Apprised of the position, officers could raise the question with H.M. Paymaster General who provides their retired pay vouchers.

C. H. H. VULLIAMY,  
Major-General.

24th September, 1959.

#### THE LIBRARY

SIR.—May I, through your columns, request that members refrain from making annotations to library books. Apart from the fact that it is gross impertinence to mark books which are the property of others, the fact that these notes are invariably anonymous means that they are worthless.

If any member reading a book feels that he can usefully comment upon it, or correct any mis-statements, I would suggest that he makes his notes on a sheet of paper and appends his name. The librarian will be able to judge whether the member has sufficient knowledge and authority to make his remarks of value, and if they are, would no doubt be pleased to 'tip in' the sheet for the information of other readers.

I have not discussed this matter with the librarian, but feel confident that I should have his support.

ERNEST J. MARTIN.

24th August, 1959.

## GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

### BAGHDAD PACT RENAMED

It was reported from Istanbul on 21st August that the Council of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara had decided that the organization should in future be known as the "Central Treaty Organization," abbreviated to "CENTO."

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Mr. Harold Watkinson has been appointed Minister of Defence in succession to Mr. Duncan Sandys who has become Minister of Aviation.

#### COMMANDANT, IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

Sir Robert Scott, Commissioner-General in South-East Asia since 1955, is to succeed General Sir Geoffrey Bourne as Commandant of the Imperial Defence College at the end of 1959. Sir Robert Scott will be the first civilian Commandant of the I.D.C. since its foundation in 1927.

#### CONFERENCE ON COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE

A conference on Commonwealth Defence in the nuclear age, which it was hoped would be the first of a series of informed inter-Service Commonwealth conferences to be held periodically, took place at Cranwell early in September under the chairmanship of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten of Burma. It was attended by the Minister of Defence, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for Air, and about 180 senior officers from all Commonwealth countries.

#### REGULAR RECRUITING

##### COMPARISON OF QUARTERS ENDING 30TH JUNE, 1958 AND 1959

	April-June, 1958				April-June, 1959			
	Navy	Army	R.A.F.	Total	Navy	Army	R.A.F.	Total
Men on full-time National Service transferring to regular engagements ...	23	687	433	1,143	9	544	338	891
Regular entries who would otherwise be available for National Service call-up during the year	162	2,505	2,127	4,794	102	787	891	1,780
Re-entries of men with previous service ...	138	868	694	1,700	79	802	604	1,485
Others: including juniors, boys and apprentices ...	1,743	4,588	2,645	8,976	1,457	5,167	2,681	9,305
<b>TOTAL ...</b>	<b>2,066</b>	<b>8,648</b>	<b>5,899</b>	<b>16,613</b>	<b>1,647</b>	<b>7,300</b>	<b>4,514</b>	<b>13,461</b>

#### CIVIL DEFENCE

Over 18,000 recruits were obtained during the Civil Defence recruitment campaign conducted in the United Kingdom in the Autumn of 1958.

This fact was disclosed in the Home Office Civil Defence strength statement for England and Wales for the quarter ended 31st December, 1958. The continued

efforts of Corps authorities to weed out inactive members, and resignations from other causes, resulted in a loss of 11,222 members during this quarter, leaving a net gain of 6,839.

At the end of the year, the total strength of the Civil Defence Corps was 335,406, compared with 330,306 at the end of 1957 and 326,704 at the end of 1956. Details were as follows :—

Section strengths	Men	Women	Total
Headquarters ... ...	31,133	15,824	46,957
Warden ... ...	54,580	10,332	64,912
Ambulance and Casualty			
Collecting ... ...	23,110	31,923	55,033
Welfare ... ...	6,145	124,453	130,598
Rescue ... ...	33,134	—	33,134
	148,102	182,532	330,634
Volunteers not yet allocated to a Section ...	2,391	2,381	4,772
Total for England and Wales ... ...	150,493	184,913	335,406

The strength of the other voluntary Civil Defence Services at the end of December, 1958, were :—

Auxiliary Fire Service	... 19,074
Special Constabulary	... 51,962 men and 914 women

#### MALAYA

It was announced in the House of Commons on 18th June that H.M. Government, in addition to providing certain grants towards meeting the cost of the emergency, would present to the Federation as a gift Service installations worth about £2,500,000, including the R.A.F. station at Kuala Lumpur, the Batu Arang cantonment, the site and buildings of Headquarters Malaya Command, and about 24 camps.

## NAVY NOTES

### H.M. THE QUEEN

**AIDES-DE-CAMP.**—The following officers have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 7th July, 1959, in succession to the officers stated:—

Commodore D. G. Goodwin, D.S.C., in succession to Captain R. W. Jones.

Captain T. N. Masterman, O.B.E., in succession to Captain R. R. S. Pennefather.

Captain A. H. F. Hunt, in succession to Captain R. H. Maurice, D.S.O., D.S.C.

Commodore I. G. Robertson, D.S.O., D.S.C., in succession to Captain H. W. S. Sims-Williams.

Captain D. Sanderson, D.S.C., in succession to Captain R. A. Villiers, C.B.E.

Captain C. R. L. Argles, in succession to Commodore J. F. Cochrane, D.S.C.

Commodore A. A. F. Talbot, D.S.O., in succession to Captain E. G. Roper, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.

Captain The Earl of Roden, in succession to Captain A. G. Forman, D.S.C.

Captain A. G. Sowman, C.B.E., in succession to Rear-Admiral R. M. Smeeton, M.B.E.

Captain A. R. Newman, O.B.E., in succession to Rear-Admiral C. B. Pratt.

Captain K. H. Smith, O.B.E., in succession to Captain C. G. Webley, O.B.E.

**HON. PHYSICIAN.**—Surgeon Captain G. L. Foss, O.B.E., V.R.D., R.N.R., has been appointed an Honorary Physician to The Queen from 30th June, 1959, in succession to Surgeon Captain R. S. Rudland, V.R.D., R.N.R.

**HON. NURSING SISTER.**—Miss Helen Moore, R.R.C., Matron-in-Chief, Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service, has been appointed an Honorary Nursing Sister to The Queen from 14th July, 1959, in succession to Miss B. Nockolds, C.B.E., R.R.C.

### BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

**V.C.N.S.**—Admiral Sir Walter T. Couchman, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., O.B.E., to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, in succession to Admiral Sir Caspar John, K.C.B., to take effect in February, 1960.

**SECOND SEA LORD.**—Vice-Admiral Sir St. John R. J. Tyrwhitt, Bt., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Second Sea Lord, and Chief of Naval Personnel, in succession to Vice-Admiral D. E. Holland-Martin, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., to take effect in December, 1959.

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**NAVY WORKS.**—The First Lord has approved the appointment of Mr. W. G. Harris as Civil Engineer-in-Chief and as Director-General, Navy Works (designate). He succeeded Sir Maurice Adams, K.B.E., with effect from 30th June, 1959.

**GREENWICH HOSPITAL.**—The First Lord has approved the appointment of Mr. H. D. Samuel as Director of Greenwich Hospital, in succession to Mr. Robert Millar, C.B.E., who retired on 1st October, 1959.

### FLAG APPOINTMENTS

**FAR EAST.**—Vice-Admiral J. D. Luce, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., to be Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, in succession to Admiral Sir Gerald V. Gladstone, K.C.B. (April, 1960).

**SCOTLAND.**—Vice-Admiral R. H. Wright, C.B., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer, Scotland, in succession to Vice-Admiral J. D. Luce, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (December, 1959).

**F.O. AIR (HOME).**—Vice-Admiral D. E. Holland-Martin, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer Air (Home), in succession to Admiral Sir Walter T. Couchman, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., O.B.E. (January, 1960).

**MANPOWER.**—Vice-Admiral J. S. Lancaster, C.B., to be Director-General of Manpower, in succession to Rear-Admiral N. E. Denning, O.B.E. (September, 1959).

**HOME FLEET.**—Rear-Admiral J. B. Frewen to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in succession to Rear-Admiral H. C. D. MacLean, D.S.C. (August, 1959).

**AIR (HOME).**—Rear-Admiral C. B. Pratt to be Chief Staff Officer, Technical, to Flag Officer Air (Home), (July, 1959); Rear-Admiral W. G. S. Tighe to be Rear-Admiral (Personnel), Home Air Command, in succession to Rear-Admiral J. S. Lancaster, C.B. (August, 1959).

**SUBMARINES.**—Rear-Admiral A. R. Hezlet, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer, Submarines, in succession to Rear-Admiral B. W. Taylor, C.B., D.S.C. (November, 1959).

**D.N.I.**—Rear-Admiral N. E. Denning, O.B.E., to be Director of Naval Intelligence, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir John G. T. Inglis, K.B.E., C.B. (January, 1960).

**MEDITERRANEAN.**—Rear-Admiral H. C. D. MacLean, D.S.C., to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir St. John R. J. Tyrwhitt, Bt., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C. (October, 1959).

#### RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (28th July, 1959).

Vice-Admiral Sir Robin L. F. Durnford-Slater, K.C.B., promoted Admiral (28th July, 1959).

Rear-Admiral J. S. Lancaster, C.B., promoted Vice-Admiral (28th July, 1959).

Rear-Admiral G. A. F. Norfolk, C.B., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (21st August, 1959).

Rear-Admiral A. J. Tyndale-Biscoe, C.B., O.B.E., placed on the Retired List (15th September, 1959).

#### EXERCISES AND CRUISES

**HOME FLEET.**—During the summer cruise of the Home Fleet the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir William Davis, in H.M.S. *Tyne*, visited Stockholm from 2nd to 10th June; Aarhus, Denmark, from the 12th to 16th; and Oslo from the 17th to 24th. The King of Norway as an Admiral in the Royal Navy hoisted his flag in the *Tyne* for a visit on 18th June, when the flag of the Commander-in-Chief was transferred temporarily to the submarine *Talent*. Ships left their home ports in mid-September for the autumn cruise, which began with weapon training off the east coast of Scotland. In the last week of September units of the Fleet visited Norwegian waters in support of a landing operation in the N.A.T.O. exercise "Bar Frost", aimed at testing the Norwegian defences. The fleet returned to Rosyth early in October for "Administrators' Week," and certain ships were afterwards to visit continental ports.

**N.A.T.O. ANNIVERSARY.**—As part of the tenth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, two squadrons of ships of Channel Command countries visited the Pool of London on 18th April for three days. The first consisted of H.M. destroyer *Agincourt*, Netherlands destroyer *Utrecht* and Belgian escort vessel *De Moor*; the second of the Belgian minesweeper *Breydel*, H.M. coastal minesweeper *Upton*, French coastal minesweeper *Pollux*, and Netherlands coastal minesweeper *Ascel*. The French destroyer *Surcouf* berthed at Greenwich on the same day, and the Danish depot and training ship *Aegir* at Battle Bridge Pier. The anniversary was also observed by assemblies of warships at Le Havre, Naples, and at Malta.

GUIDED WEAPONS.—H.M.S. *Girdle Ness*, guided weapons trials ship, was recommissioned at Devonport on 28th April, for a new series of trials while based on Malta and left for the Mediterranean in June. She has a complement of 30 officers, 20 members of the R.N. Scientific Service, and 380 men.

FISHERY PROTECTION.—The 'cod war' off the coast of Iceland was one year old on 1st September. Patrols required the services of 40 warships during the year, undertaking in turn an average of 18 days on station: 35 ships of the Home Fleet and Home Commands supplemented the permanent Fishery Protection Squadron. Most of them undertook one patrol, but 11 ships made two trips and two, the destroyers *Hogue* and *Lagos*, three trips to Icelandic waters. Refuelling at sea from R.F.A. ships was difficult because of the prevailing weather, but on only one occasion was it impossible.

MEDITERRANEAN.—Every destroyer and frigate of the Mediterranean Fleet (except one refitting) took part in exercise "Medflex Guard" in April. They were constantly at sea for the ten days of the exercise and were supplied with provisions, stores, ammunition, and fuel by four Royal Fleet Auxiliaries. Submarines of the First Squadron were employed throughout the exercise as 'enemy.'

On 5th May, 45 Commando embarked in ships of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron to take part in exercise "Penguin" on the Libyan coast. This was directed by the Flag Officer Flotillas, Mediterranean, Rear-Admiral R. A. Ewing, from his flagship the *Birmingham*, which also exercised gun support. H.M.S. *Surprise* took part in her new role as a helicopter carrier carrying the helicopters of 848 Squadron.

Exercise "Sardex," to exercise air and gunnery support of an amphibious landing, took place in the Cape Teulada area of Sardinia on 11th and 12th June. The *Birmingham* (F.O., Flotillas) was again present; four Italian vessels also took part.

Some 2,000 men from 40 Commando and the U.S. Marine Corps made an assault landing on the coast of Libya near Derna during the night of 22nd-23rd June, exercise "Whitebait." This was the largest Anglo-American amphibious exercise in the Mediterranean since 1957.

The Mediterranean Fleet spent most of July away from Malta on visits to Istanbul, the Black Sea, Corfu, and Athens. The larger units left Malta for their second summer cruise on 11th August, during which they were to visit French and Italian Riviera ports.

FAR EAST.—The biggest S.E.A.T.O. maritime exercise yet held began on 14th April, when three naval task groups left Singapore on the first phase of exercise "Sea Demon." Forty ships from five nations, Australia, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States, took part under the overall command of Rear-Admiral Gatacre, Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet. The exercise was designed to develop proficiency in the conduct of combined operations in the S.E.A.T.O. area and promote close working relationships between the nations for mutual defence.

INDIAN OCEAN.—Joint Commonwealth exercises and training ("Jet") were held in July and August for the ninth year in succession. They were the largest of the series, 35 warships and eight auxiliaries from six Commonwealth countries taking part, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, Admiral Sir Gerald Gladstone. The ships dispersed from Ceylon on 31st August.

CANADA.—The Fifth Frigate Squadron, composed of the *Scarborough*, *Tenby*, *Salisbury*, and *Whitby*, visited Halifax, Nova Scotia, and ports in the Canadian Maritime Provinces in August. At Montreal the *Scarborough* hoisted the flag of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten of Burma for passage through the St. Lawrence Seaway to Toronto for the opening of the 81st Canadian National Exhibition on 26th August. United States ports at Cleveland, Buffalo, and Rochester were also visited at this time.

## PERSONNEL

CADET SCHOLARSHIPS.—In reply to a question in the House of Commons on 24th June, the Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty, said that from independent schools, including nautical schools, 81 boys were interviewed at preliminary boards and 22 were awarded scholarships to begin in January, 1959; from schools partly or wholly supported by the State 82 were interviewed and three were awarded scholarships. There was no written examination for these scholarships.

## MATERIEL AND DOCKYARDS

“DREADNOUGHT” LAID DOWN.—H.M.S. *Dreadnought*, the first British atomic submarine, was formally begun at the Vickers-Armstrongs yard, Barrow-in-Furness, on 12th June, by the Duke of Edinburgh. The conventional keel-laying was displaced by operating machinery which moved on to the slipway a 30-ton steel hoop, 30-feet in diameter. The ceremony was attended by the First Lord, who said that many people would be surprised at the short time it would take to put the *Dreadnought* into the water.

H.M.S. “BELFAST”.—At Devonport on 12th May, H.M.S. *Belfast*, the Navy’s largest cruiser, recommissioned for service on the Far East Station after a long refit during which she was extensively modernized. A new operations room has been built.

R.F.A. TANKER.—The tanker *George Lyras*, of 16,850 tons deadweight, was taken over by the Admiralty on 17th April on charter for service as a Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and renamed R.F.A. *Appleleaf*, after a tanker which served the Royal Navy in both World Wars. She is the first of several 16-18,000-ton tankers which are being chartered by the Admiralty to replace the smaller 11,000-ton “Dale” and “Wave” class R.F.A. freighting tankers.

SHEERNESS DOCKYARD.—The sale of Sheerness Dockyard was announced in a written reply in the House of Commons on 26th June by the Civil Lord. Subject to contract, it has been bought by Building Developments, Ltd., who intend to develop the dockyard as a single or a few large units for engineering production. Possession is expected by the spring of 1960.

LAUNCHES.—H.M.S. *Lincoln*, fourth of the new type of air direction frigates, was launched by the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Govan, on 6th April. H.M.S. *Plymouth*, anti-submarine frigate, was launched at Devonport Dockyard on 20th July. H.M.S. *Oberon*, first of a new class of submarines of the same name, was launched by the Duchess of Kent at Chatham Dockyard on 18th July—the first Royal launch there since the battleship *Prince of Wales* was launched by the Princess of Wales (Queen Alexandra) in 1902. The submarine *Finwhale*, of the “Porpoise” class, was launched by Cammell Laird and Co., Ltd., Birkenhead, on 21st July. H.M.S. *Walrus*, another submarine of this class, was launched by the Duchess of Gloucester at the Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Greenock, on 22nd September. The boom defence vessel *Laymoor*, first of a new class, was launched by William Simons and Co., Ltd., Renfrew, on 6th August.

SUBMARINES COMMISSIONED.—H.M.S. *Narwhal*, fourth of the new “Porpoise” class, was commissioned at the Vickers-Armstrongs yard, Barrow-in-Furness, on 4th May, with a complement of six officers and 65 ratings. H.M.S. *Cachalot*, the fifth of this class, was commissioned at the yard of the Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Company on 1st September.

## FLEET AIR ARM

HELICOPTERS.—As was announced in the House of Commons on 9th March during the Navy Estimates debate, a special five-year commission on the Supplementary List of the Royal Navy is being introduced for young men to serve as helicopter pilots. These aircraft are employed on anti-submarine, search and rescue, and commando duties. Details of the scheme were announced on 30th April. The age limits are from 17 to 23 years of age.

The R.N. Helicopter Station, Portland, was opened by the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, Admiral Sir Manley Power, on 24th April. It is the first Service helicopter airfield in the United Kingdom.

The Boyd Trophy for 1958, awarded to 845 Squadron (helicopters) while embarked in the aircraft carrier *Bulwark* for work in connection with the salvage of the Liberian tanker *Melika* in the Persian Gulf, was presented by the Flag Officer Air (Home) on 10th April at Culdrose.

H.M.S. "VICTORIOUS."—The aircraft carrier *Victorious* left Portsmouth on 30th June for Norfolk, Va., Boston, and New York to demonstrate her air warning, control radar, and associated semi-automatic data processing equipment. The radar, known as Type 984, is a new three-dimensional system which provides simultaneous information on the height, range, and bearing of aircraft contacts. The electronic equipment has cost over £1,000,000. The *Victorious* returned to Portsmouth on 10th August.

H.M.S. "EAGLE."—After seven years' continuous service as the Navy's largest warship, the aircraft carrier *Eagle* was paid off early in May for extensive modernization at Devonport Dockyard.

RESERVE SUB-COMMAND.—The Reserve Aircraft Sub-Command of the Home Air Command was abolished at sunset on 17th August, when the Flag Officer Reserve Aircraft, Rear-Admiral A. J. Tyndale-Biscoe, struck his flag at the R.N. Air Station, Arbroath.

SEA VIXEN SQUADRON.—The first front line squadron of De Havilland Sea Vixen all-weather fighters commissioned on 2nd July at the R.N. Air Station, Yeovilton, H.M.S. *Heron*. The squadron, No. 892, was formed largely from 700Y Flight which had carried out intensive flying trials during the previous nine months.

#### ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

R.N.V.S.R.—The Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve, founded in 1936 as "a list of gentlemen with yachting experience and other qualifications of value to the Royal Navy," and later composed of ex-temporary officers of the R.N. Reserves, is now open to entrants who have no previous naval service or seagoing experience. Details announced on 17th August show that entrants between the ages of 20 and 30 can join with dormant commissions as temporary sub-lieutenants, R.N.R. The commissions will be confirmed only in the event of call-up or in an emergency. There are 6,000 officers in the R.N.V.S.R. at present, and 31 local units are distributed throughout the country where unpaid training is undertaken, but younger men are needed to replace the growing number removed from the list on reaching the retiring age of 55.

SHIP NAMES FOR H.Q. UNITS.—Ship names have been allocated by the Admiralty to Headquarters Units of the Royal Naval Reserve. They are:—

H.M.S. *Northwood*. H.Q. Unit, Northwood.  
 H.M.S. *Southwick*. H.Q. Unit, Portsmouth.  
 H.M.S. *Vivid*. H.Q. Unit, Plymouth.  
 H.M.S. *Scotia*. H.Q. Unit, Rosyth.

These units, which are an integral part of the R.N.R., provide trained teams of officers and ratings, male and female, for service in maritime and other headquarters in time of emergency.

#### SEA CADET CORPS

Captain R. Casement, O.B.E., R.N. (Retired), has been appointed Secretary to the Council of the Sea Cadet Corps in succession to Captain E. W. Bush, D.S.O., D.S.C., from 1st June, 1959.

#### R.N. NURSING SERVICE

Miss Helen Moore, R.R.C., has been appointed Matron-in-Chief, Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service, in succession to Miss Barbara Nockolds, C.B.E., R.R.C., Q.H.N.S., to date 14th July, 1959.

## ROYAL MARINES

**41 COMMANDO.**—The Admiralty has decided to re-form 41 Commando as part of a reorganization within the Royal Marine forces. It will start forming in April, 1960, at Bickleigh Camp, Devon, after the departure of 42 Commando to join H.M.S. *Bulwark*. The decision will not entail any increase in total manpower, a substantial reduction of Royal Marines serving afloat and elsewhere having been made. The original 41 Commando was formed in October, 1942, and fought in Sicily, Salerno, Normandy, Walcheren, Holland, and West Germany. It was disbanded in 1946, but re-formed in August, 1950, for service in Korea, and disbanded in February, 1952.

**VISIT OF DUTCH COMMANDANT.**—Major-General H. Lieftinck, Commandant of the Royal Netherlands Marines, visited the Royal Marines in Britain between 19th and 23rd June. His programme included visits to the Royal Tournament; demonstration "Runaground X" at Eastney on the 22nd, where he witnessed the beach landing of the SRN-1 Hovercraft; and the Royal Marines Depot, Deal.

## NEW ZEALAND

**NEW FRIGATE.**—The "Whitby" class frigate *Taranaki* was launched at the shipyard of J. Samuel White and Co., Ltd., at Cowes, Isle of Wight, on 19th August. She is the second in the programme of Type 12 frigates under construction in the United Kingdom for the Royal New Zealand Navy.

## INDIA

**NEW FRIGATE.**—The anti-aircraft frigate *Betwa* was launched at the Newcastle-on-Tyne shipyard of Vickers-Armstrongs (Shipbuilders) Ltd., on 15th September. Admiralty standard range diesel engines are being used for propulsion, with controllable-pitch propellers.

## PAKISTAN

**FLOTILLA COMMAND.**—Captain A. P. W. Northey, D.S.C., R.N., was on 29th May appointed on two years' loan service with the Pakistan Navy as Commodore Commanding Pakistan Flotilla, in the rank of Commodore.

## CEYLON

**MINESWEEPER TRANSFERRED.**—The R.N. minesweeper *Pickle* was on 6th April handed over to the Royal Ceylon Navy at Devonport and renamed the *Parakrama*.

## MALAYA

**INSHORE MINESWEEPERS.**—Two inshore minesweepers, R.N., were transferred to the Royal Malayan Navy at Singapore on 1st April, the *Altham* and *Asheldham*.

## NIGERIA

**NEW TITLE.**—At a ceremony in Portsmouth Dockyard on 21st July, the "Algerine" class ocean minesweeper *Hare* was transferred to the Nigerian Navy. During the ceremony it was announced that The Queen had approved of the title Royal Nigerian Navy being adopted by the Nigerian Naval Forces. As a gesture of friendship, the silver bell presented in 1940 by the Government and people of Nigeria to H.M. cruiser *Nigeria* was returned to the Colony with the transfer of the *Hare*, which has been renamed *Nigeria*.

**FOREIGN****GERMANY**

FRIGATES FROM R.N.—The former British frigates *Albrighton* and *Eggesford* were commissioned at Flensburg on 14th May for anti-submarine training and renamed *Raule* and *Brommy*. The frigate *Hart* was commissioned on 22nd May in Bremerhaven under the name of *Scheer*.

TRAINING BARQUE.—The new training barque *Gorch Fock* left Kiel at the beginning of August on her maiden voyage. She replaces the *Pamir*, which sank during a hurricane in the Atlantic in September, 1957.

**GREECE**

EXCHANGE OF VISITS.—H.H.M.S. *Ierax* visited Portsmouth between 20th and 24th July, with 115 cadets under training. About the same time ships of the British Mediterranean Fleet visited the Piraeus.

**ISRAEL**

FRIGATES SOLD TO CEYLON.—On 31st August Mr. Ben-Gurion announced that the Israel frigate *K.28* had sailed from Eilat through the Gulf of Akaba and had that morning crossed the Tiran Strait into the Red Sea. She had been sold to Ceylon, who had also purchased a second frigate from Israel. A torpedo boat was transported overland from Haifa to Eilat to replace the *K.28*.

**JAPAN**

NEW SUBMARINE.—The first submarine built in Japan since the war was launched on 25th May at Kobe. She is the 1,100-ton vessel *Oyashio*, and will be used as a target ship for anti-submarine exercises.

**MEXICO**

FISHERY PROTECTION.—It was announced on 4th June that Mexico is to obtain from Japan 14 patrol vessels to "protect her coasts from pirate fishers."

**PORTUGAL**

FRIGATES FROM R.N.—At Plymouth on 11th May the frigates *Burghead Bay* and *Bigbury Bay* were transferred to the Portuguese Navy and renamed *Alvares Cabral* and *Pacheco Pereira*. The Fourth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral N. A. Copeman, on behalf of the Admiralty, presented the ships' books to the Portuguese Ambassador, General Adolfo Abranches Pinto.

**RUSSIA**

SCRAPPING OF CRUISERS.—During his visit to the United States, Mr. Khruschev stated at San Francisco on 23rd September that the Russian Navy was scrapping 90 per cent. of its cruisers and concentrating instead on submarines, torpedo boats, and minesweepers.

**SPAIN**

SHIPS FROM U.S.N.—It was announced from Madrid on 1st June that Spain is to receive five more naval vessels from the United States, one destroyer and four minesweepers.

**TURKEY**

DESTROYERS FROM R.N.—The destroyers *Marne*, *Matchless*, *Meteor*, and *Milne*, purchased from Britain in 1957, were formally handed over at a ceremony in Portsmouth Dockyard on 29th June.

## UNITED STATES

**FIRST NUCLEAR CRUISER.**—The U.S.S. *Long Beach*, first nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, was launched on 14th July at Quincy, Massachusetts. She is 721 feet long and will displace 14,000 tons. Her two reactor power plants will give an endurance mobility far exceeding that of a conventional cruiser.

**NUCLEAR SUBMARINES.**—The *George Washington*, first of the nuclear type designed to fire ballistic missiles either from the surface or under water, was launched at Groton, Connecticut, on 9th June. She will have two complete crews of 10 officers and 90 men each, with a view to keeping her continuously employed. The *Patrick Henry*, the eleventh nuclear submarine and the second designed to carry the "Polaris" ballistic missile, was launched at Groton on 22nd September. The *Skipjack* arrived off Londonderry on 12th August and embarked a party of British observers, including the First Sea Lord, to witness a demonstration. She arrived at Portland on 14th August.

**MALTA BASE GIVEN UP.**—On 30th September the U.S. Navy completed the transfer of its base in Malta, set up in 1951, to Sicily. It has been closed except for an ordnance detachment of 11 men to supply stores for U.S. Navy aircraft.

## ARMY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, Honorary Colonel the London Scottish, the Gordon Highlanders, T.A., presented new Colours to the Regiment at the Duke of York's Headquarters, Chelsea, on 11th July.

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, on 15th October, unveiled at Powrie Brae the Memorial to the 4th and 5th Battalions, The Black Watch, of which Her Majesty is Colonel-in-Chief.

The Princess Margaret, Colonel-in-Chief, 15th/19th the King's Royal Hussars, presented the Guidon to the Regiment at Barnard Castle on 26th September.

The Duke of Gloucester inspected the 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards, at Tidworth on 15th July.

The Duke of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief, The 3rd Green Jackets, the Rifle Brigade, took the Salute at the Centenary Parade of the London Rifle Brigade Rangers at Armoury House, E.C., on 25th July.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments:—

**TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP (GENERAL) TO THE QUEEN.**—General Sir Geoffrey K. Bourne, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G. (14th August, 1959), vice General Sir Charles F. Loewen, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

**TO BE AIDES-DE CAMP TO THE QUEEN.**—Brigadier J. W. Wainwright, C.B.E. (16th July, 1959), vice Brigadier R. B. W. Betnell, D.S.O., retired; Brigadier D. A. K. W. Block, D.S.O., M.C. (24th August, 1959), vice Brigadier J. D. A. Lamont, D.S.O., M.B.E., retired; Brigadier E. R. Goode, C.B.E., B.Sc., M.I.Mech.E. (26th September, 1959), vice Brigadier F. K. Barnes, O.B.E., retired.

**TO BE HONORARY CHAPLAIN TO THE QUEEN.**—The Reverend J. Good, M.B.E., M.A., Chaplain to the Forces 1st Class, R.A.Ch.D. (29th June, 1959).

**COLONEL COMMANDANT.**—Of the Royal Army Service Corps, Major-General D. H. V. Buckle, C.B., C.B.E. (11th October, 1959), vice Major-General Sir H. Reginald Kerr, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., tenure expired.

**TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.**—Of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own), Major (Honorary Lieut.-Colonel) V. A. B. Dunkerly, D.S.O. (11th September, 1959), vice Major-General C. H. Miller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., tenure expired; of The Queen's Royal Surrey Regiment, on formation, Major-General J. F. Metcalfe, C.B.E. (14th October, 1959); of the King's Own Royal Border Regiment, on formation, Major-General V. Blomfield, C.B., D.S.O. (1st October, 1959); of The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment), Major-General C. A. R. Nevill, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (31st August, 1959), vice Major-General F. D. Rome, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.; of the 1st East Anglian Regiment (Royal Norfolk & Suffolk), on formation, Brigadier R. H. Maxwell, C.B. (29th August, 1959); of The Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry, on formation, Field-Marshal the Lord Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (6th October, 1959); of The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, Major-General D. E. B. Talbot, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (13th October, 1959), vice Lieut.-General Sir William Oliver, K.C.B., O.B.E., D.L.; of The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own), Colonel J. E. F. Willoughby, O.B.E. (1st August, 1959), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) G. C. Bucknall, C.B., M.C., D.L., tenure expired.

## ARMY COUNCIL

The Queen has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal bearing date the 14th day of August, 1959, to appoint the following to be Her Majesty's Army Council:—

Captain the Rt. Hon. A. C. J. Soames, C.B.E.—*President*.  
 Major the Hon. H. C. P. J. Fraser, M.B.E.—*Vice-President*.  
 General Sir Francis W. Festing, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.  
 General Sir Hugh C. Stockwell, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.  
 General Sir Cecil S. Sugden, K.C.B., C.B.E.  
 Lieut.-General Sir William H. Stratton, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O.  
 Lieut.-General Sir Harold E. Pyman, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.  
 Sir Edward W. Playfair, K.C.B.

## HONOURS AND AWARDS

CYPRUS.—The following was included in the list of awards published in the Supplement to The London Gazette of 10th July in recognition of distinguished service in Cyprus for the period ending 30th June, 1959:—

C.B.—Brigadier P. Gleadell, C.B.E., D.S.O.

## APPOINTMENTS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) G. R. D. Fitzpatrick, D.S.O., M.B.E., M.C., A.D.C., appointed Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, with the temporary rank of Major-General (October, 1959).

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General G. C. Hopkinson, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., appointed Director, Royal Armoured Corps (October, 1959).

Major-General W. F. R. Turner, C.B., D.S.O., appointed President, Regular Commissions Board (November, 1959).

Brigadier G. W. Duke, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director of Personal Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1959).

Major-General J. D'A. Anderson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director-General of Military Training, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (December, 1959).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Major-General R. B. F. K. Goldsmith, C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C., Catterick Area (October, 1959).

Brigadier P. Gleadell, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 44th Infantry Division, T.A., and Home Counties District, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1959).

Brigadier C. H. P. Harington, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C., 3rd Division and Salisbury Plain District, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1959).

Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Lathbury, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command (January, 1960).

Major-General G. C. Gordon-Lennox, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., appointed Commandant, R.M.A., Sandhurst (January, 1960).

Major-General F. H. Brooke, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief Army Instructor, Imperial Defence College (early 1960).

Major-General D. S. S. O'Connor, C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C., Aldershot District (February, 1960).

Brigadier G. H. Baker, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., M.C., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Southern Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (February, 1960).

Major-General W. G. Stirling, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Western Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (March, 1960).

Lieut.-General Sir Michael A. R. West, K.C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C. Northern Command (May, 1960).

GERMANY.—Brigadier I. H. F. Boyd, C.B.E., appointed Chief Engineer, Headquarters, Northern Army Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (October, 1959).

Brigadier D. S. Gordon, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 4th Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (12th October, 1959).

Brigadier A. Jolly, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 5th Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1959).

General Sir A. James H. Cassels, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed Commander, Northern Army Group and B.A.O.R. (January, 1960).

Brigadier E. A. W. Williams, C.B.E., M.C., appointed G.O.C., 2nd Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (February, 1960).

Lieut.-General C. P. Jones, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed G.O.C., 1st Corps (March, 1960).

MALTA.—Brigadier A. J. C. Block, D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed G.O.C., Troops (December, 1959).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General G. R. D. Musson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, General Headquarters (December, 1959).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Lieut.-General Sir Roderick McLeod, K.C.B., C.B.E., appointed Commander, British Forces, Hong Kong (May, 1960).

MALAYA.—Major-General Sir Rodney Moore, K.C.V.O., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C. of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Malaya, with the temporary rank of Lieutenant-General (October, 1959).

GHANA.—Brigadier H. T. Alexander, D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Chief of Defence Staff (January, 1960).

#### PROMOTIONS

LIEUT.-GENERALS.—Temporary Lieut.-General or Major-Generals to be Lieut.-Generals:—C. P. Jones, C.B., C.B.E., M.C. (1st January, 1959); G. S. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E. (1st June, 1959).

MAJOR-GENERALS.—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—C. M. F. Deakin, C.B.E. (1st May, 1959); C. E. Welby-Everard, O.B.E. (19th May, 1959); C. I. H. Dunbar, C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st June, 1959); the Lord Thurlow, C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st June, 1959); A. P. W. Hope, C.B.E. (12th June, 1959); N. L. Foster, D.S.O. (23rd June, 1959); H. M. Campbell, C.B.E., M.A. (23rd September, 1959).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—N. L. Foster, D.S.O. (13th June, 1959); H. M. Campbell, C.B.E., M.A. (26th August, 1959); W. R. G. Burns, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C. (1st September, 1959).

#### RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired.—Lieut.-General Sir Charles Coleman, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E. (27th July, 1959); Major-General C. R. Price, C.B., C.B.E., B.A., B.Sc. (19th September, 1959); Major-General Sir Owen Rooney, K.B.E., C.B. (23rd September, 1959); Major-General R. C. M. King, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (10th October, 1959); Major-General K. G. Exham, C.B., D.S.O. (11th October, 1959).

#### BATTLE HONOURS

The following are the twelfth and thirteenth lists of Battle Honours approved by The Queen for the 1939-45 War. The Battle Honours selected to be borne on Colours and Appointments are shown in bold print.

16TH/5TH THE QUEEN'S ROYAL LANCERS.—“Kasserine,” “Fondouk,” “Kairouan,” “Bordj,” “Djebel Kournine,” “Tunis,” “Gromballa,” “Bou Ficha,” “North Africa, 1942-43,” “Cassino II,” “Liri Valley,” “Monte Piccolo,” “Capture of Perugia,” “Arezzo,” “Advance to Florence,” “Argenta Gap,” “Traghetto,” “Italy, 1944-45.”

THE WORCESTERSHIRE REGIMENT.—“Defence of Escaut,” “St. Omer-La Bassée,” “Wormhoudt,” “Odon,” “Bourguebus Ridge,” “Maltot,” “Mont Pincon,” “Jurques,” “La Variniere,” “Noireau Crossing,” “Seine, 1944,” “Nederrijn,” “Geilenkirchen,” “Rhineland,” “Goch,” “Rhine,” “North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45,” “Gogni,” “Keren,” “Ambo Alagi,” “Barentu,” “Abyssinia, 1940-41,” “Gazala,” “Via Balbia,” “North Africa, 1941-42,” “Kohima,” “Relief of Kohima,” “Naga Village,” “Mao Songsang,” “Shwebo,” “Mandalay,” “Irrawaddy,” “Mt. Popa,” “Burma, 1944-45.”

THE KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS.—“Calais, 1940,” “Mont Pincon,” “Falaise,” “Roer,” “Rhineland,” “Cleve,” “Goch,” “Hochwald,” “Rhine,” “Dreirwalde,” “Aller,” “North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45,” “Egyptian Frontier, 1940,” “Sidi Barrani,” “Derna Aerodrome,” “Tobruk, 1941,” “Sidi Rezegh, 1941,” “Gazala,” “Bir Hacheim,” “Knightsbridge,” “Defence of Alamein Line,” “Ruweisat,” “Fuka Airfield,” “Alam el Halfa,” “El Alamein,” “Capture of Halfaya Pass,” “Nofilia,” “Tebaga Gap,” “Argoub el Megas,” “Tunis,” “North Africa, 1940-43,” “Sangro,” “Arezzo,” “Coriano,” “Lamone Crossing,” “Argenta Gap,” “Italy, 1943-45,” “Veve,” “Greece, 1941, '44-45,” “Crete,” “Middle East, 1941.”

QUEEN VICTORIA'S RIFLES, THE KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS, T.A.—“Calais, 1940,” “North-West Europe, 1940.”

THE QUEEN'S WESTMINSTERS, THE KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS, T.A.—“Mont Pincon,” “Roer,” “Rhineland,” “Cleve,” “Goch,” “Rhine,” “North-West Europe, 1944-45,” “El Alamein,” “North Africa, 1942,” “Italy, 1943-44,” “Athens,” “Greece, 1944-45.”

THE RANGERS, THE KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS (now the Rangers, The Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)), T.A.—“Gazala,” “Retma,” “Bir Hacheim,” “Defence of Alamein Line,” “Ruweisat,” “Fuka Airfield,” “North Africa, 1942,” “Veve,” “Proasteion,” “Greece, 1941,” “Crete,” “Canea,” “Retimo,” “Middle East, 1941.”

THE NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT (THE PRINCE OF WALES'S).—“Dyle,” “Defence of Escaut,” “Ypres-Comines Canal,” “Caen,” “Orne,” “Noyers,” “Mont Pincon,” “Brieux Bridgehead,” “North-West Europe, 1940, '44,” “Djebel Kesskiss,” “Medjez Plain,” “Gueriat el Atach Ridge,” “Gab Gab Gap,” “North Africa, 1943,” “Anzio,” “Carroceto,” “Rome,” “Advance to Tiber,” “Gothic Line,” “Marradi,” “Italy, 1944-45,” “Burma, 1943.”

LONDON IRISH RIFLES, THE ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES, T.A.—“Bou Arada,” “El Hadje,” “Stuka Farm,” “Heidous,” “North Africa, 1942-43,” “Lentini,” “Simeto Bridgehead,” “Adrano,” “Centuripe,” “Salso Crossing,” “Simeto Crossing,” “Malleto,” “Pursuit to Messina,” “Sicily, 1943,” “Termoli,” “Trigno,” “Sangro,” “Fossacesia,” “Teano,” “Monte Camino,” “Calabritto,” “Garigliano Crossing,” “Damiano,” “Anzio,” “Carroceto,” “Cassino II,” “Casa Sinagogga,” “Liri Valley,” “Trasimene Line,” “Sanfatuccio,” “Coriano,” “Croce,” “Senio Floodbank,” “Rimini Line,” “Ceriano Ridge,” “Monte Spaduro,” “Monte Grande,” “Valli di Comacchio,” “Argenta Gap,” “Italy, 1943-45.”

2ND KING EDWARD VII'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES (THE SIRMOOR RIFLES).—“El Alamein,” “Mareth,” “Akarit,” “Djebel el Meida,” “Enfidaville,” “Tunis,” “North Africa, 1942-43,” “Cassino I,” “Monastery Hill,” “Pian di Maggio,” “Gothic Line,” “Coriano,” “Poggio San Giovanni,” “Monte Reggiano,” “Italy, 1944-45,” “Greece, 1944-45,” “North Malaya,” “Jitra,” “Central Malaya,” “Kampar,” “Slim River,” “Johore,” “Singapore Island,” “Malaya, 1941-42,” “North Arakan,”

**" Irrawaddy," " Magwe," " Sittang, 1945," " Point 1433," " Arakan Beaches," " Myebon," " Tamandu," " Chindits, 1943," " Burma, 1943-45."**

**SPECIAL AIR SERVICE REGIMENT.—" North-West Europe, 1944-45," " Benghazi Raid," " Tobruk, 1941," " North Africa, 1940-43," " Landing in Sicily," " Sicily, 1943," " Termoli," " Valli di Comacchio," " Italy, 1943-45," " Greece, 1944-45," " Adriatic," " Middle East, 1943-44."**

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**25TH DRAGOONS.—" North Arakan," " Buthidaung," " Razabil," " Ngakye-dauk Pass," " Burma, 1944-45."**

**27TH LANCERS.—" Gothic Line," " Savio Bridgehead," " Capture of Ravenna," " Menate," " Filo," " Argenta Gap," " Bologna," " Gaiana Crossing," " Italy, 1944-45."**

**ROYAL TANK REGIMENT.—" Arras counter-attack," " Calais, 1940," " St. Omer-La Bassée," " Somme, 1940," " Odon," " Caen," " Bourguebus Ridge," " Mont Pincon," " Falaise," " Nederrijn," " Scheldt," " Venlo Pocket," " Rhineland," " Rhine," " Bremen," " North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," " Abyssinia, 1940," " Sidi Barrani," " Beda Fomm," " Sidi Suleiman," " Tobruk, 1941," " Sidi Rezegh, 1941," " Belhamed," " Gazala," " Cauldron," " Knightsbridge," " Defence of Alamein Line," " Alam el Halfa," " El Alamein," " Mareth," " Akarit," " Fondouk," " El Kourzia," " Medjez Plain," " Tunis," " North Africa, 1940-43," " Primrose Bridge," " Gerbini," " Adrano," " Sicily, 1943," " Sangro," " Salerno," " Volturno Crossing," " Garigliano Crossing," " Anzio," " Advance to Florence," " Gothic Line," " Coriano," " Lamone Crossing," " Rimini Line," " Argenta Gap," " Italy, 1943-45," " Greece, 1941," " Burma, 1942."**

**THE SOUTH WALES BORDERERS.—" Norway, 1940," " Normandy Landing," " Sully," " Caen," " Falaise," " Risle Crossing," " Le Havre," " Antwerp-Turnhout Canal," " Scheldt," " Zetten," " Arnhem, 1945," " North-West Europe, 1944-45," " Gazala," " North Africa, 1942," " North Arakan," " Mayu Tunnels," " Pinwe," " Shweili," " Myitson," " Burma, 1944-45."**

**THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT.—" Caen," " Noyers," " Falaise," " Arnhem, 1944," " North-West Europe, 1940, '44," " Sidi Barrani," " North Africa, 1940," " Landing in Sicily," " Sicily, 1943," " Italy, 1943," " Chindits, 1944," " Burma, 1944."**

**THE ROYAL IRISH FUSILIERS (PRINCESS VICTORIA'S).—" Withdrawal to Escout," " St. Omer-La Bassée," " Bou Arada," " Stuka Farm," " Oued Zarga," " Djebel Bel Mahdi," " Djebel Ang," " Djebel Tanngoucha," " Adrano," " Centuripe," " Salso Crossing," " Simeto Crossing," " Malleto," " Termoli," " Trigno," " Sangro," " Fossacesia," " Cassino II," " Liri Valley," " Trasimene Line," " Monte Spaduro," " Monte Grande," " Argenta Gap," " San Nicolo Canal," " Leros," " Malta, 1940."**

**23RD LONDON REGIMENT, T.A.—*Honorary Distinction*: A Badge of the Royal Tank Regiment with year-dates " 1941-45 " and three scrolls: " North-West Europe," " North Africa," " Italy."**

#### C.I.G.S.'s CONFERENCE

The annual C.I.G.S.'s exercise at the Staff College, Camberley, was not held this year owing to the Inter-Service conference at the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, which was attended by the Chiefs of Staff of Commonwealth countries (see General Service Notes).

Instead, the C.I.G.S. held a conference at the Duke of York's Headquarters, Chelsea, on 1st September for United Kingdom officers to deal with matters of Army policy only. The conference was attended by Commanders-in-Chief at Home and Overseas, Commanders of Regular and Territorial Divisions, and War Office Directors.

## DESIGNATION OF REGIMENTS

It was announced by the War Office on 20th August, that H.M. The Queen had approved a change in the title of the Regiment to be formed by the amalgamation of The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment and The Northamptonshire Regiment. In consequence, the title of the Regiment when formed will be: 2nd East Anglian Regiment (Duchess of Gloucester's Own Royal Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire).

## DIRECTORATE OF WORK STUDY

A new Directorate has been formed at the War Office to supervise the application of Work Study in the Army. Work Study, widely used by industry, has been practised in the Army—primarily in the 'Q' services—for some time, and this system of improving existing methods in an organization to achieve a saving in manpower, money, and materials is to be extended. An Army Work Study Group, consisting of trained military and civilian officers and warrant officers is being set up under control of the Director, and teams formed from it will be based on Commands at home and abroad to carry out local studies at the request of commanders.

## MOBILITY EXERCISES

**EXERCISE "BAR FROST."**—Six hundred parachute troops from the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group were successfully dropped 15 miles from Bardufoss airfield (northern Norway) on 25th September during exercise "Bar Frost," in which a combined British force attacked Bardufoss and Andoea airfields, held by Norwegian Units.

**EXERCISE "RED BANNER."**—In a five-day exercise on Salisbury Plain which commenced on 12th October, a brigade group of the strategic reserve was moved by R.A.F. Transport Command, two of its battalion groups being parachuted with their equipment and the third air-landed. The force was maintained wholly by helicopter and a few light aircraft. Troops taking part included 1,200 men of the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade and elements of the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. Helicopters were provided by the Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit and the U.S. Army, supplemented by civilian machines.

## RE-ORGANIZATION OF T.A. BRIGADES

To conform with the changes made last year in the composition of Regular Army Brigades the following changes in the composition of T.A. Brigades took effect from 1st August this year. There will be no changes in the titles or dress of the battalions concerned.

## 1. REDESIGNATIONS

	<i>Old Title</i>	<i>New Title</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
(a) The Yorkshire and Northumberland Brigade, T.A.	... ...	The Yorkshire Brigade, T.A.	Due to the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers being transferred to The Fusilier Brigade, T.A.
(b) The Midland Brigade, T.A....	... ...	The Forester Brigade, T.A.	To conform to the redesignation of the Regular Brigade.

## 2. FORMATION OF NEW BRIGADES

Formation of The Fusilier Brigade, T.A.

To conform to the Regular Brigade.

## 3. TRANSFER OF TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS OF REGIMENTS TO NEW BRIGADES

	<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Old Brigade</i>	<i>New Brigade</i>
(a) The Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regiment) ...	... ...	The Highland Brigade, T.A.	The Lowland Brigade, T.A.
(b) The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers ... ... ...	... ...	The Yorkshire and Northumberland Brigade, T.A.	The Fusilier Brigade, T.A.

(c) The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) ... ...	The Home Counties Brigade, T.A.	The Fusilier Brigade, T.A.
(d) The Lancashire Fusiliers ...	The Lancastrian Brigade, T.A.	The Fusilier Brigade, T.A.
(e) The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment ... ... ...	The Midland Brigade, T.A.	The East Anglian Brigade, T.A.
(f) The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry ...	The Light Infantry Brigade, T.A.	The Green Jackets Brigade, T.A.

#### UNIVERSITY AND SHORT SERVICE COMMISSIONS

It is now no longer necessary for a university graduate to go through the ranks before he can obtain a Regular commission in the Army. A new scheme makes it possible for him to apply direct to the War Office—or through his O.T.C. commander if he belongs to his university contingent—and appear before the Regular Commissions Board at Westbury. If the Board recommends him, and its decision is endorsed by the War Office Commissions Board, he is assured of a commission when he obtains his degree. There will be vacancies for both arts and science graduates. Candidates—who must be under 25—can apply at any time to the War Office (P.A.6b).

Another scheme with an appeal for university graduates—and school leavers—has got off to a good start this year. Since it was announced in January more than 900 inquiries, resulting by June in 230 firm applications, have been received for the three-year Short Service Commission which enables a man to become an officer without any service in the ranks except as an officer cadet. Candidates are accepted for commissions into the arm of their choice within the yearly quota of vacancies, but those for the cavalry and infantry are not promised a vacancy in any particular regiment.

#### SANDHURST SCHOLARSHIPS

The second competition for scholarships to the R.M.A., Sandhurst, was to have been held in July, but was postponed to September and October to avoid interference with other school examinations.

The first competition was held in March and April when 40 of the 152 candidates were selected by Command Boards to appear before the War Office Board which then awarded scholarships to 20 of them. The standard of the finalists was high. For the next competition, to avoid any danger of unequal standards, the same board covered every area of the country, but the final War Office Board was retained.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

**PRESENTATION OF GUIDON.**—Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer presented a new Guidon to the 17th/21st Lancers at Paderborn on 15th May.

**PRESENTATION OF PLAQUE.**—A bronze plaque was presented to the 1st Battalion, London Irish Rifles by the Worshipful Company of Founders at a ceremonial parade at St. Martin's Plain Camp, Shorncliffe, on 27th June, to mark the centenary of the Regiment.

**CORPORAL MISSILE FIRED.**—The first of a series of guided missiles to be fired by the Army from the guided weapon range in the Hebrides took place in June.

#### CANADA

**PRESENTATIONS OF COLOURS.**—The Queen presented new Colours to the following regiments of the Canadian Army during Her Majesty's tour in Canada last Summer —

The Royal 22nd Regiment, the Canadian Grenadier Guards, the 48th Highlanders, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada.

#### PAKISTAN

**CHIEF OF STAFF RETIRES.**—It was reported from Karachi on 4th October that Lieut.-General Habibullah Khan had retired on 30th September.

#### FOREIGN

##### FRANCE

**NEW CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF.**—It was announced from Paris on 9th September that General André Demetz had been appointed Army Chief of Staff in succession to General André Zeller, retiring.

## AIR NOTES

### H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments, from 15th September, 1959:—

His Majesty King Olav V, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., of Norway, to be Honorary Air Chief Marshal.

His Majesty King Frederik IX, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., of Denmark, to be Honorary Air Chief Marshal.

His Majesty King Gustav VI; Adolf, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., of Sweden, of the Goths and the Wends, to be Honorary Air Chief Marshal.

Group Officer A. Lowrey, R.R.C., is appointed Honorary Nursing Sister to The Queen in succession to Air Commandant Dame Alice Mary Williamson, D.B.E., R.R.C., Q.H.N.S., on the latter's retirement from the R.A.F., 1st September, 1959.

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### PROMOTIONS

Air Marshal The Earl of Bandon, K.B.E., C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., is promoted to the rank of Air Chief Marshal, 1st July, 1959.

### APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Commodore R. N. Bateson, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.D.C., as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operational Requirements), with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal, 21st September, 1959.

FIGHTER COMMAND.—Air Commodore C. H. Hartley, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., as Air Officer Commanding, No. 12 Group, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal; Air Commodore H. J. Maguire, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., as Air Officer Commanding, No. 13 Group, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal, 9th November, 1959.

TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal W. H. Kyle, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, with the acting rank of Air Marshal, 21st September, 1959; Air Vice-Marshal P. S. Blockey, C.B., C.B.E., B.A., M.I.Mech.E., as Senior Air Staff Officer, 24th August, 1959.

ARABIAN PENINSULA.—Air Vice-Marshal D. J. P. Lee, C.B., C.B.E., as Commander, Air Forces, 1st August, 1959.

R.A.F. COLLEGE, CRANWELL.—Mr. J. A. Boyes, M.A., as Director of Studies, in succession to Mr. Antony Constant, M.A.

### RETIREMENTS

Air Marshal Sir Gilbert Nicholetts, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., 1st July, 1959; Air Marshal Sir Bryan Reynolds, K.C.B., C.B.E., 13th July, 1959; Air Commodore H. J. Butler, C.B.E., 27th August, 1959.

### W.R.A.F.

SMALLER CHEVRONS FOR W.R.A.F.—In future non-commissioned officers in the Women's Royal Air Force will wear chevrons of smaller dimensions than those worn by members of the R.A.F. The chevrons will be two inches long compared with the former four inches.

### ORGANIZATION

NO. 103 SQUADRON.—A Royal Air Force helicopter squadron which has been operating in Cyprus for three years has been given a new number. Previously No. 284, it has become No. 103 Squadron as a result of the planned reduction of the size of the

Air Force, which makes it inevitable that some squadrons must be disbanded. Air Ministry policy is generally to retain those with longer histories, though other factors are taken into account. Squadrons with relatively short periods of service are therefore taking the numbers of older units.

**NO. 110 SQUADRON.**—Numbers 155 and 194 (Helicopter) Squadrons, which have been engaged in anti-terrorist operations in Malaya for the last five years, have been amalgamated at their base at Kuala Lumpur to form a new single squadron, No. 110.

**SCHOOLS AMALGAMATE.**—The Far East Air Force's Parachute School and Survival School have been amalgamated into one unit known as the Far East Survival and Parachute School. It is based at Changi, Singapore. Its jungle survival course, the only one of its kind in the world, has since February, 1956, trained over 1,000 Servicemen of the South East Asia Treaty Organization, Commonwealth Services, and the R.A.F.

#### PERSONNEL

**NEW TECHNICIANS.**—With the arrival of the Britannia and Lightning aircraft it has been found necessary to reorganize the training of certain technicians who will maintain the aircraft. In the past, with less complex aircraft, a man was trained to do only one job; now, however, certain airmen are being trained in all aspects of a complete system on a particular aircraft. They will be responsible for fault-finding and will supervise the servicing of the system. It is hoped these 'system' tradesmen with their overall knowledge of a large part of an aircraft's mechanism will speed-up servicing and cut down the length of time an aircraft needs to be on the ground.

#### TROPHIES AND AWARDS

**SASSOON CHALLENGE CUP.**—The Sassoon Challenge Cup aerial photography competition for 1959 was won by No. 79 Squadron of R.A.F. Gutersloh, Germany. No. 17 Squadron of Wildenrath was second and No. 2 Squadron of Jever was third.

**GOLD STANDARD AWARDS.**—Four aircraft apprentices and two boy entrants who have been training at R.A.F. technical training schools have been awarded the Gold Standard of the Duke of Edinburgh Scheme which was started in 1956 as an incentive to British boys to develop their characters. These are the first Gold Standard awards made to youths under training in the R.A.F.

**MARINE CRAFT TROPHY.**—The Marine Craft Squadron at Seletar, Singapore, which operates the largest fleet of R.A.F. vessels overseas, has been awarded the Far East Marine Craft Trophy for general efficiency for 1959. It is competed for by Marine Craft units of the Far East Air Force based on Singapore, Hong Kong, Gan (Maldive Islands), Penang, and Katunayake (Ceylon). This is the third time the Squadron have won the trophy; they previously held it in 1953 and 1954.

#### EXERCISES

**EXERCISE "MANDATE."**—Summing up Exercise "Mandate" held between 23rd and 25th July, the Air Ministry said that Fighter Command, with a higher interception rate than in previous exercises, was pleased with the result of this practice in bringing to battle mass formations as far as possible from the British coast. The Command also considered that it came well out of the self-imposed handicap of assuming that certain key radar stations and fighter airfields had been put out of action by hits from nuclear weapons, or by fall-out. The Air Ministry said that the 'enemy' sent 200 nuclear aircraft of nine different types in waves from the Orkneys to Dover, to impose maximum effort on the manned fighters and the Bloodhound ground-to-air missiles. The Bloodhound station at North Coates, Lincolnshire claimed to have 'destroyed' 16 of the 25 target aircraft which came within its range.

## MATERIEL

**LAST OF THE SUNDERLANDS.**—On 15th May, the last Sunderland flying-boats in the R.A.F. ceased operations. They belonged to a squadron of the Far East Air Force. Thus ended the career of the aircraft which has seen the longest period of squadron service—a few weeks short of 21 years—in the history of the R.A.F. It will also be the end of the flying-boat as a British Service class of aircraft after continuous service of 45 years—with the old Royal Naval Air Service from 1914 and with the Royal Air Force since its formation in 1918.

**"BRITANNIA" IN R.A.F. SERVICE.**—On 9th June the first of the R.A.F.'s Britannia 253 aircraft was delivered to No. 99 Squadron at Lyneham. The R.A.F. is to have 22 Britannias for trooping and freighting to replace the Hastings, which have been the R.A.F.'s main large transport planes since the war.

**NEW TRAINER.**—A new British designed and built supersonic jet aircraft, the Folland No. 144 Gnat Trainer, flew on its maiden flight on 1st September. The Gnat Trainer is a tandem 2-seat transonic version of the Gnat Mark I fighter, which is in service with the Indian and Finnish Air Forces, and it has the high power-to-weight ratio quality of the original fighter. Among the special features are a new wing of increased area and decreased thickness/chord ratio and a larger tail surface. It also has improved low-speed handling characteristics, while retaining the performance and manoeuvrability of the fighter.

## MISCELLANEOUS

**R.A.F. CLOTHING MUSEUM.**—Housed at No. 25 Maintenance Unit is a collection of Service uniforms dating back to the original Royal Flying Corps issue. Also in the museum are uniforms issued in 1912 to the Royal Engineers and Royal Naval Air Service, who later formed the nucleus of the Royal Flying Corps. Exhibits include W.R.A.F. uniforms of the war of 1914-1918.

**R.A.F. PHOTOGRAPHIC MUSEUM.**—The R.A.F. School of Photography, Wellesbourne Mountford, Warwickshire, now in its 43rd year, is forming a small historical section and museum in preparation for its silver jubilee in 1967, and is collecting photographic equipment, pictures, and memoirs concerning aerial photography in the early days and during both world wars.

**AIR HISTORY GROUP.**—The formation of an historical group was announced by the Royal Aeronautical Society on the 6th August. Its aim will be to collect, interpret, and preserve information and material. It will also initiate such historical researches as may be thought necessary and will co-ordinate and foster the interests of the many individuals, both inside and outside the society, who have undertaken work and research into the history of aeronautics.

## CANADA

**UNVEILING OF AIR FORCE MEMORIAL.**—On 1st July the Queen, in the presence of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Commonwealth High Commissioners, and Service chiefs, unveiled a memorial to 798 men and women of the British Commonwealth Air Forces who gave their lives in Canada, the United States, and neighbouring lands and waters while serving in the last war. Among those listed by name are 246 from the R.A.F., and some of the British relatives of those who gave their lives were present. The memorial is on Greè Island in a peaceful setting overlooking the falls where the Ottawa and Rideau rivers merge. Its central feature is a sculptured terrestrial bronze globe 10 feet in diameter, supported by three bronze beavers and surmounted by a bronze eagle with outspread wings.

**CANADA CHOOSES F-104 G.**—Canada will re-equip its eight Sabre jet fighter squadrons, committed to N.A.T.O., with United States Lockheed F-104 G fighters. This was announced by the Minister of Defence, Mr. George Pearkes, on 2nd July. He told the

Canadian House of Commons that negotiations were under way with Lockheed Corporation to have the airframes and J-79 engines of the 1,400 m.p.h. fighters built in Canada. It would be some two years before the new aircraft was in operational service.

**MISSILE TESTING SYSTEM.**—Air Force Headquarters announced in early July that the R.C.A.F. had developed one of the world's most efficient missile testing systems for use at the rocket range at Cold Lake, Alberta. The new missile range control and telemetering system is well in advance of any other known facility installed for a similar purpose. Hitherto information collected from guided missile flights takes months of editing and translation before it can be presented to development and engineering staffs. With the new system the same work is done in a matter of hours.

### AUSTRALIA

**FAR EAST AIR FORCE APPOINTMENT.**—Air Vice-Marshal C. D. Candy, C.B.E., Royal Australian Air Force, has been appointed Senior Air Staff Officer, Far East Air Force, with effect from 24th August, 1959.

**ROCKET EXPERIMENTS.**—Experiments have recently been made with two Australian designed and built exploratory rockets, which have been fired to heights of up to 100 miles. One of them, the Long Tom, had reached a speed of 4,000 miles an hour, and the other, the Aeolus, 3,000 miles an hour. The rockets, which carried up to 50 lb. of instruments, were able to measure micro-meteorite prevalence at high altitudes and wind patterns at heights of 40 miles.

**GUIDED MISSILES.**—The first of the R.A.A.F.'s Sidewinder air-to-air guided missiles have arrived from the United States. They will be used for a prototype installation to establish the technical procedures necessary before a start is made on fitting them to all the R.A.A.F.'s Sabre jets in Malaya. The Sidewinder missile was developed by the United States Navy. It is standard equipment in the U.S.N. and the U.S.A.F. It is nearly nine feet long, is powered by rockets, and has a high-explosive warhead.

**QUEENSLAND CELEBRATION.**—Aircraft from the Royal Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force are participating in the Queensland centenary celebrations, with visits to Brisbane and displays there and over other principal cities. The R.A.F. is represented by three Valiants of Bomber Command, supported by a Comet 2 and a Hastings of Transport Command. The detachment is being joined by a Britannia of No. 99 Squadron on a proving flight to Australia, and a Beverley from Far East Air Force. The R.C.A.F. is being represented by two Argus aircraft of Maritime Air Command which are making a month-long tour of Australia and New Zealand.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### GENERAL

**The Military and Industrial Revolutions of Our Time.** By Fritz Sternberg.  
(*Stevens and Sons, Ltd.*) 35s.

*The Economist*<sup>1</sup> has lately printed some papers by Professor W. W. Rostow on Growth, and in addition has made illuminating comment on them. Lest the reader should suppose that the bouquets in this review are being misdirected let me say at once that the main theme of this book both heralds and receives an additional conviction from the specific outline of Professor Rostow's views.

First published in Germany, it is in two parts. The first and shorter deals with the military revolution which is obvious and familiar ground; and it is in describing the effects of the second industrial revolution and underlining the link between the military and industrial needs that this book makes its greatest impact. Mr. Sternberg deals with this highly complex subject with admirable skill, only succumbing to his own facility in his Epilogue where he outlines some controversial issues.

We are witnessing the decline of Europe as the sole focus of power and the inspiration of human endeavour on the globe. The vast source of energy and power discovered by military necessity has engineered this change and is going to determine the character of social life in the future. Nuclear parity demands industrial parity and both together necessitate a re-orientation of our ideas about war and the basis of social organization.

Automation has made the use of atomic energy possible but in itself it will have a variety of effects not entirely beneficial. However, preparation for the advent of automation, and the race for industrial supremacy which it implies, emphasizes the extent of the new responsibility of the State. The rise of State responsibility throughout the 19th Century culminates today when the democracies are compelled to control the primary industries in one way or another. In the Soviet Union where State control is universal there is an interesting dilemma. If Russia continues to depress her producers, with regard to consumer goods and improved standards of living, even though in the interests of increased production, her relative increase in productive capacity will diminish. Yet if she relaxes the man-hours and improves standards generally her productive capacity will also diminish. Her production thus seems subject to a law of diminishing returns. Automation should gradually lift this burden which at present must be specially irksome since the democracies have already gone some way towards the complete abolition of poverty.

The tendency to measure trends and development in terms of relative percentage does not give an adequate idea of what has in fact taken place. Nevertheless it is all fairly evident in what we can see around us. For those at home the change is in the social structure, in industry, and in the social organisms generally. Those abroad are aware that, in what are known as under-developed countries, the time-lag between the development of industrial power and the take-off of these countries as industrial powers will be very much shorter than was the same phase in each of the Western countries.

While he appreciates that all this is going to create social organisms quite different from those of the democracies, Mr. Sternberg in one notable instance does not follow his own lead. The ratio of families working in agriculture at the beginning of the first industrial revolution was four to one in the urban areas whereas today the figures are practically reversed. The second industrial revolution is going to take effect without radically altering the immense rural populations of the world. Now, it should be remembered that the first industrial revolution was not simply a shifting of the population from the rural to the urban areas: it was a fructifying period of ideas as well.

It was this change of thinking which over the period compelled governments to introduce social legislation in their own interest as well as that of the people. When the

<sup>1</sup> 14th and 22nd August, 1959.

new industrial revolution takes place in the under-developed countries it is likely to raise standards without changing ideas very much; and certainly not political concepts, at least not initially. Continued peace and community of interest must surely depend on the progressive development of ideas.

The importance of this book lies in its political and economic sagacity rather than any evidence of military acumen, but it is well to note how far the former underlies the latter. Mr. Sternberg thus makes many wise observations on the under-developed areas and the need for a new political and strategic consciousness. The isolationism which characterized the United States, and to some extent the United Kingdom, and even European indifference, no longer has any justification. World history, he says, has only now begun in a completely world sense. Unless we ourselves and our leaders take the trouble to examine these problems with a new determination, world history might well be appallingly short and unimpressive.

**Arms and the State.** By Walter Millis with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein. (*The Twentieth Century Fund, New York.*) \$5.

The United States emerged from the first World War with one aim, a rapid return to normal after so disturbing and unpleasant an excursion into European politics—return to a normal state of affairs, where each department of government looked after its own particular business, where the State Department guided foreign policy and left the Army and Navy to their own limited tasks which hardly extended beyond defence of the Panama Canal and maintenance of a small garrison in the Philippines. Any thought of co-ordination or joint planning in the spheres of foreign policy, economics, and defence was but a small cloud on the horizon. Hitler and Japan were to alter all this.

In little more than 20 years the United States has had to evolve a machinery for formulating and implicating politico-military policy suited to the strains and stresses of war, and that uneasy peace which is designated cold war.

The authors have aimed to provide an historical survey of United States civil-military relations from 1930. In doing so they have furnished a record of the evolution of governmental machinery designed to meet conditions as they have changed under the varying circumstances of war, limited war (e.g. Korea), and the nuclear arms race. The record is marked by the multifarious government agencies and boards which have passed across the Washington scene. From the kaleidoscopic pattern two organizations emerge more or less unscathed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) and the National Security Council (N.S.C.). The J.C.S.—fashioned on the British pattern—was Roosevelt's right hand during the second World War, and still today, under the Secretary of Defence, forms the principal machinery for formulating defence policy and for executive military action once such policy has received the Presidential approval. N.S.C. on the other hand was set up after the war with the prime object of bringing "the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence into a regular working relationship." Under the Truman régime N.S.C. was largely ineffective, but since Eisenhower entered the White House it has blossomed, until today it is the "chief arm for policy formulation in the areas of defence, international affairs, and internal security."

Under the U.S. system of administration senior officers of the Services are brought into more frequent and closer contact with politicians—mainly through the system of Congressional Committees—than is the case in Britain. It is not, therefore, surprising that the tendency for top-ranking officers to 'dabble' in politics is marked, and seldom more so than in the immediate post-war years. This tendency probably reached its apogee in the Truman-MacArthur struggle which ended in the latter's dismissal and relegation to big business. It appears to have been finally scotched when Eisenhower became President. The whole subject is adequately covered by the authors in Part II. One is tempted to speculate as to what will happen under Eisenhower's successor. Will this tendency reappear? Here the reader is left to gaze into his own crystal ball. As a factual record of the American policy-making machinery this volume is to be recommended.

**The Failure of Atomic Strategy.** By Lieut.-Colonel F. O. Miksche. (Faber and Faber.) 25s.

Colonel Miksche despises the technological mania of the West, which he blames for having led us up the dead-end of atomic strategy, and his latest book is one long cry for economy of methods and for simplicity in weapons and organization. "To defend Europe with atomic weapons," he writes, "would be equivalent to destroying our civilization—it would in fact mean the end of what we are defending." And undoubtedly we have come to rely too much on the military technician, just as we have forgotten—if we ever knew—that revolts and guerrilla fighting are "the cheapest kind of offensive warfare." It is one of the paradoxes of our age that the development of A.B.C. weapons has only heightened the importance of the tough, well-trained fighting man.

Rather than by atomic weapons, European security, Colonel Miksche suggests, can best be assured by a fortified zone along the iron curtain, manned by some "50-60 simply equipped infantry divisions" and backed by three armoured corps for mobile intervention. One need not agree with this conclusion, nor indeed with all of the author's arguments—the historical and political reasoning in particular seems open to question—but Colonel Miksche's writing always stimulates, and it is a marvellous touchstone on which to test one's own ideas on Western defence.

**The Campaigns of Wavell.** By Robert Woolcombe. (Cassell.) 21s.

Military history is no longer a closed shop. There has been a number of excellent books, published in the past few years, by writers of very diverse background and outlook, none of whom would, in any sense, describe themselves as experts: Majdalany's *Cassino* is one example, Peter Fleming's *Invasion, 1940*, is another. Mr. Robert Woolcombe ranges himself in this category with his second book, *The Campaigns of Wavell, 1939-1943*.

## B·A·T·S·F·O·R·D



## SERIES

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### The Capture of Quebec

CHRISTOPHER LLOYD

'A vivid and scholarly addition to recent Wolfe studies.'—THE TIMES.

'A little masterpiece of the military historian's art.'—THE OBSERVER.

35 illustrations. 21s.

This is not a text-book for the professional. It is unpretentious, intelligent, sensitive, and most agreeably written. Mr. Woolcombe had access to none but the published records, which amount nowadays, it must be admitted, to a pretty formidable array. He has followed Wavell's career as a Commander-in-Chief from the first Desert campaign at the end of 1940 to the dismal little Arakan episode and Wingate's first Chindit expedition into Burma early in 1943. Wavell's total of campaigns in those years was 14. He was always, as he himself once observed, at the end of the supply line in both men and materials. His Western Desert victory of 1940-41 was of a classic quality. Thereafter the burdens laid on him became heavier and heavier, the expectations larger and more urgent: East Africa, Greece, Iraq, Crete, Syria. When he was relieved of his Middle Eastern command in July, 1941, he was sent to India because the Prime Minister mistakenly believed that there he could 'sit under the pagoda tree' and rest. Within a few months he was carrying the heavy British share of the catastrophe in the Far East. When they gave him the fantastic command called A.B.D.A. they omitted to give him an aircraft to be able to move about in it.

Mr. Woolcombe records Wavell's victories and reverses, as seen on the operational and tactical plane, with competence, composure, and good manners. He shows that he has a considerable insight into Wavell's complex, many-sided, and deeply lovable character. He hardly attempts, however, to assess him by one of the standards which Wavell himself laid down for admittance to the 'sixth form' of generalship, his power to deal tactfully with his Government and his allies. About this there is still a good deal to be said. And there is one other aspect of Wavell to which Mr. Woolcombe, for all his quiet skill and understanding, does not do full justice—his humour. Many of the notes in *Other Men's Flowers*—and goodness knows they were written in a hard, bleak time, when there was little to be hilarious about—bubble over with fun and zest. More than once Mr. Woolcombe uses the adjective 'Arthurian' about Wavell. This is just and perceptive. With a civilization and an empire dissolving around him, Wavell stood out, brave, talented, farsighted, and chivalrous, striving with all his strength to prevent the onrush of barbarism and ruin. It happened that not long before I read Mr. Woolcombe's book I had been brooding over Mr. T. H. White's extraordinary book about Arthur, *The Once and Future King*, so much of which might be a portrait of Wavell himself; but Mr. White gives his Arthur a considerable fund of laughter.

This omission apart, Mr. Woolcombe's book can be well recommended as a clear and well-rounded portrait of one of the greatest soldiers this country has ever bred.

**The Capture of Quebec.** By Christopher Lloyd. (Batsford.) 21s.  
**Trafalgar.** By Oliver Warner. (Batsford.) 21s.

It is always a pleasure to encounter a publishing enterprise that combines imaginative approach to the choice of material with a high standard in the matter of its presentation. It has evidently occurred to Messrs. Batsford that to offer a "true, full, and particular" account of certain peak events in Britain's tremendous military chronicle might very well serve to stimulate interest in the tentative student of history and encourage wider reading and more extended study. If that has been the aim by which this enterprise has been inspired, then the appearance of these two most attractive volumes should help materially towards its realization.

One of the primary difficulties confronting the authority setting out to write an account of the set piece encounter-battle, such as Trafalgar or the Plains of Abraham victory, is to determine just how much historical background is needful to put the reader unversed in the period well and truly in the picture. This is a task that both Mr. Warner and Mr. Lloyd can be said to have tackled with exceptional competence and fidelity.

It is possible to query the adequacy of Mr. Lloyd's assertion that, "the conflict on the North American continent was between a society belonging to the past and a society with a future; between a feudal, almost theocratic colony and a number of settlements in

which democratic institutions were beginning to emerge." So far as it goes, that is true enough. But as a summary it ignores the important consideration that whereas the riparian community centred on Quebec and the St. Lawrence was under central control and direction, the New England Provinces were united in nothing but their detestation of their French-Canadian neighbours. It called for the integration and unification of design characterizing Amherst's campaign to furnish the co-operation and drive so notably absent from the spasmodic, unco-ordinated activities that represented the Colonists' military effort in the earlier 'Queen Anne's War.'

Possibly Mr. Warner's task of exposition was the less demanding of the two. At any rate he leaves us in no doubt as to Napoleon's bleak ineptitude as a naval planner. Surely no man, trying to grapple with the problems of oceanic strategy in the days of sail, was more hopelessly 'at sea' than the little Corsican. March tables mean so very little to wind and waves. Furthermore, the Gallic Navy had never recovered from the imbecile excesses characterizing the early days of the revolution, when the cream of the officers' corps had been mercilessly done away with in the sacred name of egalitarianism. Britain's 'first line of defence,' on the other hand, had never been in better fighting trim or better commanded.

Both authors have filled out their respective narratives from secondary sources that add considerable value to the overall picture. The reaction to Collingwood's despatch on the part of the British prisoners at Verdun is a very happy touch; although it arouses a longing to learn what the French P.O.W. at Norman Cross, Coxheath, and other internment centres made of the news when they enquired the meaning of the 'victory' bonfires blazing into the heavens, despite the protests of those mourning the little Admiral's death.

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But surely it is scarcely just to attribute operational control of Nelson's armada to the First Lord? The semaphore signal stations stopped at the coast, and—mercifully—communication by wireless had not come into being to interfere with the decisions arrived at by the man on the spot.

Wolfe, of course, was another man who was spared the embarrassment of 'inspired' remote control. And if the support accorded him by his brigadiers left a good deal to be desired—especially in the case of the acidulated Townshend—in Admiral Saunders he found a tower of strength, and eke a resourcefulness to which a very large share of the general success was due.

Both Nelson and Wolfe fell in the hour of victory. Had they survived, it is interesting to speculate as to the standing they would have achieved respectively had their talents been put to the test of further combat. It is impossible to repress the thought that Nelson's was the more durable genius.

It is understood that these two volumes introduce a series in which the Armada fight, the battles of the Civil War, Waterloo, and, possibly, the Somme offensive will be dealt with on similar lines. If the publishers can maintain the high standard of authorship and presentation distinguishing the two works under review, the subsequent volumes—like the present pair—can be assured of a very warm welcome, especially at a price so commendably restrained.

**An Atlas of World Affairs. Second Edition, 1959.** By Andrew Boyd. (Methuen.) 6s.

The first edition of Mr. Boyd's atlas came in 1957 and rapidly proved its value with many students of current affairs. The new edition is welcome. Though much of the old one remained valid, it has been found necessary to rewrite several sections and to introduce new ones. The number of maps, 70, remains the same. There are new sections on sputniks, rockets, and tests, on African Acceleration, and there is much new matter on the Middle East, on disengagement, convertibility, and the twelve-mile limit.

Not the least among improvements is that the price has been reduced from 15s. to 6s. It is essentially a book to buy and keep handy, and the new price makes this possible.

#### NAVAL

**The Law and the Custom of the Sea.** (Third Edition.) By H. A. Smith. (Stevens and Sons.) 21s.

To the title of this book might be added 'in peace and war.' With equal justice it may be said that there is no subject appertaining to their profession of which most naval officers know so little, although captains of H.M. ships may at any time, often with little warning, be faced with the need to apply it. Was the captain of H.M.S. *London*, for example, sent to protect British lives and property during the revolution in Madeira in 1931, entitled to concentrate the British colony in a hotel and proclaim it a neutral zone?

International law may be included in the training of officers of the Supply Branch, but how often are they consulted on it? Before the last war it was in the curriculum of the Naval Staff College and the Senior Officers' War Course. Perhaps it still is in the former, but when the reviewer attended the latter four years ago it was not mentioned. More surprising, perhaps, the Admiralty has issued no official publication on the subject except for the *Manual of Prize Law* of 1866, revised in 1888 and then suppressed. Is the reason for this, now, the ease with which a captain can seek guidance by radio from the Admiralty? The U.S. Navy has its *Law of Naval Warfare*, issued in 1955.

Be this as it may, the Professor Emeritus of International Law in the University of London, who used to lecture at Greenwich, rectified this omission in 1947 with the first edition of this book. The need for a second (revised) edition so soon as 1950 and, now, for yet a third edition (further revised), is evidence of its success. It can be described as

a text-book, but this does not mean that it is dry. Because it frequently cites history, and because it has been written for naval officers and not for lawyers, it is far from dull.

All aspects of International Law affecting warships, merchant ships, and aircraft operating over the sea are dealt with. The rights of ships and their crews in foreign ports, territorial waters, blockade, contraband, reprisals, neutral waters, and piracy are a few of the subjects covered. So, too, are internal waters (e.g. the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles, etc.), hot pursuit, the slave trade, privateers, ruses of war, minefields, armed merchant ships, capture, and seizure. There is an important chapter on war crimes with special reference to the responsibility of the individual and the defence of superior orders. The Declaration of London, though never ratified, is rightly dealt with in detail. Added to this edition is a section on the 1951 decision of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, and an appendix giving the text of the Conventions presented to the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

One criticism ; the few direct references to articles in Q.R. & A.I. have not been amended to accord with the current edition, issued in 1953. Nonetheless, this is a useful book for which the Royal Navy is in debt to its distinguished author. It should be studied by all naval officers who aspire to command, and be available for reference on board every H.M. ship.

**Admirals in Collision.** By Richard Hough. (*Hamish Hamilton.*) 18s.

Mr. Richard Hough, whose first book on the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese war made something of a sensation, has chosen the largely forgotten episode of the *Victoria* and *Camperdown* as the subject of his second. It may be remembered that during manoeuvres in the Mediterranean in 1803 the fleet flagship, with the Commander-in-Chief on board, was rammed by the *Camperdown* during the course of an 'impossible' manoeuvre and sank within a few minutes with heavy loss of life. The accident caused a considerable stir in England at the time, since it called into question the design of British battleships and a suspicion that they were all equally as vulnerable as the *Victoria*.

Mr. Hough, who is obviously a writer to follow, has treated this subject with all the skill which he showed in his earlier book. He has the knack of recreating all the excitement and drama of that 66-year-old tragedy and takes the reader through the subsequent court-martial, making it come to life again with the drama of the ebb and flow of evidence. This is a most readable book, and if occasionally Mr. Hough flounders among the technicalities of warship construction and manoeuvre, he can be readily forgiven for the pleasure he gives in his accurate and dramatic reconstruction of a naval *cause célèbre*.

**ARMY**

**Unofficial History.** By Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (*Cassell.*) 21s.

In years to come someone will probably be commissioned to write the life of Sir William Slim and two formidable and expensive volumes will appear, the bulk of which will cover the Burma campaign. How fortunate for the writer to have *Defeat into Victory* at hand and, still more, to have this new volume, *Unofficial History*, for earlier material. The Field-Marshal here tells us nine tales of his military life, three of the 1914-18 War, two of the inter-war period, and four of the late conflict up to the time he left the Middle East. 'Tales' is perhaps the right word. They are not, he says, "photographs taken through the lens of a camera, completely accurate and untouched by emotion. They are instead the more individual and freer canvases of a man trying to paint things seen, felt, and remembered. . . ."

Each chapter is headed by a few dry lines from an official history or communiqué. These highlight the humanity, humour, and perception of the stories which follow. The temptation to quote is irresistible. Here are two extracts from countless which could have been chosen. The first is of a small action in Mesopotamia : "As I followed our advance I could not help feeling that there was a lack of smartness about it. If you have

ever tried to peel an orange and at the same time carry a loaded rifle with a fixed bayonet at the ready, you will understand what I mean." The second is from an incident nearly 25 years later: "At a signal the men climbed aboard the trucks in a disciplined silence I approved of, and in another moment the small advance-guard of the column moved off. . . . Nothing looks as uniform as a Gurkha battalion, nothing looks more workmanlike, and few things look so formidable."

To combine a light touch for the beastliness of war with the professional expertise of a practised commander is art indeed. If this is not a serious contribution to military history it is an unforgettable glimpse into the mind of a great soldier.

**The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945.** By Colonel H. C. B. Rogers. (Seeley, Service and Co.) 42s.

Colonel Rogers's book consists of a great many excerpts from contemporary accounts of the mounted soldier in peace and war between the 12th and 20th centuries, linked by an agreeable though not always accurate commentary, e.g. the cloth bag of the original busby was probably *not* intended to protect the neck against sabre cuts (p. 161); the Royal Staff Corps was not formed during the Peninsular Campaign but in 1800 (p. 175). Pictures, quotations from diaries, letters, and manuals are well chosen to illustrate both the characteristic and the changing conditions of the trooper's life in stables, barracks, and in the field; though the sources are not always clearly enough identified and there is neither a bibliography nor an index. But then this work—which devotes more pages to the mail coaches in Wellington's day or to the length of horses' tails than to tactics—is obviously not intended for the student of military affairs. Anyone looking for anecdotes or pleasant and sometimes instructive vignettes of the mounted services will, however, not be disappointed.

**In Every War but One.** By Eugene Kinhead. (W. W. Norton and Coy., N.Y.) \$3.95.

During and after the Korean War unpleasant stories were told about the conditions in Chinese prison camps. An investigation was carried out by the American military authorities, and the truth proved even more unpleasant but for unexpected reasons.

Between June and November, 1950, when the Chinese Communists entered the war, 1,036 American prisoners were shot by North Koreans. For reasons of policy, however, the Chinese Communists rarely used physical torture except on the relatively small group of Air Force prisoners. This is surprising in view of the fact that 2,730 of the 7,190 American prisoners (38 per cent.) died in captivity. Investigation showed that this was not in the main due to the brutality of the captors but to the ignorance and callousness of the prisoners themselves. There were examples of American prisoners refusing to care for sick and injured comrades, and even of ill-treating them. Many could not adapt to primitive surroundings, and actually lost the will to live. About one-third of the American prisoners were guilty of some sort of collaboration with the enemy; not one escaped; and 21 Americans remained with the enemy after the armistice.

The Communists aimed at breaking down group loyalty and favoured the establishment of an informer system. Prisoners were encouraged to criticize themselves and others. The resisters included two main groups; first, mature, well-integrated individuals; and secondly, those unwilling to submit to authority who often had bad army records. It is of interest that as soon as a prisoner was found to be resistant to indoctrination, the Communists did not trouble him further. Once a man yielded, however, even in a small way, he was never his own master again. Lying or deception was inadvisable since, under Communist disciplinary code, lying is punishable by death.

The American authorities did not make any attempt to excuse the behaviour of prisoners, although an Assistant Secretary of the Army admitted to the author that it was the first time in the history of the Army that the enemy had carried the war into the prison camps. The misconduct was mainly attributed to bad discipline, but a doctor who had himself been a captive observed that soldiers had not been warned about what they might expect if they were captured.

The indiscipline can in some way be explained by the fact that two-thirds of the Army prisoners (3,759) were captured in the first chaotic six months of the war. One understands that during this period partly trained units, often from the base and communications zone, were thrown into the battle. In contrast, the highly trained and disciplined American Marines lost fewer prisoners, of whom only 13 per cent. died in prison. The Turkish contingent had the best record, but again, this was presumably a highly selected force.

The author has welded the official records into a valuable account of the Communist approach to prisoners. There is, of course, no, guarantee that a similar approach will be used in the future. At present troops are told that they must give only number, name and rank if they are captured. The moral of this book is that in future they must be warned of the dangers they face in captivity.

**Robert Rogers of the Rangers.** By John R. Cuneo. (*Oxford University Press.*) 38s.

In the world of the theatre it is not unknown for some vivid, well-played, small part virtually to steal the show from the principals. History has been known to countenance a similar phenomenon; but rarely more flagrantly than between the years 1755 and 1763. For rivalling Amherst, Wolfe, the brilliant George Augustus Howe, and John Forbes for attention were such 'small part players' as John Stark, Israel Putnam, and, above all, Robert Rogers, the subject of this engaging biography.

Rogers was born on the turbulent Massachusetts frontier in 1731, the son of Ulster Scottish immigrants, and already at the age of 14 was playing his part in the interminable French-Indian wars that kept the borderlands in perpetual ferment. By 1756 his fame as a scout had reached as far as ministerial circles in London. In days when Wolfe could brusquely dismiss the Provincial troops as "the dirtiest, most contemptible dogs you can conceive," this was a very considerable achievement. It was, indeed, clear proof of Rogers's outstanding quality as a leader of Colonial irregulars, whose innate skill in 'bushwacking' called only for discipline and control to render them ideal troops for work as remote from the formalized warfare of the European battlefields as well could be imagined.

So long as Amherst was in command, Rogers could rely on appreciative and sympathetic support. In the final advance that ended in Montreal's capture the Ranger rendered service whose value was only exceeded by his subsequent exertions in rounding up the French garrisons and pacifying the restless Indian tribes of the far West.

Unhappily for Rogers's fortunes in 1763, Amherst was replaced by General Thomas Gage, a crony of the jealous Superintendent of the Northern Indians, Sir William Johnson, and therefore anything but a friend to the Ranger.

Advances to his men, ransom for prisoners, and lavish presents for the Indians had plunged Rogers deeply into debt. But he was far more at home in the trackless wilderness than amidst the tangled thickets of government accountancy. Consistently stonewalled by Gage and Johnson, he repaired to London. There he could obtain little money from a well-nigh bankrupt Treasury but secured the command of the lonely outpost of Michilimackinac. But an appointment that appeared to hold salvation actually led to his downfall. Gage and Johnson pursued their vendetta until it culminated in a trumped-up charge that Rogers had held traitorous communication with the Gallic enemy. At worst he could be accused of the venial practice of indulging in private trade while still in official employ—an activity too common to the times to rank as anything out of the ordinary. Although the verdict of the court-martial was not guilty, Rogers was a ruined man; and the rest of his story is but a sorry declension, scarcely relieved by his fitful appearance as a partisan leader during the War of Independence.

Mr. Cuneo has ransacked every conceivable source to authenticate his narrative, which is written clearly, forcefully, and with rare understanding. He is to be warmly congratulated on so skilfully retrieving an intriguing 'small part' from the virtual obscurity in which it had hitherto been shrouded.

**The History of Coast Artillery in the British Army.** By Colonel K. W. Maurice-Jones, D.S.O. (*Royal Artillery Institution*.)

Within the limits of time and space imposed upon him, Colonel Maurice-Jones has done an astonishingly good job. Based on a great deal of research, he has written an account of the progress of Coast Artillery since its origin in the time of King Henry VIII, dividing it into periods corresponding to our great naval wars and the periods of military recession between them. For each of these periods he gives information about our naval bases and defended ports, the forts protecting them, their armament, their systems of fire control, how the men were found to man the guns, and how the equipment was cared for—or too often left uncared for. He gives an account of the financial problems involved and of the parsimony of the Board of Ordnance, who often failed to provide not only for the proper upkeep of the works, armament, and equipment but even for the clothing and pay of the gunners. He shows the difficulties of dual control—by the War Office over the military policy concerning the ports and by the Board of Ordnance over their artillery defences—up to the time of the absorption of the Board by the War Office in 1855.

The most interesting parts of the book are the accounts of various actions in which the Coast Artillery took part, from the successful defence of Gibraltar to the tragedies of Hong Kong and Singapore. Included in these are many small actions in remote parts of the world, which, besides being of great interest in themselves, well exemplify some of the problems of a maritime power. From these examples the author deduces two important lessons, which indeed emerge from the history of sea power: the need for security for ships in harbour while resting and refitting and the danger of the assumption that a fortress is secure when its front door is well defended even if its back door is unguarded. The whole book points to two lessons of importance today: the value of an adequate deterrent, which Coast Artillery has been in its own sphere, and the ease with which the lessons of history are forgotten.

As is said in the foreword, this is a book for both military and civilian readers. For the historian it contains a large number of facts relating to a special branch of military history. For the artillerist it provides a most interesting history of one branch of his art. For the general reader it gives a fascinating epitome of one aspect of this country's maritime warfare over some 400 years, including a number of little-known episodes. It has a good index, a useful bibliography, and is well equipped with maps. Colonel Maurice-Jones has produced a most readable book, a valuable record, and a worthy memorial of our Coast Artillery.

**Proud Heritage : The Story of The Highland Light Infantry. Volume 2.** By Lieut.-Colonel L. B. Oatts. (*Nelson*.) 42s.

In the February, 1959, number this reviewer noticed Volume 1 in this series, dealing with the story of the 71st from 1777 to 1881. This volume tells of the 74th Highlanders from 1787 until they were amalgamated with the 71st in 1882 to form The Highland Light Infantry.

Lieut.-Colonel Oatts had plenty of material to work on—campaigns and battles in India, the Peninsular War, native wars in South Africa, the loss of the *Birkenhead*, and the Egyptian Campaign—including the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. He has dealt admirably with this wide variety of activities and illustrated the text with adequate maps. As with Volume 1, the opening chapter makes an excellent introduction to the detailed story which follows, and throughout the book the author has been at pains to include a proper proportion of background.

The present generation are mostly unfamiliar with Wellesley's early military career in India. Here they will find first-rate accounts of the Indian wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, including a particularly good description of the Battle of Assaye. Similarly the Egyptian campaign of 1882 and the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir which have been

generally neglected by military historians. Chapters XXX and XXXI give a good summary of the events leading up to the war in Egypt, followed by an excellent account of the operations.

The price of 42s. at first seems high, but the book consists of nearly 400 pages of text and, taking into consideration the four coloured and one black and white plate and eight maps, the book is good value for money. An unusual feature is a coloured chart illustrating the various places where the 74th fought between 1787 and 1881. It is a book which should be in the possession of all past and present members of, and all who are associated with, this famous Scottish Regiment.

"... the story of hard fighting and gallantry all over the world . . ." are the words used in the foreword by the Colonel of the Regiment, Major-General R. Bramwell Davis, to describe this book. It is to be hoped that Lieut.-Colonel Oatts will not stop at Volume 2, but will complete the series with the proud story of the Highland Light Infantry in the two World Wars.

**The Indian Engineers, 1939-47.** By Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.S.O., M.C., R.E. (*The Institution of Military Engineers, Kirkee, India.*)

Colonel Sandes has unrivalled qualifications for being the historian of the Indian Engineers of the second World War period and its immediate aftermath. He has already written a two-volume work, *The Military Engineer in India*, and a history of the Indian Sappers and Miners, the title under which so many of us knew this fine Corps. The present volume is a sequel.

Two problems faced the author, first to give a coherent account of the work of the many units of the Indian Engineers actually at war and, secondly, to record the enormous development of the Corps, both in size and in scope of duties, a growth quite unprecedented and giving rise to problems never before tackled. The motto of the I.E. is "Sarvatra," the equivalent of "Ubique" of the R.E., a fair symbol of where the Corps served. Colonel Sandes gives us sufficient background to each campaign to place the engineer work in perspective. This is well done, with a nice balance between wood and trees, though the bulk of it will inevitably interest few outside the Corps. The two chapters on India should, however, be of deep concern to all who study mobilization and need to know how these vast formations of engineer troops were raised and trained in so short a time, how they were officered, and how many new duties were taken on not contemplated in peace. And withal how the standard of the old Sappers and Miners was kept up. It is a story of devotion, enthusiasm, and hard grind, never to be forgotten. The final chapter describes reduction and demobilization, and the sad splitting of the Corps and separation of comrades caused by the partition of the continent.

Many of us who served in India had dealings with the Sappers, of Madras, of Bengal, or of Bombay, and we developed a healthy respect not only for their professionalism but for their formidable participation in hockey, cross-country running, and khud-racing. Colonel Sandes has worthily recorded the war period which linked the old "S. & M." with the modern "I.E."

**Shoot to Kill.** By Richard Miers. (*Faber and Faber.*) 18s.

It is stated on the jacket that this is an 'un-put-down-able' book; an ambitious claim for an account of military operations. Yet the present reviewer must confess the claim justified, for it kept him indoors reading it for most of a glorious Sunday afternoon while all sorts of interesting garden tasks were left undone for another week. Brigadier Miers has indeed written an enchanting and thrilling book. He has also added, incidentally, another fine chapter to the history of an already illustrious regiment.

The author commanded the 1st Battalion of the South Wales Borderers, and this is primarily an account of the Regiment's part in the campaign waged against the Communist terrorists of Malaya.

The book opens on a peaceful note in the Regiment's home town of Brecon ; but peace is shattered on the very first page by the lady who ' did ' for the author and his wife. From thenceforward, until the battalion's capture of its last and most prominent terrorist, the reader is carried from one peak of excitement to another. Indeed, the final hunt of Ming Lee and the unexpected and almost comic sequel provide a breath-taking finish which is rarely equalled in the thrillers of fiction.

Brigadier Miers has the gift not only of portraying the characters and reactions of his own officers and men but also of entering into the minds of his enemies and of showing ' what makes them tick.' He has a delicious sense of humour, and such incidents as Mrs. Boyes's assertion of the right of the Colonel's baby to cross the parade ground or of the unanimous election to the platform at a London Communist meeting of ' Evan,' the Special Branch officer charged with reporting their activities, will delight the reader. If one would venture a slight criticism it is that the title is not worthy of the book.

There is a foreword by General Sir Francis Festing, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

#### AIR

**The Impact of Air Power.** By Eugene M. Emme. (*Van Nostrand.*) 79s.

The title is misleading. This is not a thesis on air power but a carefully selected and annotated anthology of the best that has been written on the subject of air power from the exploits of the Wrights until the space projects of today. There are articles, excerpts from memoranda, White Papers, books, speeches, Parliamentary debates, and histories. Among the British writers heavily drawn upon are Churchill (including some of his air memoranda of 1914), Smuts, Spaight, Trenchard, Groves, Slessor, Portal, Saundby, and Tedder. Americans quoted include Mitchell, Spaatz, Arnold, Cooper, Eliot, Vandenburg, Garthoff, Seversky, Kissinger, and Le May. German, Russian, and French writers are well represented.

All this material would be of little value if it were badly arranged and inadequately indexed. But the layout is crystal clear and the index has not been found wanting. There are three main sections of the book, The Nature of Air Power, The Revolution in Warfare, and Air Policy in National Security and World Politics. Each of these sections is split into several chapters and each of these, in turn, contain a number of quoted articles or other material. A most useful feature is the introductory essay which precedes each chapter and the ample bibliography and list of articles which follows it. Most of the references are easily accessible.

The book is a large one, 900 pages, and the price puts it beyond most individuals. But the existence of such a book should be widely known and it should be within reach of all who write, speak, or argue on air power and modern war.

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
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
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